

NO 4

SUMMER 1951

---

# CURRENTS

*A New Quarterly Review  
to explore the implications  
of Christianity for our times*

TURNELL • CONGAR • MASCALL • MANNONI  

---

DE SOLAGES • BENDISCIOLI • BURGELIN

## CONTENTS

### SUMMER 1951

The Lament of the Negro	O. MANNONI	1
Poetry and Crisis	MARTIN TURNELL	12
Christianity and Evolution	BRUNO DE SOLAGES	26
The Doctrine of Analogy	E. L. MASCALL	38
Protestant Psychology and Catholic Psychology	PIERRE BURGELIN	58
Towards Religious Unity in Germany	MARIO BENDISCIOLI	70
Attitudes Towards Reform in the Church	YVES CONGAR	80
Notes on other Publications		103

### EDITORS

Joseph L. Caulfield	Alfred di Lascia	Léon King
Sally S. Cunneen	Erwin W. Geissman	John J. Kearney
Ernst F. Winter	Russell S. Young	

Managing Editor: Joseph E. Cunneen

Assistant Editors: William Fitzgerald — Marie-Christine Hellin

London Agent: John Figueroa, 44 Seaton Street, London S.W. 10

Cover Design: Marjorie di Lascia

---

CROSS CURRENTS is published quarterly by Cross Currents Corporation, a non-profit membership corporation, at \$1. per issue, \$3. per yearly subscription. Canada \$3.30, Foreign \$4. Subscription Department, Box 189, New York 27, N. Y. Editorial communications may be sent to Joseph E. Cunneen, 17 W. Lawnwood Avenue, Orangeburg, N. Y. Piermont 2-0937W. Copyright 1951 by Cross Currents Corporation. Printed in the U.S.A. by the Waldon Press, 203 Wooster Street, New York 12, N. Y.



# THE LAMENT OF THE NEGRO

O. MANNONI

OF ALL the laments of men, that of the Negro used to be recognizable by its style and its aesthetic characteristics. There were, for example, the songs of slavery and exile. Under a particular elegiac form however, these songs were expressing nothing but a global despair which awoke in every man a common misery. The Negro became an object of pity. Now the true Negro lament has changed its nature. The Negro has stopped lulling his unhappiness to sleep; he no longer sings of this unhappiness in order to rally all men to the sources of compassion. He has left this childhood. Today it is as a Negro that he makes his protest.

*O. Mannoni teaches in Madagascar and is the author of PSYCHOLOGIE DE LA COLONISATION. This essay appeared in Esprit, May 1951.*

Primarily, he is protesting against injustice, prejudice, pity itself, charity and humiliation. His ancestors knew displacement, slavery, and paternalism as particular aspects of a world where man exploits man. His protest is added to that enormous mass of grievances whose correction oppressed peoples constantly await, and which already weighs so heavily that one hopes they will all be removed. With good reason the Negro considers that every victory against oppression will also be his victory, and through the breach made in common, he will pass along with the others. In effect, his fate is strictly tied to that of all exploited peoples. Nevertheless, one cannot help but remark that in this global solidarity, he has a way of holding himself somewhat apart. He demands that we do not forget that the evils from which he suffers, although similar to other evils, have in addition a particular significance, and he fears that this significance risks being overlooked if his protest is lost in the mass of grievances. When he claims, along with others, certain advantages—greater respect, additional rights, more money—he feels profoundly, taught by his experience as a Negro, that this could not completely satisfy him. When he asks himself why, it seems to him that he is condemned, among men who claim a remedy for their wrongs, to raise a more comprehensive demand, to seek endlessly the very root of evil. He surmises, since he is always the last to receive his share, that as long as there is any imperfection in sharing, he will have received nothing. But the great demand that underlies his protest, has, as we shall see, a deeper significance.

It is hard to bear the burden of such a demand. It often happens that the Negro does not dare admit it to himself, and suffers injustice more patiently than another. By a sort of effect of compensation, nothing is worth the trouble any longer when one is obliged to demand everything. But even when he falls into this sort of resignation, which is particularly characteristic of him, the hope that he preserves as a dream is that of a total revolution of the relationships among men. He gives the impression of making some special demand as a Negro, and that it is for this reason that his cry is always a little apart. This is not true. He does not demand a special justice for the Negro—on the contrary! It is just that he does not know how to bring us to an understanding and admission of this

truth which is evident for him; we are not doing enough when we make him a *man like everyone else*. We propose to forget all silly racial ideas and prejudices. This is not sufficient: his black skin is not just a prejudice. Certainly it is first necessary that he be recognized as a man, but it is also necessary, almost with the same urgency, that he be recognized as a different man, as a Negro. This embarrasses us. We complain that now it is he who has prejudices; we accuse him of racism in reverse. Apart from inevitable exceptions, this is not true; we know well that there is something false in the accusation. When a white man calls him a "dirty nigger", everyone knows that the motivation of this cry is not justice, and that it is not a revolutionary cry. When a Negro is led to take position against whites in general—and how would he not often be brought to this?—he follows an altogether different path: in the situation in which we have placed him, this position is a part of his struggle against evil in the world, and it is not even necessary to suppose that he is clearly aware of it.

**I**N THOSE moments when the protest of the Negro is made against the whites in general, we attempt to divert it; we would like to recall to the Negroes that there are "good" and "bad" whites, that we are not all accomplices, and that many fight on their side. The Negro knows this better than we do, and he makes necessary distinctions better—but at the same time he discovers that there is something indefinably annoying about those distinctions. A kind of shame, the fear of being accused of ingratitude, prevents him from explaining it. Nevertheless, he cannot forget what he knows: a white man living as a Negro, sharing the same suffering, going to prison with him, encountering the scorn of the same white men, does not in addition suffer from being a true Negro. It is not an unhappy circumstance for him that he is a Negro in white skin. Whereas in what ought to be a similar situation, a Negro with "good" whites, feels obscurely checked by being a white man with black skin. In front of black justice, the white man has at the very outset the right of being white. Before white justice, the Negro experiences something that escapes us. Having received the right of being a man, he discovers that he still, unfortunately, has to fight for the right to be a Negro, and he cannot forget this demand. Something is lacking in our justice. . .

The "good" white does not succeed in understanding that it is unjust to treat a Negro like a white man, or to proclaim that the color of his skin does not count, that it has become almost invisible, that he will be judged by his moral qualities which do not admit of racial differences. In speaking like this, the white man, without suspecting it, reminds us of those colonial photographers who used to give their naive clients just the negatives, in order to make them happy. This pleasure was particularly humiliating when the scornful intention was understood—although it is an intention which exists, even when hidden, in every project of commercial exploitation. But a Negro cannot be exploited exactly as we are: our cautions, our flatteries, and silence are wounds for him. If a man is accepted for implied or hidden qualities, while he is reproached for his visible "defect", he has not received his whole share.

It might be said that the whites, in their "good will", do not know how to begin. At first they are astonished that the Negro is "so amazingly sensitive", and considered superficially, this is a sort of character trait. But it would be closer to

the truth to understand his actions otherwise. The Negro has become demanding in his relations with us because he rejects those very appearances with which we are content. Confronting him compels us to be authentic.

Obviously it should not be imagined that the Negro is more authentic than the white. It is the situation in which the white man and the Negro meet each other, with all the weight of what has been the past history of this relationship, with the unspoken demand that the Negro bears, the protest he brings by his very presence and which is never forgotten despite his pride, it is the situation which is revealing in itself, if one dares to face it. We get the impression that the Negro is condemned to make masks fall by the very fact that he shows his skin.

THAT is why a profoundly human understanding is more easily reached in every situation which in itself requires authenticity, in situations in which it is difficult to lie: true love, participation in real dangers, in battles where we risk death for the same cause. Any human truth—provided it be true—instantly erases racist lies, and when they have this experience, both Negro and white make it with exaltation. The experience is possible, even in everyday life, where we distinguish less well, but nevertheless are able to separate the false from the true. But this experience is often badly interpreted by the white man. (By the Negro too, moreover, in certain cases.) If it fails, the Negroes are “strange people who can’t be understood”. If it succeeds, the white man, having felt himself to be more true, more human, more genuine, imagines that the Negro possesses a special *nature*, a better preserved biological force which brings to our tired world the vigor of a virgin forest. We can never repeat often enough how false these interpretations are. It is true enough that the Negro, because of his experiences and his suspicion, has explosive reactions of liberation which are contagious for the white man. He is incapable, for instance, of “amusing himself sadly”. But what he is bringing us is especially such a refined experience of absurd injustice that the least appearance of injustice in our relations with him, the least trace of falseness in ourselves, is immediately brought to the surface. This is so true that satisfactory relations between whites and Negroes are not only a victory against racial prejudices: they end by appearing as the very model of all human relations among men.

We would be wrong then in believing that the protest of the Negro summons us to bring to an end merely those abuses which we ourselves recognize and condemn along with the Negroes. The Negroes demand this first of all, but they are asking for more than that. Each one of us feels guilty that there are white colonialists, and every Negro who has gained respect from whites feels himself humiliated in those Negroes who are humiliated. But the protest of the Negro goes still further, and just as the liberation of the slave is of value to the free man in helping him discover his own hidden slavery, and the tragedy of the exile reminds us in what sense every man lives in exile, in the same way the interior battle the Negro is endlessly condemned to lead against his own misfortune, his successes and failures, ought also to make clear to whites the universal existence of this evil, and the means of defeating it. The Negro does not know what must be done better than we do, but seeks with us, even when he is seeking it against us. The essence of his protest still remains *without conclusions*. We can easily imagine



some whites of "good will" exclaiming: "But finally these Negroes bother us. If you treat them like Negroes, they protest, they want to be like us. If we treat them like us, they protest because they are Negroes. What do they want?" An attitude like this is not quite honest. Yes, this is one of the significances of the Negro's complaint: the manner in which whites treat each other among themselves is not good enough for Negroes, for when someone has been made sensitive to what is most absurd in inter-human relations, he sees how bad it is. We might say that the Negro brings to a head something that was troubling the white world but had been held in suspension, and he is thus in a position to teach us what is not right in that world, which is necessarily his as well. Whether his lament is joined to the Internationale or to spirituals, it cannot remain a claim simply in the interests of Negroes; it must take on a revolutionary resonance valid for everyone: we might say that beyond the justice we have proclaimed, a pure form of justice must be found. Thus we feel that racists are not merely enemies of Negroes. We do not need to reflect on this to know that against them we are defending not the Negroes alone, but also a secret and obscure hope towards this new justice, and that it is already an affair among men, without regard to race.

The whites, however, have a tendency to be satisfied with naive explanations. They easily believe in atavism. They gladly imagine that the community life of the tribes of long ago has remained as a nostalgia in the Negro soul, that the Negro has difficulty in adapting himself, and this is how they explain the particular accent of his lament. These explanations are without any value, at least for Negroes who have not been formed in tribal life. This nostalgia for a communitarian existence is the same for all men, the regret for the *Urwir* from which the ego is exiled. If the memory of a happy life persists under the form of a hope, it cannot be merely the mirage of a lost paradise. Thus nothing is more naive than asking ethnologists in order to understand the actual feelings of Negroes who live among us.<sup>1</sup> The protest of the Negro has no longer anything African in it; if we sometimes find a trace of the exotic, this is at most a means of expression, valuable for every poet, white or black, or even a means of seducing the white reader, almost of mystifying him.

The slaves of American colonists, when they were too miserable, used to give a sense of nostalgia to their unhappiness, and killed themselves in order "to return to Guinea". In America today, however, they wish to gain those rights which are related to their being men and being Negroes; they no longer feel exiled, except metaphorically, like the exile Baudelaire, who believed in a previous life. When they flee *their* country it is not to return to their own people, but to go among other whites, in order to try to lead there a life which would be valid both for Negroes and whites. In this battle they need the white man, for they can find a solution only in that place where the evil has been revealed to them. Whites need them for another reason. We need to hear their protest, we need to understand this accusation whose significance is still partly obscure, for it must be entangled little by little, as in a story which must be lived and which gradually takes on its meaning. That men are born with black skin or with white is an absurdity, that is to say, a pure fact. A fact which no one needs, and cannot be removed. But it is quite a different matter that the fact has led to a situation of protest and accusation. When all is said, this protest and this accusation are the most important of the contributions the Negro can make to universal civilization.

Doubtless he has made many contributions, among others in his music and

in his sculpture. But they do not have the same importance, for there is also, for example, a pre-Columbian art to which we are attached; nevertheless for this we have no need of pre-Columbians themselves. Apart from having a pathological need for coherence, one might be a complete advocate of slavery and still have a connoisseur's appreciation of Negro music. . . The Church does not need Jews themselves in order to adopt their Scriptures, but they preserve them nevertheless as witnesses of its truth. We need Negroes as witnesses to our lie. Not a lie we can readily denounce ourselves, but one we would hardly be able to perceive without them. They are there in order to find a drop of injustice even in our justice, even when they cannot explain how, even if they do not see more clearly than we do what must be done.<sup>2</sup> Perhaps it is not their strong point to create a new justice; but to suffer from its delay in arriving, in order to know what the old injustices are, to unmask them where they are hidden—this the Negro knows better than anyone.

CERTAINLY he is not the only one to know injustice and exploitation. There are surely other victims of every race. But it is he who is most purely exploited and badly treated simply because of the color of his skin, and the whole absurdity of the system is nakedly displayed and unveiled in this particularly shocking absurdity better than anywhere else. How can this pure fact, which by itself has no meaning, the fact that the Negro finds that he has black skin, how can this not be for him the source of the most complete injustice, since it is the most absurd? We cannot stop in a Voltairian attitude, and believe that it is enough to denounce the nonsense of it. Irony is useless: "My friend, it is just and conforms to reason that I should rest and that you should work since your skin is black." The absurd ought to be surmounted, that is what it is for.

Although the difference between the colors white and black is the model of complete antithesis, the difference of color which actually distinguishes the white man from the Negro often finds itself reduced to a very small matter. This Negro is a mulatto or a quadroon, this white man is a heavily tanned southerner, and if the problem is restricted to degrees of whiteness, there would be no exact limit. Nevertheless the ideal line which separates the Negro from the white is traced with the greatest vigor. Amateur specialists are not lacking to maintain it. Everywhere that the question of color is raised concretely, these specialists appear, proud of their competence. There are signs, (the palms of hands), which the non-initiated find difficult to perceive, and in which the initiated claim never to be deceived. In the same way the anti-Semite flatters himself with his infallible analysis. Thus a sort of science of morphology has been created and applied, a fact which suggests a few comments.

First of all, if it is true, as the racist says, that the Negro has faults which we could not tolerate, why would one not rather recognize him by those same faults? What are the reasons for imitating Lombroso? At least in his illusions Lombroso pursued an intelligent task; since the criminal remained hidden, or only declared himself unexpectedly, it was necessary to discover him by constant and visible signs. Of what concealed fault are the Negroes to be accused? Next, why are we never concerned about signs by which one might recognize a white man? Obviously these signs would again be met with among mulattoes, and it is a matter of diagnosing the least trace of Negro blood—as a *blemish*. Finally, what

is most important to consider is that to decide on the quality of being a Negro, an appraisal is necessary. This evaluation may be easy and require only a glance; it may be delicate and require a meticulous examination. But it is always made from the outside. In time, he can accept the role assigned him, but first he *learns* that he is a Negro, in the same way that you learn that you are tubercular, by having an X-ray examination, or that you were born in Paris, by consulting the public records. These are not things of which one is conscious, as one is conscious of being in love, or tired. Nothing interior reveals to the Negro that he is a Negro. He must inform himself or be informed. Besides, he may lose the remembrance of this revelation, because of the age at which it is made.

A Negro walks in his room, while thinking that he is a Negro. He has his hands in his pockets, in imagination he sees them with their color, dark on the back, clearer at the palm. According to his humor, they please him or disgust him. He remembers, from photographs of Africa, that Negroes often have badly formed navels. He thinks of his own, gets the image of it clearly in his mind, and, as an expert, seeks to decide if it is a "Negro navel". He sees his own face in an imaginary mirror and tries to know what effect it might have on another. Is it ugly? Frightening? Handsome? Congenial? He cannot know, it is his face. It is impossible to ask someone else. In this self-examination, in what does this Negro differ, even in the slightest degree, from the young woman who asks herself if she could be a movie star? The latter studies her legs, her carriage, the effect of her smile. Both one and the other are looking at themselves with the attitude of a horse-dealer, a slave-merchant, or an impresario. They seek, from the outside, for signs of what they are. . . . Of what they are? Not even that, for these signs are signs of nothing. My trembling is a sign of my fear, my blush of my shame. But if blackness of skin is the sign that one is a Negro, this is pure tautology. At least this ought to be pure tautology. But the world in which the Negro lives is organized in such a way that it is immediately the sign of a fate. Richard Wright has written: "The word *black* in America has a sense which is neither racial nor biological, but purely social, a meaning fabricated here in the United States." But never and nowhere has this word any but a fabricated meaning. Its definition is simply more detailed, so to speak, in the United States, because it refers to official measures of discrimination, because the Negro is considered more abstractly. There, one is a Negro by decree, by an operation of nomenclature, and cruel consequences flow logically from it, by virtue of that logic proper to juridical inferences. Major: The Negroes in general are . . . this or that. Minor: Such a man is a Negro. Conclusion, etc. . . . This is the same way that we define the communist, the aggressor, the enemy, the backward country, peace, war, etc. . . . But, in every "civilized" country, the same thing happens in varying degrees; the word *black* cannot have another meaning, the Negro finds himself taken in hand by the logic and syllogism of the country in which he lives, and his fate thus becomes the supreme example of the alienated man in that country. . . . "You have gathered flowers in a field which is not yours. But this is in conformity with the definition of theft. Therefore . . . etc." Presented with such reasoning, I do not recognize myself as a thief, I am not led to become conscious that I am a thief. They teach me this by accusing me. Yet I have less to complain of than the Negro, because I do not have the word *thief* tattooed on my skin. Otherwise, they would not have needed to accuse me of having stolen the flowers. The Negro truly has the word Negro written on his face, but this is not a word which is legible from within.



**T**HAT is essentially what it is to have black skin and to be a Negro. It is not necessary to have the real experience of it in order to know this; the real experience doubtless brings other learning, but that does not make it any clearer in the essentials. It is necessary to believe that all men have a community of experience, that they have similar experiences without ever understanding, and even that each man's experience enlightens him on what he imagines of another's experience. Nevertheless, we can guess how often the protest of the Negro can be ambiguous. First, under its naive and childish form, it announces itself: "Why has this catastrophe happened to me? Why do they say that I am a Negro? I do not *feel* like a Negro. They say that Negroes are bad—well then I don't like them for I am good." Then it becomes precise: "Why don't the whites try to understand the Negroes like the Negroes understand themselves? Why do they judge them from the outside? Why are they so wicked when we have done nothing to them?" Finally it ends by taking its valid form: "Why do men judge each other without knowing each other? Why do they seek to dominate, one over the other, on every occasion? No one is in a better position than I to understand this madness; my black skin can become a rallying-point, my sufferings will have been able to be of some use. Perhaps I have been born black not just for my unhappiness, but in order better to unmask a misery in which all men are concerned."

Richard Wright, in a conference on American Negro literature,<sup>3</sup> explains that in the age of slavery the Negro was superior in a certain manner to what he has become since the Emancipation. The American civilization hardened in developing, and while believing himself emancipated, the Negro became more and more oppressed. Finding a way of having a good conscience when you are a slave-owner is easier than trying to be just with "free" Negroes. The effort that the white American has had to make in order to give himself a good conscience, at the same time that he kept the Negroes "in their place", is certainly responsible for a part, perhaps a large part, of the present degradation of the white conscience in America. If "good reasons" have allowed the white American to let his moral and political life become infested with falsity, it is because he has not known how to be honest with the Negroes. In spite of the degrading circumstances that have been given them, the same casualty has not occurred to the Negro; on the contrary, the Negroes have become the true conscience of America. They know it. "Is it not clear in your eyes", Richard Wright says, "that black Americans are the only group in our country to formulate proudly and passionately the problem of liberty? It is a service rendered to America and to the world." If that is possible, if the Negro has become the archetype of the oppressed man, it is also necessary to understand that this is related to the fact that the white American has ceased to be the model of a naive supporter of slavery. On the contrary, he pleads his own cause with the greatest facility. He tends to become the model of a new kind of racist, far more disguised and more dangerous today. It is becoming a tactical error to pretend that, in order to liberate the Negroes, it is especially necessary to combat the old-style defenders of slavery. This puts the others at their ease, and the furors of enraged southerners serve as an alibi for "good" whites who have invented this way of being "charitably" racist. By themselves, the Negroes are not a sufficient force to brake this inhuman development. But they are a kind of land-mark, to indicate the absurdity of it. It is from this viewpoint that it is necessary to understand the Negro as he takes stock

of the situation. He does not take note of the fact that he is a Negro. That is something he is taught, and at the moment he learns it, it is an absurd fact, a *fatum* which has no significance and which crushes him. As this enters his consciousness more deeply, there is the discovery, little by little, that it is possible to give this absurdity a meaning, and if this takes on meaning there are other "truths," much too prevalent up till now, which become absurd in their turn. That is what he wants to say when he advances to the white man, crying out to him in a brotherly attitude which is also a challenge: "I am a Negro."

Becoming conscious in this way is only possible in the midst of whites, under the blows of white oppression;<sup>4</sup> it is difficult and sometimes fails. For example, the Negro may remain fixed in a moment of self-pity, or even revert—not without grandeur—to the all-powerful magic of childhood, and wall himself up in a sterile pride. After having been his own chief mourner, he becomes in some sense his own ancestor, sheltered from good and evil. These defeats also occur to whites, but in a more accidental way, since theirs is a less demanding fate. Or, as with some European children, the Negro may ironically adopt the judgment of his oppressors and in front of the white man play the role of the Negro, as one might play the clown. I seem to note that these accidents are rarer than they used to be. Because some Negroes have taken stock of the true situation, others have been collectively helped, and the fact of being a Negro, while continuing to be one of suffering, ceases to be completely sterile. When we know how to give meaning to a sadness—even if this meaning, as I believe, has not been completely revealed—it is not the same sadness as before.

We can nevertheless understand this sadness in its absurd phase, before a significance has been found for it, and I think it is important to try, because the Negro must almost inevitably meet it once in his life, stumbling along and without help. We understand that it is not a matter of hunger, or destitution, or bad treatment, for neither whites nor blacks had to wait until they met each other in order to undergo these experiences. This absurd grief, especially cruel because of its absurdity, is the discovery, on the contrary, of the rending of the human community—not by becoming aware of it, but because of the unconscious cruelty of another. But this cruelty places the point of departure, of what will be a long process of becoming fully conscious, on the level of the absurd, and it is the victim who is going to become, little by little, the conscience of his blinded tormentor.

**A**MONG an infinity of possible examples, I will borrow one from American scientific studies. For a certain form of scientific objectivity must also be put on trial. Being objective is not sufficient to make all prejudices evaporate, and human difficulties are never problems whose solutions are contained in the terms in which they are given. A science of man cannot be elaborated without first tacitly taking certain positions, and those implicit assumptions constitute the man who is the object of study. Without them, there would be no object. There is no place here to develop these considerations, but the reader will understand what their direction might be after the discussion of the following example.

It concerns an inquiry among Negro children from three to seven years old,<sup>5</sup> taken in schools in both the South and North of the United States. In the North,

the schools were mixed, in the South they were segregated. The method consisted in showing each child white and black dolls, and asking him the following questions:

1. Show me the doll with which you would like to play.
2. Show me the nice doll.
3. The one that is bad.
4. The one which has a pretty color.
5. The one which looks like a white child.
6. The one which looks like a colored child.
7. The one which looks like a Negro child.
8. The one which looks like you.

The answers to the first four questions show that Negro children prefer white dolls. There is, nevertheless, an interesting evolution: 72% of the four-year-olds find the white color prettier; only 50% of the seven-year-olds agree. If the pupils from the North are compared to those of the South, it is seen that those of the North (who go to school with whites) are more severe with the black dolls: 71% find that it has a bad look. In the South there was only 49% for that answer, in addition to 35% who did not dare give their opinion.

The answers to the last four questions show the following variations: at seven there were 100% correct answers to questions five and six. When the word Negro was pronounced (question 7), there were 15% errors or refusals to answer. In question eight 52% of the four-year-olds identified themselves with the white dolls; at seven, only 13% made that "error".

There are the facts. It is always good to have facts and percentages. But it would also be nice to know what they mean. This inquiry—so clumsy that it is enough to read the list of questions as a surrealist poem to betray its bad disposition—is conducted in an objective manner, with a statistician's coldness. But objectivity itself would require the noting of "qualitative information". For example, some of the children who were at their ease and relaxed at the beginning of the experience, burst into tears or refused to answer the last questions. Two children ran out of the classroom, "unconsolable, convulsed in tears". The children of the North were more disturbed than those of the South, who went through the experience with more "humor".

This "qualitative data" has at least as much importance as the statistics given, since the essential thing is to try to understand what this experience means. In the time of Herodotus, one would not have failed to conclude that white is the "natural" color of man. Today's racist would want to draw from this that whites are more congenial than blacks, and this quite objectively, since even Negro children spontaneously recognize it. The authors of the inquiry have adopted a more "scientific" point of view: racial differences exist objectively—"There are specific groups differentiated by evident physical characteristics that are commonly considered as radical differences" (the reservation "that are commonly considered" is also scientific; in fact, the notion of race is not "scientifically" established). Given this state of facts, they propose to themselves to examine in what manner Negro children "have an awareness" of these racial differences.

But is this not already strange, that only Negro children are chosen for this? If it was simply a question of knowing, scientifically, how children become aware of racial differences, all the children of a mixed school would



have been taken, if only to see how whites and blacks differed in the process of becoming aware. This is not necessary: rightly or wrongly, we do not wait to see if white children, even at four, might take themselves for Negroes. Why not wait for that? On this interesting question, the investigators say nothing. Nevertheless, for the sake of scientific objectivity itself, when we propose to make an inquiry, we ought to know what brings us to make it in one way rather than another. When an analogous inquiry is made among whites, no dolls are needed. They are simply asked their opinions about Negroes. And they are not embarrassed about giving it, whatever it is. Whereas if you proceeded in the same way with Negro children, they would say nothing or lie. The trick of the dolls was necessary, and even so, understanding too quickly where they are being led, they are no longer as free and relaxed at the end as at the beginning.

"Scientific objectivity" cannot hide the dramatic character of this experience. This is also what gives it its psychological value, if the word drama is taken in the sense that Politzer gave it. This world of white and black dolls is a world of obscure feelings, unhappy conflicts and torturing choices. What makes the account of it painful for us to read is that we see how simple children try by every means to flee a conflict which is too cruel, and with what mercilessness the experience nevertheless obliges them to confront it. This experience is a moment in the life of these children, it is passed in *a society which places them apart and contradicts the sense of importance which each of these children naively experiences in himself*. It does not take place in a natural, objective, scientific world, where "it is a fact" that there are whites and blacks (and the sooner one recognizes facts of this kind—at three years old, for example—the better). No, the rending of the human environment is not a purely objective fact. Or, if there is a *law*, (but science does not speak of it) it should explain why such a split does not tend to constitute a frontier midway between two groups, why it is necessary that it be placed in charge of one of the races. It is transformed into an *exclusion*, and it is the excluded race which has the privilege of living this split, while the other race is condemned not to understand it, or to see in it only a caprice of nature. When Negro children "choose" to be white, when they prefer white dolls, this simply shows that they refuse to be excluded, this reveals their need of participating in a community whose cleavage they do not seek to ignore, but to deny! In their naiveté they are ready to take the black doll as a sort of scapegoat in order to divert to it the evil with which they feel threatened.

Frankly, if this inquiry teaches us anything about racial questions, it is not what its authors imagine. It reveals to us that Negro children are in the position of those accused. I would wager, without any need of "scientifically" verifying it, that the same results could be obtained in a similar inquiry concerning a group of enuretic children, with dry dolls and wet dolls. This is so because the children would see in it, in a similar manner, a situation where they are being accused.

What is revealing is that the more the accuser accuses, the more he ceases to understand, whereas the more the accused is accused, the more the problem deepens for him: he is forced to live by it and sees the truth of it. In the end, it is he who establishes himself as the conscience of the accuser, and if, as Richard Wright suggests, the Negroes are in the process of becoming the

American conscience, we see already how this conscience comes to be born in a child in tears in the face of black dolls, and an "objective" but unconscious experimentalist!

**T**HE condition of the Negro, once scientific and literary myths are dissolved, appears as the revelation of one of the inhuman aspects of the condition of mankind. The protest of the Negro is full of significance for everyone, it is the complaint of one who is obliged to assume by himself the blackness of all men, but who begins to teach others and himself to see clearly in the night.

Translated by JOSEPH E. CUNNEEN

<sup>1</sup> Obviously, the only one with whom we are here concerned. He who, in some manner, is or feels himself attached to African social structures is in a different social situation.

<sup>2</sup> Speaking of the *new justice*, Nietzsche said that the exceptional man has the right to his ray of sun, that the earth was both morally and physically round, and that "in the moral world, the antipodes also have the right to exist." But this is not enough, this justice would not be new enough! Western philosophy, in effect, dares to advance even to the point of saying that "The wicked man is innocent", without understanding that "the wicked man", in front of this attitude, refuses innocence, and vindicates himself by his wickedness! He can only attack this pharasaical justice which glorifies itself in a pardon which is a sort of gratuitous excess from the overflow of its good conscience. . . . In the strongest sense, as long as there will be the smallest possibility that the Negro can feel that he is being pardoned for being black, that his blackness is being *forgotten*, he will feel himself obliged to vindicate it, and he will stand erect with pride and anger. It is easy for us to feel that he is right, and even that his manner of being right is of value for anyone who questions himself on the essence of justice.

<sup>3</sup> *Les Temps Modernes*, August, 1948.

<sup>4</sup> When the Negro is still kept in his original social structures, even when he understands quite well that he is oppressed by white colonization, things are quite different. He does not immediately have an awareness of his solidarity with other oppressed peoples, by itself the notion of *black* scarcely exists for him. For example, natives of Madagascar still consider black West Indians who come to Madagascar as white; they claim they see no difference, that the color of skin has no importance. *From their point of view* the remark is apt. Certainly the native of Madagascar is not "scientifically speaking" a Negro—but the scientific point of view has nothing to do with what happens in fact. A West Indian is not "scientifically" a Negro either . . .

It is the action of the white man, *whatever it is* (education or exploitation, evangelization or civilization, assimilation or discrimination), which ends by creating this Negro reduced, so to speak, merely to the color of his skin, and which obliges him to become aware of the situation which makes his society one which no longer has anything in common with its original environment, nor even with the typically *colonial* environment.

Some of the criticisms that have been made of my book on the psychology of colonization are to be explained by the fact that not enough attention has been given to the difference between situations.

<sup>5</sup> "Racial Identification and Preference in Negro Children", by Kenneth B. Clark and Mamie P. Clark, in *Readings in Social Psychology*, New York, 1947. I do not know if the authors of this inquiry are whites or Negroes, but this is not important for my discussion. If, as is likely, they are Negroes, it is certain that remarks similar to mine, which their work suggested, could not have escaped them; only they did not take them into account, *in order not to depart from their attitude of scientific objectivity*.

<sup>6</sup> This conflict and these efforts to deny it have a great psychological importance, and determine in part the future reactions of the adult. In psychiatry, it has been possible to isolate, in certain Negroes who have been analysed, a delirium in regard to the denial of color. Doubtless this is a regression to an infantile state, in the same way that among whites who were analysed, a delirium might grow up concerning childish ideas of unlimited power.

# POETRY AND CRISIS

MARTIN TURNELL

## The Marxist Critic

*"To tell the truth, literature is never happy for long without a master; it needs a settled background. Even now it is trying to decide which master to serve—the revolutionary mass-movement or the liberalism of Freud." (C. Day Lewis.)*

AMONG the welter of conflicting 'philosophies' which divide the contemporary world, Marxism stands out as a conscientious attempt to provide a system that will take the whole of life into account. Marxists themselves attach so much importance to the arts and have given them such prominence in their scheme of social reconstruction, that no discussion of the place of poetry in life would be complete which did not say something of their work. The Marxist theory of art has, indeed, a peculiar relevance to the present discussion. It is a reaction against the tendency to turn poetry into a substitute for religion; but in their anxiety to restore art to its proper place in the life of the community, Marxists have made it the slave of a narrow ideology and deprived it of that freedom without which there can be no art.

It is not surprising that Marxism should have appealed so strongly to many of our younger writers. It is clear from literary history that it is easier to write well in an age dominated by a common outlook than in an age in which there is none. Writers turn to Marxism in the hope that an initial act of faith in its tenets will provide a solution to their aesthetic problems and a framework in which they can express their personal vision instead of being compelled to waste their talents in working out a fresh philosophy. Although one may find the Marxist position unsatisfactory, it would be unfair to pretend that Marxists have made no contribution to the problems of art. Marxist critics have undoubtedly drawn attention to points which have been overlooked by other critics and in this way have succeeded in clarifying many of the issues involved.

What is most valuable in the Marxist approach is its insistence on the social factor in art, on the fact that literature can only be truly healthy when it is the expression of the life of the community as an undivided whole. Now the literature of the past 200 years reflects for the most part the disintegration of the social unit. The work of Fielding, for example, though in no sense the product of a 'classless society', was based on an outlook which was common to all classes and which indeed transcended class distinctions; and that gives his work, in spite of certain obvious limitations, a strength of its own, a strength which the modern novel has lost. Fielding's outlook was neither as profound nor as comprehensive as Chaucer's, but it was undoubtedly based on that 'blood connection' which, as D. H. Lawrence acutely pointed out, had disappeared by

*Martin Turnell is a well-known English literary critic. In this country New Directions has brought out THE CLASSICAL MOMENT and, more recently, THE NOVEL IN FRANCE. The present article represents the last two chapters of a small volume (POETRY AND CRISIS, Sands) published in 1938, of which most copies were destroyed in the blitz.*



the time we reach Jane Austen. When the artist lost contact with the people, something vital went out of his art. It is not merely that modern literature is individualist, an art for the élite: it is rather that excessive analysis is gradually destroying its object. Human nature is defaced, and the quality of the art suffers in consequence. The sort of change that is taking place can be appreciated by comparing the *Wife of Bath's* Prologue with Mrs. Bloom's monologue at the close of Joyce's *Ulysses*, *Tom Jones* with parts of *The Rainbow*. The work of both Joyce and Lawrence is notable for its attempt to restore natural human nature to its proper position, to restore to art something that has been lost by excessive cerebration. Compared with Chaucer and Fielding human nature in Joyce and Lawrence is warped and stunted. The solidarity behind Chaucer and Fielding was conserved by the whole structure of the social organism and once it was lost it could not be recovered by the methods they employed.

At the present time, therefore, as Marxists point out, the World is divided between two main groups: 'the bourgeois' and 'the proletariat'. Art and culture are practically the monopoly of the bourgeois and, as we all admit, the art which most clearly reflects the crisis through which we are passing has been produced by this class—while the proletariat has ceased to produce anything at all. We must also admit that for all its refinement, this art has become exceedingly precarious, an art of disillusion and despair. It is clear that this state cannot continue indefinitely. The middle classes have been living off their intellectual capital for some time and there are unmistakable signs that it is nearing exhaustion. The problem which faces not only Marxists, but also all who are concerned for the future of civilization is the blending of those two opposites. Marxists believe that it can only be accomplished through social revolution and the creation of the classless society, and that all writers who are worthy of the name ought to devote their energies to this work. It is certainly evident from the experiments of Joyce and Lawrence that this can only be brought about by a complete transformation of existing society, by a veritable change in human nature.

"A writer who wishes to produce the best work that he is capable of producing", affirms one critic categorically,<sup>1</sup> "must first of all become a socialist in his practical life, must go over to the progressive side of the class-conflict."

"The social organism to which literature has to be related", asserts another critic,<sup>2</sup> "is humanity in its advance to socialism. The function of criticism is to judge literature, both content and form, as part of this movement. It can only fulfil this function if it takes part in the movement on the side of the workers of the world."

**W**E NOTICE that in both passages the emphasis falls on the class-conflict and this provides a key to the whole Marxist ethos. For Marxists art is only important in so far as it helps or hinders the 'Struggle'. Whatever glorifies the 'Struggle' is 'good' and is encouraged, while whatever hinders it is 'bad' and is mercilessly suppressed. The 'Struggle' has been the most fruitful source of inspiration in Marxist art. The authentic poetry of the Russian Revolution is to be found not in Russian literature, but in Russian films. The work of Eisenstein and Pudovkin is important because it expresses a vital issue, because

it shows *the people as a whole* united in a single movement. The great value of Eisenstein's work comes from the artist's concern for *life*, from the way in which he has caught the vitality and energy that were released by the Revolution. From an artistic point of view it is the weakness of his films that the vitality remains somehow unattached, unrelated to any significant scheme of life.

Unfortunately, however, the new order has been somewhat slow in emerging and the sudden flagging of inspiration in the later Russian films shows that the source of inspiration was capricious. A revolution is of its nature sudden and short-lived. It may produce a series of masterpieces over a comparatively short period, but it must be followed either by a new order or a fresh revolution. Art cannot thrive by presenting a permanent state of revolution. The decline of Marxist art in Russia has been accompanied significantly by an attempt to formulate a hard-and-fast theory of art and to impose it on all artists. Now the existence of literature depends upon the absolute freedom of the artist to express himself *through* existing society. The attempt to impose a rigid 'general line' of thought on the artist is nothing more or less than an attempt to force the note, to make him portray a society which the 'Struggle' has failed notoriously to bring into existence.

The Marxist's desire to bridge the divisions between the different sections of the community described above has led to the formation of two distinct and mutually hostile movements, each of which claims to be Marxist-Socialist: Realism and Surrealism. Although Socialist Realism has been adopted by the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute as the official Marxist theory of art and Surrealism anathematised as a Marxist heresy, both contain elements which are worth attention while remaining essentially one-sided and incomplete. They are both attempts to find a common basis for art, but they approach the problem from opposite angles. Socialist Realism is based on a materialist philosophy and Surrealism (in spite of an uncomfortable alliance with dialectical materialism) on an idealist philosophy. One seeks its common basis in the reality of the external world—in the thing perceived: the other in the unconscious life of the individual—in the perceiving subject. To the socialist realist individualism and introspection are anathema: the surrealist hopes by penetrating into the unconscious to reach a level which is beyond class distinctions.

Its insistence on the reality of the external world—the one fragment of truth salvaged from the wreckage of traditional philosophy—is probably the most important aspect of Socialist Realism and a corrective to the excessive subjectivism of some of the most distinguished of contemporary writers. It is also its most serious danger. For though Marxists deny any connection between Socialist Realism and Naturalism, it is clear that the conflict between Socialist Realism and Surrealism is the last phase of the struggle between Naturalism and Romanticism. Socialist Realism is nothing but Naturalism with the addition of a revolutionary ferment.

The danger of Socialist Realism as of Naturalism is the assumption that there is no other reality except the material reality of the world in which we move. The dogmatic application of this principle must lead, as it has led in Russia, to a complete impoverishment of art. Anything that does not fit in with the official view of life is brutally suppressed. This means that the whole development of modern literature is treated not merely as one-sided and incomplete, but

as mistaken, and its undoubted discoveries ruthlessly discarded. This poverty of outlook suggests that there must be something badly wrong with the programme of reconstruction in the name of which it has been elaborated. And in fact an incomplete conception of the meaning of terms such as 'class' and 'social consciousness', a failure to see that social and economic changes are themselves conditioned by something outside them, leads in practice to the assumption that our problems can all be solved by a simple economic and social reshuffle.

It is on these points that Surrealism, at any rate from a theoretical point of view, constitutes an important challenge to the assumptions underlying orthodox Marxism. For the surrealist does appreciate that material reality is only one aspect of the real and his experiments justify the assertion that there are other aspects which, whatever one's inclination, cannot be disregarded or suppressed. Carried to its logical conclusion, Socialist Realism means a return to a more primitive mentality instead of a further development which would enable the discoveries of modern writers to be incorporated into a proper scheme and seen in their true perspective. Here again the surrealist has a contribution to make. For he sees that the 'new order' must be metaphysical and not merely economic, that it must begin instead of ending with a change in man himself. For what we need is first and foremost a spiritual revolution which will produce the social revolution. Although the surrealist is no more able to accomplish this than the orthodox Marxist, he is not prevented from demonstrating in a very forcible way its necessity.<sup>3</sup>

## II.

IT IS time to turn from general considerations to the Marxist poetry produced in this country. The more sensitive English Marxists have perceived the folly of attempting to impose a rigid theory on the artist and the attempt has been vigorously opposed by a writer like Mr. Stephen Spender in his book of criticism, *The Destructive Element*. It is evident from Mr. Spender's own verse, however, that there are other ways in which a particular philosophy may change poetry. In one of his poems he writes:

Leave your gardens, your singing feasts,  
Your dreams of suns circling before our sun,  
Of heaven after our world.  
Instead, watch images of flashing brass  
That strike the outward sense, the polished will,  
Flag of our purpose which the wind engraves.  
No spirit seek here rest. But this: No man  
Shall hunger: Man shall spend equally.  
Our goal which we compel: Man shall be man.

In Russia art inspired by the 'Struggle' was sometimes a success, because the issue was a living one as it has never been in England—as we can see from these lines. There is clearly an attempt to work up some sort of revolutionary fervour. The 'singing feasts' and the 'dreams of suns circling before our sun' are relics of romanticism and an appeal to a shallow unbelief. The 'flashing brass', the 'polished will, Flag of our purpose' are part of a sentimental attempt



to evoke the Marxist panacea. The high-sounding words with their suggestions of hardness and determination are, indeed, used to hide the obvious immaturity which is so apparent in Marxist poetry; but they fail to cover the falsity of the emotion or to enable the writer to carry off the bathos of:

Man shall spend equally.

Our goal which we compel: Man shall be man.

Mr. Auden, on the other hand, provides a marked contrast to Mr. Spender, with whom he is usually bracketed. Auden has lately been described by an orthodox Marxist as 'a bourgeois artist' who has entered into an 'anarchist alliance with Marxism'. To the non-Marxist such criticism must appear as a tribute to Mr. Auden's honesty and integrity. His finest work is distinguished by a refusal to accept the Marxist simplification. Its dramatic power springs from an intense desire for social health combined with a recognition of a state of necessary sickness. It is too readily assumed that his poetry represents a healthier attitude than Mr. Eliot's, is in some way a 'fresh start' in English poetry. It is his resemblances to Mr. Eliot and not the differences between them that are remarkable. The individualism and subjectivism which are anathema to Marxists are not less, but more pronounced in his work, as we can see from his fondness for clinical associations and terms drawn from Freudian psychology:

Send us power and light, a sovereign touch  
Curing the intolerable neural itch,  
The exhaustion of weaning, the liar's quinsy,  
And the distortions of ingrown virginity.

The 'Struggle' dominates Auden's work as it dominates that of his Marxist contemporaries, but it is significant that he interprets it in a very different way from them.

You talk to your admirers every day  
By silted harbours, derelict works,  
In strangled orchards, and the silent comb  
Where dogs have worried or a bird was shot.  
Order the ill that they attack at once:  
Visit the ports and, interrupting  
The leisurely conversation in the bar  
Within a stone's throw of the sunlit water,  
Beckon your chosen out. Summon  
Those handsome and diseased youngsters, those women  
Your solitary agents in the country parishes;  
And mobilize the powerful forces latent  
In soils that make the farmer brutal  
In the infected sinus, and the eyes of stoats.  
Then, ready, start your rumour, soft  
But horrifying in its capacity to disgust  
Which, spreading magnified, shall come to be  
A polar peril, a prodigious alarm,  
Scattering the people, as torn-up paper  
Rags and utensils in a sudden gust,  
Seized with immeasurable neurotic dread.

This is a description of the 'Antagonist' marshalling his forces. Now there is a curious ambiguity about the 'Antagonist' who stands sometimes for what one writer calls 'the forces of inert habit within the decaying system'<sup>4</sup> and sometimes, as he appears to in this remarkable passage, for the forces of revolution which will overthrow the doomed social order. The contrast between the obliviousness of the doomed society and the feverish activity of the agents is suggested by two sets of images—one suggesting stagnation ('silted harbour', 'derelict works') and the other suggesting force ('mobilise', 'powerful', 'spreading magnified', 'prodigious', 'immeasurable'). The passage moves slowly at first and rapidly gathers momentum as it approaches the climax—the explosion of the subterranean force. There is a deliberate pause at

Then, ready, start your rumour, soft

which creates a sensation of suspense which turns at once into fear. 'Horrifying', 'disgust', 'peril', 'dread' introduce the new motive—the fear of the victims which is heightened by the hiss of the s's. The last five lines rise to a roar. 'Spreading magnified' makes the reader feel the hidden forces seizing the people, and is followed by

A polar peril, a prodigious alarm

where the thud of the p's suggests the restlessness of the movement carrying all before it. The whole is clinched by the final image of the rags, papers, and utensils whirled by the wind. It is curious that so sensitive a critic as Mr. Edgell Rickwood should have been able to write of Auden that:

"The setting-up of a pamphlet-poem antagonism, i.e. social struggle *versus* inner struggle, is a reflection of the poet's continuing isolation, falsifying the perspective of social development and delaying the re-integration of the poet into the body of society."<sup>5</sup>

For it is one of the most striking signs of Auden's integrity that he does realize that there is and must be an 'inner' as well as 'social struggle', and refuses to believe that the new order can be brought about by the simple economic reshuffle proposed by Marxists. The great problem that faces the modern poet is that he is without a 'system' and that with all the good will in the world he cannot be re-integrated 'into the body of society' as it is at present constituted, or adhere completely to any one of the conflicting groups, without entirely ruining his work. Auden therefore remains as much an isolated individualist as Mr. Eliot, and his best work simply registers a further stage in the social decay reflected in *The Waste Land*. The sense of the imminent collapse of the whole system has never been more vividly presented.

Financier, leaving your little room  
Where the money is made but not spent,  
You'll need your typist and your boy no more;  
The game is up for you and for the others  
Who thinking, pace in slippers on the lawns  
Of college Quad or Cathedral Close . . .

It is a striking fact that in Auden's poetry the emphasis falls almost exclusively on the destruction of the existing order and holds out no hope at all that a better order will emerge from its destruction. There never was a Marxist

writer who was so completely uninterested in, so completely sceptical about the 'new order' as Auden; and this scepticism is evident from the flatness and emptiness of a poem like *The Dance of Death* which is supposed to show the emergence of the 'new order' after the destruction of the old.

It is his honesty, his refusal to accept a facile solution which makes Auden's early work valuable as poetry and important as an indication of the plight of his generation.

### The Function of a Catholic Critic<sup>6</sup>

"The touchstone is emotion, not reason. We judge a work of art by its effects on our sincere and vital emotion, nothing else . . . A critic must be able to feel the impact of a work of art in all its complexity and force." (D. H. Lawrence.)

THE tendency of 'modern thought' has been on the whole destructive, has been a continual process of dissociation. The rise of the positive sciences in the seventeenth century put an end to the old synthesis, or indeed to any kind of synthesis. Knowledge has been broken up into the departmental sciences, which means that there has been an enormous increase in specialisation, in people who are equipped with a limited technique which is only capable of exploring one section of reality. The result has been twofold. Exponents of the departmental sciences have explored their corner of reality without making any attempt to relate it to first principles. The same men have tried to use methods suitable for one thing and one thing only to formulate a 'philosophy of life' (Sir James Jeans, Freud).

In recent years people have become increasingly aware of the shortcomings of this method, and there has been a desperate effort, particularly among art critics, to put Humpty-Dumpty together again. The necessity of some sort of synthesis seems to be inherent in the human mind. There is a desire for 'some system' which will provide the principles of art and also find a place for art in a general scheme of things. Thus in the middle of the nineteenth century we find Zola making comic efforts to found an aesthetic on Bernard's *Principles of Experimental Medicine*; and Brunetière (before his conversion) wrote a history of French literature based on a combination of Darwin and Haeckell.

In our own times the two most persistent attempts to provide a complete philosophy, and therefore to relate art and life, have been made by Catholicism and Marxism. We may not approve wholeheartedly either of Maritain's *Art and Scholasticism* or of Trotsky's *Literature and Revolution*; but we must admit that both are healthy signs, because both are attempts to get away from doctrines like art for art's sake—one of the most chronic symptoms of the decay of bourgeois-capitalist civilisation. The advantage of a Catholic philosophy is that when properly applied it is capable of enriching the critic, of opening new horizons before him, while a materialist system necessarily impoverishes him and narrows his outlook on account of its exclusiveness. A Catholic philosophy provides the most comprehensive picture of the universe; it is capable of finding a place for 'all experience', particularly for those experiences which materialism is driven to explain away, to discount as abnormal or illusory because they belong to regions whose existence is incompatible with materialism. Moreover, as



I have already suggested, a Catholic philosophy with its emphasis on the nature of man, is in a better position than another to determine what experiences are good for men.

Thus *in theory* a Catholic critic should be able to recognize valuable experience wherever he meets it and whatever the general outlook of the writer happens to be. Paradoxical though it may seem, the first thing a Catholic must realize is that in the literary order dogma must never be applied dogmatically. To assume that only those experiences are valuable which are completely Christian, is to condemn oneself to sterility at the outset. They may be the most valuable experiences, but they are by no means the only valuable experiences. If we are to be true to the ideal of comprehensiveness, we must be able to sympathise with the fresh experiences that are evolved in the course of civilisation. *In practice*, however, it is precisely on this point that both Catholic and Marxist critics are open to the gravest objections. As soon as absolute truths enter the literary order, the critic who is committed to a system exposes himself to two dangers. He tends to praise works which express, or seem to express, the dogmas of his system. Thus theory perverts sensibility. As an example, we have the Marxist critic's enthusiasm for Shelley on account of his alleged 'revolutionary' outlook, and the admiration of Catholics for a poet like Francis Thompson. The other error is to condemn writers simply because their outlook is at variance with one's own system, as a Marxist writer like Mr. Philip Henderson<sup>7</sup> appears to condemn 'bourgeois' novelists like Mrs. Woolf, Mr. Forster, and Mr. L. H. Myers, and Catholics condemn D. H. Lawrence. While the spectacle of the converted Brunetière resolutely condemning anything and everything modern is scarcely one on which we can look back with pleasure.

THE function of criticism, as Eliot has pointed out,<sup>8</sup> is "the elucidation of works of art and the correction of taste". This is not a plea for the purely literary criticism—literary criticism in the sense of neat appreciation is something in which we can no longer believe—but it does stress an important point. Criticism is a matter of sensibility as well as of intelligence. The first business of the literary critic is to discover whether the poem is good or not, whether or not it provides the reader with a valuable experience. It is only later that he can go on to pass judgment on the state of mind behind the work. For if the art is bad, if it is a dead thing, then it can have no vital relation to the society from which it springs, and there can be no earthly good in discussing its symptomatic aspects. Only the great writer can be an important symptom because what is happening to him, what is revealed in him, is also happening to society. What we also have to recognize is that we are constantly meeting works of art which we know are good but which are still a sign of an unhealthy state of society. The best instance is of course Baudelaire, who was probably the greatest European poet of the last century. But healthy or not, the fact remains that great poetry, even when it is the expression of a crumbling civilisation, possesses in some measure the same kind of power—a regenerative power—that belongs to the great literature of the stablest periods.

The point I wish to stress is that the critic must approach works of art *as works of art*, not as sociological treatises. The clue is not the poet's beliefs

or his morality, but his style. Francis Thompson and D. H. Lawrence have already been mentioned and they provide an excellent instance of what I mean. Thompson's *Hound of Heaven* may, as a distinguished preacher once argued, be an excellent 'retreat book', but the soundness of its theology or the 'majesty' of its central idea does not concern the critic. What does concern him is that the language of the poem is tired, stale, effete. On the other hand, the justification of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* is that the 'lurid' passages, so far from being unhealthy, are in fact written in a language which (as compared with Thompson's) is remarkably virile and fresh.

The danger of the dogmatic critic who is deficient in sensibility is that criticism will degenerate into a half-and-half science, will become a branch of sociology. This is the menace of a writer like Henri Massis who, whatever his qualifications as a thinker, is certainly deficient in sensibility.

"The dissolution of the human person", he writes,<sup>9</sup> "is the feature that strikes us in the most recent manifestations of our young literary men, the disciples of Marcel Proust and André Gide, for example. . . . All the characters drawn by our young authors are recognisable by the fact that they are no longer *centred*, and this gives them a strange resemblance to each other that is well adapted to distinguish them from all the human types that have hitherto appeared in French literature. There is about them something loose, something like a refusal to be formed, and to make a unity of their discordances. There is no effort to concentrate on any point in their sensibility, but an entirely material sincerity in which the mind no longer plays a part. Not only have their intelligence and will no distinct aim, but it seems that the subject itself is looking for an undiscoverable 'ego', as if modern subjectivism must finally result in a total dilution, a complete reabsorption into the original-confusion of things. . . . It is the lassitude of a generation which was bruised too soon by life, and which has no discipline of heart or mind to defend it against a feeling of powerlessness to which many disappointments have made it prone. It is here that 'Asiaticism' lies in wait for us."

The interest of this passage lies in the fact that it is an illustration of the wrong use of the dogmatic principle. Massis bases his criticism on the Catholic view of man and has no difficulty in showing that the disciples of Proust destroy the unity and integrity of man and that their work is thoroughly subversive. But one cannot help feeling that criticism of this sort is not only too easy, but is also largely irrelevant. Instead of using philosophy to help literary criticism, Massis is actually condemning writers on grounds which have nothing to do with literature and passes over the real virtues and the real vices of their work. For this is not a literary criticism at all. It is simply using literature to try to prove the corrosive influence of Asiatic thought on European society. From a literary point of view, the cardinal defect of this school is its failure to get outside the narrow circle of purely personal feelings to say something beyond, and of this Massis has nothing to say. Nor has he anything to say of its great merit, which is to have explored with unsurpassed insight whole new regions of human experience. Instead, we are fobbed off with a sentimental phrase about "a generation which was bruised too soon by life". What we have to remember—what Massis seems not to remember—is that success of a work of art *qua* art is to a certain extent independent of the beliefs on which it reposes. It may still

provide us with valuable experiences, even when it seems, in the Père de Munynck's vivid phrase, to "propel humanity towards the abyss".<sup>10</sup>

This does not mean that the psychological novel is not open to criticism. The way in which Catholic theology, properly applied, can facilitate the task of the critic, is brilliantly illustrated by Jacques Rivière's comparison between Stendhal and Dostoyevsky.\*

"There is a sort of naiveté about every non-Christian writer. He always reminds you of someone from whom something is hidden without his suspecting it. . . . Even when it is no longer a question of penetrating into things, but simply of inventing people and happenings, even in a novel, Christianity gives a special power, a sort of extra profundity to anyone who seeks inspiration from it. Think of Stendhal, of the power and life he manages to give to his characters! How briskly they move! One perceives their feelings carefully grouped in them, always alive. The author rejoices in them as though they were delicious perfumes which would vanish the moment one breathed them in. They are all marvelously light, active, clear-cut. They are *individuals*, but not *creatures*. They are nothing but the sum of their passions. They are exactly what they feel and nothing beyond. In the last resort, their souls might have been composed by chemical forces sublimated to the *nth* degree (Stendhal believed in Cabanis). The one thing that is needed to make them absolutely real is this—one could never wish for them to be forgiven; one could never pray for them. And just as we are separated from them, so they are separated from one another. . . . At bottom, they are without that little break which enables a human being to escape, to communicate with his neighbor. In them, humanity is without its wound. On the other hand, the characters of Dostoyevsky have from their origin this other dimension. They are completely man, but also what man has from God. They begin by coming to life, and with what power and what zest! They give way, without a thought, to the torrent of their individuality. They break down all resistance, they are as wicked as they can be. . . . And yet there is something more in them than their feelings. It is that faint image of God which never quite disappears. They can be saved. They have souls like us which may be lost. . . . There is more to it than that. They are not only so much alive that we fear for them; but however base they may be, they have feelings which are unknown to the pure heroes of Stendhal."<sup>11</sup>

The reason why this criticism is illuminating is because it is *literary* criticism; it shows that for Stendhal the absence of a coherent view of life involved artistic flaws in his work. It is instructive to compare the passage of Rivière with that of Massis in the passage above. We notice at once that Rivière is concerned with the *writer*, and Massis with the *subject-matter* of the writer. Rivière shows how narrowness of vision leads Stendhal to present an incomplete picture of life, to exclude whole tracts of experience. Massis, on the contrary, is criticizing the modern novel because its picture of man differs from man as defined in a Catholic philosophy, forgetting, it seems, that modern man has indeed lost his

---

\*Although Rivière's approach still appears legitimate, I admire Stendhal far more in 1951 than I did in 1935 when these pages were first written. Whatever his shortcomings, Stendhal now seems to me to be the greatest of all French novelists. M.T.



bearings and that the contemporary novelist's business is not to show us the ideal, but man as he is.

The great value of these two passages is the way that they bring out the difference between the literary critic and the sociologist. When we indulge in criticism of this sort we must be sure we are criticizing the artist and not the situation. "They are nothing but the sum of their passions"—it is a radical criticism of the modern *novelist*. No one will deny that the modern novelist's power of psychological analysis has enriched his art considerably; but there has unhappily been a corresponding loss. It was no doubt a mistake on the part of the older critics of fiction to insist on character to the exclusion of all else. But we are beginning to discover that character does matter. The character after all—the person who 'suffers' the experience, to use a scholastic term—must be a *person* if his experience is to have any meaning for us. The genius of the modern novelist is to have presented with unprecedented power and vividness certain states of mind: his shortcoming is to have lost sight of the person in the state. The result is that the work of a writer like Mrs. Woolf is inclined to degenerate into a succession of intense but largely unrelated moments and nothing more. In other words, instead of the English novel developing and combining the characterisation of the old writers with the increased insight of the new, it has relinquished all that writers like DeFoe, Fielding and Jane Austen had won.

## II.

THE main point I wish to make is that dogma can only be used as a corrective. It cannot be applied in that narrow way in which a good many critics have tried to apply it. A good illustration of what I mean is provided by Remy de Gourmont's devastating essay on Brunetière. He quotes a passage from Brunetière's book on Balzac:

"It is not only not true that everything appears differently to different people according to personal idiosyncracies . . . but reality is the same for all intelligences. There is only one point of view from which it is true and 'in conformity with its object', just as in science there is only one formula that is truly scientific."

"With this principle one ends by denying the legitimacy of all individual activity. Art disappears altogether. . . . Every object, every fact, only permits of one valid representation, which is true, and ideas are necessarily divided into two classes—the true and the false. . . .

"Let us remain true to the principles of subjective idealism which are impregnable. The world is my representation of it. It is the only creative principle, the only one which allows the full development and ordering of intelligence and sensibility."<sup>12</sup>

There are two criticisms to be made of these passages. Brunetière, instead of using dogma as a corrective, tries to force one of the principles of moderate realism and ends by vitiating aesthetic judgment; and Gourmont appears to seek in modern art the justification of a particular philosophical system. It is perfectly true that the development of modern art has been greatly influenced by the change from a classical metaphysic to idealism; but this in itself tells us nothing

about the *value* of the art nor about the truth or untruth of the philosophy. What we have to admit is that the works produced are often extremely good and that they have greatly increased the scope of our personal experience. What is more, the dogmatic application of Brunetière's principle would necessarily be sterile and would end in the most through-going academicism. We should be obliged to condemn the whole of Picasso's later work, superb as it often is, as well as nearly all modern poetry from Baudelaire and Laforgue down to Eliot, Pound and Auden.

On this particular issue the Catholic critic adopts an intermediate position. The real question is whether art ought or ought not be representational. It is the old issue between Plato and Aristotle all over again. The tendency of modern criticism to minimise the importance of Aristotle's *mimesis* strikes us as mistaken. There is nothing to show that by 'imitation' Aristotle meant a slavish 'copying' of the object. He was simply concerned to stress the representational element—an element that always played a big part in so-called classic art. The basic principle of representation—that there must be a relation between art and concrete *things* and that the emotion must be proportionate to the objects that evoked it—seems to me to be undeniably true. Whatever liberties the artist takes with his material, there must subsist "the primitive relation with the real"<sup>13</sup> if the work is to be intelligible. For the conformity of emotion and object is the only check to the cult of complete subjectivism which has in recent years invaded all the arts.

I would suggest, parenthetically, that there is no better way of estimating the value of Catholic philosophy to the literary critic than by comparing the best of Gourmont's criticism with the best of Rivière's. It is an unfortunate fact that Rivière's output was small and piecemeal, and some of his finest work is still buried in the files of the *Nouvelle Revue Française*, where it originally appeared.\* But it does show in what sense Catholicism is a *plus* quantity, just as to my mind we can now see that the scepticism of Gourmont, far from being the brilliant intellectual advantage it was once thought to be, was in fact a defect of intelligence that prevented him from being a still greater force in contemporary letters.

### III.

THERE is a final position that calls for comment and explanation—the position of the Catholic critic in the face of contemporary literature. In an essay on 'Literature and Religion'<sup>14</sup> T. S. Eliot draws attention to the damage that is being done by the secularist literature of our time.

"Though we may read literature merely for pleasure, of 'entertainment' or of 'aesthetic enjoyment', this reading never affects simply a sort of special sense: it affects us as entire human beings; it affects our moral and religious interests. And I say that while individual modern writers of eminence can be improving, contemporary literature as a whole tends to be degrading. . . ."<sup>15</sup>

"For the reader of contemporary literature is not, like the reader of

---

\*The best of his later essays have been now collected in *Nouvelles études*, Paris, 1947. M. T.

established great literatures of the past, exposing himself to the influence of diverse and contradictory personalities; he is exposing himself to a mass movement of writers who, each of them, think that they have something individually to offer, but are really all working together in the same direction. And there never was a time, I believe, when the reading public was so large, or so helplessly exposed to the influences of its own time."<sup>16</sup>

"What I do wish to affirm", he continues, "is that the whole of modern literature is corrupted by what I call Secularism, that it is simply unaware of, simply cannot understand the primacy of the supernatural over the natural life: of something which I assume to be our primary concern."<sup>17</sup>

It is clear that in such circumstances the critic finds himself in a sort of no-man's land—in territory which belongs at once to the theologian and the literary critic. There has been in the past, I believe, a tendency to confuse the two; we have had literary critics who have suddenly abandoned their roles and turned theologian; and we also had the pronouncements of theologians like the late Abbé Brémond, who were not sufficiently familiar with literary technique to venture into such realms at all. What I wish to do is to make Mr. Eliot's judgments an opportunity for commenting on the relation between the theologian and the critic, for indicating what seems to me to be the limitation of literary criticism as such.

I have taken it as axiomatic in this essay that 'pure appreciation' is all over and done with, that of critic of literature must also be the critic of the culture from which that literature springs. His approach must be literary. He can show, for instance, how changes of style reflect changes of mind, how the disappearance of the classic virtues of objectivity and impersonality point to profound disturbances in the life of a people. He can also point out that *from a literary point of view* the disappearance of religious sanctions and the invasion of secularism has resulted in a tremendous impoverishment of poetry.

It seems evident, however, that the function of the literary critic, even the Catholic critic, once he enters this sphere, must in a sense be negative. He can show what has been lost; he can assert the need of Tradition and of a new social order; he may even help to preserve Tradition where it exists; but he can do nothing to get Tradition back for us once it has been lost, neither can he reform the existing social order. The weaknesses of the best contemporary poetry are inherent in society and they will only disappear when that society has given way to a better one. The literary critic can point all this out, he can diagnose, but with diagnosis his function as a critic comes to an end. The rest concerns his responsibility as a man.

"We shall certainly continue to read the best of its kind of what our time provides," runs the concluding sentence of Eliot's essay, "but we must tirelessly criticize it according to our own principles and not merely according to the principles admitted by the writers and critics who discuss it in the public press."<sup>18</sup>

"The necessity of religious sanctions in some form seems necessary to the health of the world", writes another distinguished critic,<sup>19</sup> but, as he hastens to add, "they cannot be had for the wanting."

It is abdication to be sure. But one can only commend the perspicacity and



humility with which two critics, writing from very different points of view, make the gesture of abdication.

---

<sup>1</sup> Edward Upward in *The Mind in Chains*, London, 1937, p. 52.

<sup>2</sup> Alick West, *Crisis and Criticism*, London, 1937, p. 140.

<sup>3</sup> This is discussed more fully in an article on 'Surrealism' in *Arena*, for October 1937.

<sup>4</sup> D. A. Traversi in *Arena*, October 1937, p. 208.

<sup>5</sup> *New Verse* (Auden Double Number), November, 1937, p. 22.

<sup>6</sup> In order to make my position clear I have been obliged in this chapter to quote extensively from other writers. These extracts are of the utmost importance for understanding the view I am putting forward, and should be read with special care.

<sup>7</sup> *The Novel Today*, London, 1936.

<sup>8</sup> *Selected Essays*, p. 24.

<sup>9</sup> *Defense of the West*, English translation, London, 1927, pp. 151-2.

<sup>10</sup> *Colosseum*, March, 1934, p. 30.

<sup>11</sup> *De la foi*, Paris, 1927, pp. 72-4.

<sup>12</sup> *Promenades littéraires*, III., pp. 32-3.

<sup>13</sup> *Colosseum*, September, 1934, p. 56.

<sup>14</sup> In *Essays Ancient and Modern*.

<sup>15</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 105-6.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 107-8.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 108.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 112.

<sup>19</sup> F. R. Leavis, in *For Continuity*, London, 1933, p. 173.

# CHRISTIANITY AND EVOLUTION

BRUNO DE SOLAGES

**I**T WOULD be useless to deny that the attitude of most theologians with regard to evolution has been, up to the present, very reserved; and it is not difficult to understand the reason for this. Without doubt the revelation of the gift of God to men, the eternal message of Heaven to Earth, is so overwhelmingly more important than the problems of natural science, that anything that science could discover would appear almost of indifferent value, from the point of view of Revelation, to the believer. We are told that at the time of the Galileo controversy, Cardinal Baronius wrote (and how justly!): "Holy Scripture was written to teach us how to go to heaven, and not how the heavens go." One can never insist too strongly on the transcendence of the Christian Mystery: "Now this is everlasting life, that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou has sent."<sup>1</sup>

*Bruno de Solages is Rector of the Catholic Institute of Toulouse. This article appeared first in the BULLETIN DE LITTÉRATURE ECCLESIASTIQUE, no. 4, 1947.*

And yet, the very history of Christian thought teaches us that that thought has always felt the need of making a synthesis of the data of the two sources of knowledge: on the one hand, Revelation, and on the other, the gradual discoveries made by human reason. It was out of this need for synthesis that the Summas of the Middle Ages were born. The Summa of St. Thomas presented the facts of Revelation within the framework of the ancient, Aristotelian representation of the world. Spatially, it was a geocentric conception; temporally, a cyclical one. The Copernican revolution shattered the crystal spheres of the Aristotelian universe. Several centuries had to pass before the majority of theologians could accept the new concept, so troubled were their habits of thought by it, and so strongly did it pose to them apparently insoluble problems, problems which hardly bother us today.

After this reversal in our concept of Space, less than a century ago the Darwinian revolution came to affect our ideas of time at their very root. It is hardly surprising that this change of perspectives to which human thought had become accustomed for centuries met with some resistance.

This resistance was all the stronger because evolution was usually presented during the nineteenth century as anti-Christian, as a mechanist substitute for Creation. However transcendental Christian dogma may really be in comparison to nature and the theories of science, in order to be reasonable it must postulate certain fundamental philosophical truths; inasmuch as it is a gift of God to spirits, a gift to be merited by the moral exercise of liberty, it is evidently incompatible with a materialistic, mechanistic and atheistic evolution. In order therefore to be assimilated by Christian thought, the theory of evolution had first to be corrected. We must conceive evolution as created and guided by God, and as admitting within its framework a spiritual and free soul. This done, it still

remains for the theologian to explain the first pages of the Bible, and particularly its narration of human origins, in the light of an evolutionist view of the world. This is a task of the greatest delicacy. Therefore there are many who still refuse to accept the evolutionist perspective.

Their position, however, becomes daily more untenable. For as one author has correctly written: at the present time "any course in biology in any university of the world is based on the fact of evolution", and "since the end of the last century, all research in the vast domain of the sciences of life could not have been made except in the light of evolution".<sup>2</sup>

What is the cause of this impressive unanimity? The Professor of Geology and Paleontology at our Catholic Institute (whose opinion is well known) would not mind if I borrow the answer to this question from a page written by the eminent Professor of Biology of the Faculty of the Sciences of Toulouse, M. Vandel: "The idea of evolution was revealed to the first naturalists by a study of comparative anatomy, but today it is based essentially on a knowledge of fossil forms. For, where comparative anatomy offers only probabilities, paleontology brings certitude. Paleontology becomes, because of the breadth of its conclusions, a truly philosophical science."

Paleontology teaches us that animal and plant organisms have succeeded one another in a regular and hierarchic order during the course of geological periods. It is this fact, the accuracy of which we cannot deny, that we translate by the word evolution.

Let us remove some objections, which are more misunderstandings than anything else. First objection: continuous evolutionary lines are rare in paleontology; great gaps continue to remain between the various organic groups. Let us note in the first place that the width of these gaps diminishes day by day, as a result of the continued work of paleontologists. Recent discoveries have considerably reduced the depth of the chasms which, a short time ago, appeared to separate the fish from the amphibians, and the reptiles from the mammals. Let us not forget however that paleontology is an historical science and is condemned, like all historical disciplines, to present lacunae which are all the greater as research goes back into epochs more distant in time. Perfect knowledge of the pedigrees of all organisms is really an ideal which will never be quite attained. The fact that the very nature of paleontology is such that it can give us only partial pictures of the past should not make us reject its general conclusions.

The fundamental teaching of paleontology is not so much derived from the total knowledge of all organic lines, as from the irrefutable demonstration of the order of appearance of the various organic groups. The birth of animal and plant groups did not occur haphazardly. Simple forms always preceded complex forms. Amphibians appear later than fish, mammals later than reptiles, etc. Conditions for the appearance of a "superior" group are furnished by the existence of an "inferior" group which gives it support and furnishes it with the basis of its organization. The appearance of the mammal inescapably presupposes the previous existence of the reptile, whose organization serves the mammal as its foundation and its strictly necessary point of departure. This connection of organizational types and their regular succession in time constitutes the irrefutable proof of evolution.



The objection which would be fatal to the evolutionary interpretation of life is not that there are lacunae and obscurities in the genetic line of organisms; it would be the discovery of a fundamental disturbance in the order of appearance of animal or plant forms. Such would be the bringing to light of a hominoid ape, arising in the Jurassic before the differentiation of the placental mammals. However, a fact of this order has never been discovered. Quite the contrary, paleontological discoveries have always appeared according to the place and epoch assigned to them by evolutionists; just as the recently discovered chemical substances have taken their place in the periodic table set up by Mendeleeff.<sup>3</sup>

These facts are so decisive that my colleague, Msgr. Délépine, an eminent geologist, and Rector of the Catholic University of Lille, could recently write: "In short, when you view human beings in their totality, this is no longer an hypothesis but an unavoidable observation: We find an organic increase of perfection through the ages, from inferior being up to man. One author was able to write, and very correctly, that 'The whole history of life is that of an ascent towards man and towards the domination of the nervous system, by which the dictates of the spirit are carried out.' We can be ignorant of the mechanism, we can discuss the immediate causes and the manner in which they work: natural selection, the influence of environment, mutations, the acceptance and transmission of mutations by chromosomes; but there remains one undeniable fact: the continuous ascent in each line of living beings towards forms having a superior organization."<sup>4</sup>

**I**T IS then necessary for the Christian thinker to adopt the evolutionary outlook and to present the facts of Revelation within the framework of an evolutionary concept of the universe, just as St. Thomas in the thirteenth century presented them in the framework of the ancient cyclical representation of the world.

But is there nothing better for him to do than to accommodate himself to this concept as well as he can, and to correct—as if from outside—the mechanistic evolution which others work out for him? If he could only start with this perspective and show how the Christian message is harmonious with it, if he could show that he can be a spiritualist although he may be an evolutionist, would not the position of the Christian scholar be infinitely better? But it is exactly along these lines that eminent thinkers have been working. Do I need to mention Bergson's *Creative Evolution* and where it led him? The last works of that eminent scholar, Lecomte de Nouy, followed the same direction. However, it is not exactly in their steps that I wish to tread today. Another name, which is indeed becoming glorious, is now on the lips of all when they speak of spiritualistic evolution: it is the name of Father Teilhard de Chardin.

He is a learned paleontologist, a profound thinker, and a soul eminently religious; and in addition he has been gifted with extraordinary talent as a writer. It is his thought which is exciting the Catholic mind. Unfortunately, it is very imperfectly understood. It is known from his scattered articles, and—what is much worse—from his unpublished studies. These deal only with partial phases of the subject, and were written primarily for non-Catholics; competent

authority has not judged their publication opportune. But they have circulated among his friends (not all of whom have been prudent) and indiscreet admirers a great deal more than could have been foreseen by their author (who has been in China the best part of the last twenty years). However, they owe their spontaneous distribution to nothing else than the intense curiosity which their own special merit inspires. They have nothing about them of the anonymous or the clandestine; their author has never set out to dissimulate his opinions. His fault, if it is a fault, is rather that of a too-confident straightforwardness.

I have protested against the indiscreet use made of these documents in public controversies, but I notice that more and more, as if it were inevitable, people are talking about them, and they will go on talking about them, rightly or wrongly. We must surely recognize the fact that, if on the one hand they represent a prodigious apologetic force and have done a great deal of good—whether it be among those for whom they were originally written (“those who oscillate between belief and unbelief”), or whether it be among competent theologians to whom these documents have opened up larger vistas—on the other hand, they are read with more enthusiasm than insight by young people who are insufficiently formed, or who have never known them except very partially, and have therefore often been completely misunderstood.

Therefore it appears to me necessary that someone who has followed avidly the development of thought of which these documents are the successive expression, and has for over twenty years corresponded with the author and had numerous conversations with him, should delineate their true sense in a brief survey. If I decide today to cite unpublished pages or fragments of them, it is because of the title of faithful friendship which has united me for so long a time with their author.

These documents are of very different dates, and they testify to a constant progress in the depth and accuracy of their author's thought. Since I am of necessity a critical theologian, I would not subscribe to them all. But the presentation that I am about to make will show that the well-balanced synthesis which Father Teilhard de Chardin has now achieved contains nothing which could imperil Christian dogma. I hope that this presentation, while assisting in the exact understanding of the thought of one of the greatest Christian thinkers of this century, will moderate the superficial enthusiasm and calm the disquiet which an imperfect knowledge of these documents has excited.

## 2.

**A** MIND formed by the Scholastic studies common in our seminaries is easily disconcerted when first reading these papers. Such a mind would ask to what category of studies they belong: to that of science, philosophy or theology? And, according to the passage, the reader might wish to reproach the author for not having explained his position on such and such a theological question; or, on the contrary, to reproach him for having mingled all perspectives; unless fascinated by the magnificent drapery with which this thought is garbed, he might see in it nothing but a kind of poem. All of these errors in interpretation have a common source: the one who reads these passages does not take the same

point of view as did their author in writing them; for, no matter how it may seem at times, the author is perfectly conscious of his goal, his method and the plane on which he moves, and finally, of the point of view from which he approaches reality. The splendor of the literary form should not deceive us: we are in the presence of an extremely rigorous dialectic.

What then, is the point of view of the author? It is not precisely the traditional point of view of the Christian philosopher when he studies man; that point of view is one which surveys man from within. Father Teilhard de Chardin takes the position of a scientist. He studies man from without, as he would appear, one might say, seen from the planet Mars with the aid of a huge telescope. From this viewpoint you would not gain an intuitive knowledge of man; you would not be as much impressed by the individual as by all of humanity. His point of view is objective and global. The intriguing thing about it is precisely that it is the view predominant among our contemporaries; and, similarly, he looks at the world the way they do, and speaks their language in order to reach them at their weakest spot. The reason for the influence that Teilhard de Chardin has had upon so many of our contemporaries is the fact that he is a man in intense sympathy with his times. But starting with that fact, he carries them further; as we shall see, he uses a purely external method to rediscover the interior view, and employs the great mass of humanity to reveal the value of the personal.

Nonetheless, though he assumes the scientific, objective point of view, the work of Father Teilhard de Chardin in the documents of which I speak (for I omit consideration of his writings on geology and paleontology), is not exactly what we would call science in the restricted, contemporary sense of the term. Every study made from the scientific point of view, dealing not with a part but with the whole of reality, must necessarily take on a philosophical air, but this does not in itself make it a work of metaphysics or theology. In so far as we can force a thought so modern into ancient categories, we must say that his fundamental point of view is what Aristotle would call Physics, and the Scholastics, Cosmology. Considering total reality from the objective point of view of the sciences, the author attempts to make a systematic presentation of it, and thus to derive its essential laws and postulates, including the existence of God. Did not Aristotle introduce in his Eighth Book of the Physics a demonstration of the Prime Mover?

"Let no one look in these pages," our author has written, "for an *explanation*, but only an *introduction to an explanation of the world*. I have tried to take man as the center of my thought, to establish a coherent order of human consequents and antecedents, and to discover in the elements of the universe not only a system of ontological and causal relations but an experimental law of recurrence expressing the successive appearances in the course of time—that and only that I have attempted to do."

The method he employs to realize this attempt is that which is fundamentally at the basis of all science and all philosophy: namely, to discover a point of view from which the real would appear coherent, unified, and consequently, intelligible.

This exposé of totality, essentially done from the phenomenalist point of view, is therefore by definition incomplete, since it does not study reality in all



its profundity; it is not therefore a substitute for metaphysics or, *a fortiori*, for theology. Our author does not only not deny this, he affirms it: "Beyond this first scientific investigation, of course, a place remains—essential and waiting to be filled—for the more profound reflections of the philosopher and the theologian. I have carefully and consciously avoided adventuring even for a moment into this realm. At the very most I feel confident that I have uncovered with a certain amount of exactness, on the level of experience, the dominant trend (toward unity); and that I have determined the proper places for those discontinuities which, in the course of subsequent investigations and because of considerations of a higher order, philosophical and theological thought will feel they have the right to demand."

It follows that the author is not supposed to be treating, in these writings, those strictly theological questions which could be raised at various points. For that would be precisely to confuse his perspectives. Indeed, to demand that he not make any cosmological statements except on condition that he should propose the solution of all the theological problems which these new perspectives would raise, would be a presumption, for two reasons. First of all, theological problems cannot be solved except by the use of theological method, and it is to the professional theologians that we must look for such solutions. Secondly, to demand that a thinker should not present his own synthesis except on the condition that he shall have already answered all the questions which could be raised, would be to demand the impossible. Only the naive—in this life—believe that their systems provide all the answers.

Is it not a magnificent work that he has (as we shall see) rectified the theory of evolution from within, that he has, so to speak, taken the weapons from the hand of materialism to turn them against it, and has offered to the theologian an evolutionary view of the universe so frankly spiritualized and so explicitly open to the supernatural?

### 3.

LET us, then, look at the universe with the eyes of Father Teilhard de Chardin. The general fact which is at the basis of his synthesis is the fact of evolution: first of all, evolution of different species, but then evolution extended to all reality, from the atoms to the stars, a generalized evolution which is, more and more, that of all the sciences, and which in consequence reinforces the certitude of the particular fact, (which is already quite general) of the evolution of species. "The geologist makes a history of the earth, the historian makes a history of humanity—why, then, between the two are we not permitted to make a history of life?" That is a noted sentence of Father Teilhard written twenty years ago, and it has been for me a flood of illumination. In the very first of his writings which I read we find this phrase, which we can take as a motto for the whole effort of modern thought: "We are discovering Time."

"The Universe is an evolution." With that statement all contemporaries would agree. But how should we understand this evolution? The first act of Father Teilhard de Chardin—significant in its consequences—was to vindicate the place of man in this perspective of evolution. He has shown that it was un-

scientific to neglect (as did most scientists in their syntheses) what he likes to call the *human phenomenon*: that is to say, as we have already seen, humanity regarded not from within, after the manner of psychologists, but from without, in the scientific way, as a "phenomenon." He has shown that it is just as dangerous for the cosmological synthesis to neglect the human phenomenon because it is difficult to fit in with its ideas as it would be for contemporary physics to neglect the phenomena of radio-activity as uncongenial, because they overturned its traditional notions.

Now, when we seek to place man within the totality of evolution, we are obliged to admit that man is the last to appear. The human phenomenon, therefore, appears as the capital one. *If the key to the evolution which directs the universe is in anything, it is in man.* As a matter of fact, if it was indeed irrational to try to explain the universe which was always the same—a cyclical universe like the world of the ancients—by purely mechanical considerations, it is truly absurd to seek to explain an evolutionary universe without asking where it is going. When we wish to point out the secret of a movement, is it not more important to look at where it is going than to see only where it came from? But if we consider reality in evolution as scientists, with a strictly objective regard, we are obliged to recognize the fact that it proceeds—from the electron to the atom, from atom to molecule, from molecule to cell, from cell to organism and, in the case of living beings, from inferior organisms to man—always toward a greater complexity. *And this ascent towards a more and more complex organization is paralleled by an ascent towards an always greater consciousness and liberty: "Evolution progresses towards the spirit."* We have here at once a law of continuity, from the simpler to the more complex, and a law of design, since this growth in complexity does not occur simply by means of a greater accumulation of the elements of the synthesis. Once the process has arrived at a certain degree of complexity, it must change its plane in order to proceed further, and it passes—as if through a critical point—from the atom to the molecule, from the molecule to the cell, from the cell to the organism, and so forth. A molecule, for example, cannot exceed a certain magnitude. To overcome this barrier and to grow still greater, it is obliged to use the resources of another order of being, that of life, and then we have the cell. In its progressive action, evolution would seem to be obliged to replace its ordinary procedure of synthesis by activities of a superior order. *There are necessary discontinuities in the very midst of necessary continuity.* All through his phenomenalist description of evolution, Father Teilhard de Chardin points out with the same insistence both the continuity of its movement and the necessity of "distinguishing absolute boundaries of perfection and of growth", and of "real metamorphoses." Thus, he speaks for example of the appearance of life in the world: "We must posit at this particular moment of terrestrial evolution a maturation, a transformation, a threshold, a crisis of prime importance: the beginning of a new order." The metaphysician is free to deduce from this, according to his point of view, the consequences which his particular method may demand.

Now, the greatest discontinuity is manifest with the appearance of man. In his case, it is the spirit which has appeared, endowed with its essential characteristics: generalizing thought, reflection, liberty. But after this, what? What could be the future of evolution? For, unless we are willing to admit its funda-

mental absurdity, it must still go on. Its progress is irreversible. It must continue in the same direction and according to the same laws. Here we arrive at a critical point; and it is here that the liberating power of Father Teilhard de Chardin's dialectic is most evident.

In order that evolution continue in the same direction, it must continue to progress towards a greater complexity and greater consciousness; in order to continue according to the same law, far from destroying the spiritual values it has succeeded in bringing forth, it must safeguard these during its passage to a higher plane. In fact an *evolutionary universe*, which seems to be one tremendous action, because of the fact that the spirit has been born in it, and because evolution has begun to be conscious of itself in the sundry spirits of the world, *d demands, from its very structure, the indestructibility of the spirit.* Suppose the universe should become aware of the fact that it is proceeding towards complete extinction. It would become conscious of this through its rational and free elements—elements now in the vanguard of its movement, and entrusted with the task of continuing the movement consciously. In this case it would cease all action, for sheer lack of will. But an evolution which would find its end in complete death is sheer nonsense. Therefore complete death does not exist. Evolution demands the immortality of the spirit.

But what is meant when we speak of the indestructibility of the spirit? What is essential in the spirit: is it what it does, or is it itself, that is to say those centers of syntheses, centers that are personal, incommunicable, without which it could not exist? It is obviously these personal centers themselves, the actual term of the movement towards greater complexity and consciousness. Therefore, evolution, which has always succeeded in safeguarding in its further synthesis what the previous stage has produced (the molecule does not destroy the atom, nor the cell the molecule, nor the organism the cell) this evolution, I say, must be able in some way to preserve these centers of synthesis which are the finest products of its creative efforts. If it does not do this, it would destroy itself in destroying them. *The indestructibility of the Spirit demands the personal immortality of spirits.* All this means that having witnessed the fact that personal spirits have been born in it, *the universe cannot continue the process except by achieving a new synthesis*, a synthesis of these personal spirits in some higher unity, but a synthesis which will preserve them as personal spirits. The only possible synthesis for spirits is *the birth of a community of spirits.* Biological evolution (and this is a change of plane within the very course of continuity) is succeeded by social evolution, which appears to have a kind of biological value. *It is not Superman who is to be born in this higher plane of evolution, it is humanity.*

This perspective at once puts in its proper light the organic value of humanity and the superior nature of this synthesis, since the successive syntheses of evolution are never identical but only analogous to one another. The error of totalitarian regimes is precisely an error concerning the very concept of this new unity.

**T**HUS the final problem presents itself. How can we unify persons in a great human community which would nevertheless respect their personalities? What



force would be strong enough, yet delicate enough for this higher synthesis of spirits? This force could only be love. But love is something eminently personal. It is the intimate relation of Thou and I. How could we be capable of loving directly with a real love billions of other persons, to whom the evolution of the universe has given birth? It would seem that humanity could not achieve this synthesis of communion in love except indirectly, by uniting itself about a superpersonal center which is strong enough to love the multitude of spirits, a superpersonal center which would unite them in its love by making them superpersonal. *The forward progress of humanity* (at present the last stage of the evolution of the Universe) *can never be achieved except by love in God.* But this can never happen—and, now we are at this point, we perceive that the whole previous movement of evolution is otherwise inconceivable—unless God be not a point of ideal projections, but a real and present center of attraction, whose force is felt from the very beginning of evolution, and therefore *a transcendent center to evolution.* "And for this reason, therefore," Father Teilhard de Chardin continues, "the cosmic human phenomenon is seen, in turn, to be profoundly modified. At first we could only see in it (or we were entitled to see in it only) an autonomous, spontaneous upsurge of consciousness. But now we discover that this surge is a great tide attracted by the force of a supreme start. If the many are united in one, it is because in the last analysis they are attracted." Here I think of Pascal's dictum: "God cannot be the End if He is not the Beginning, or we would be building on sand, and would be overthrown while looking at Heaven."

Once we have attained God as the supreme center, the prime mover of the evolution of the Universe, attracting and unifying its constituent elements, a further question might be raised: If this center is superpersonal, could it only play the role of a physical or biological prime mover?<sup>6</sup> Would it not also assume the role of a psychic prime mover, would it not address itself to persons brought into being by its action, as one person to other persons, speaking to their spirit, to their heart, to their liberty? Yes, if this superpersonal center exists, its action not only *ought* to make itself felt as a motivating power of evolution in general—and that has already been demonstrated—but it could make itself felt by personal manifestations. If it could, did it? Here we are no longer dealing with a dialectic demonstration based on the very movement of evolution itself, but we should ascertain whether we can discover by a new inspection of total experience an answer to this question. "It is at this point," writes Father Teilhard de Chardin, "that in the midst of the human phenomenon, the *Christian phenomenon* appears and demands our attention. Historically, with the advent of the Man-God, a new phylum of religious thought appeared among the mass of humans, a category whose presence has never ceased to influence, more and more widely and profoundly, the developments of the Noösphere. Absolutely nowhere outside of this remarkable current of consciousness has the concept of God and the act of adoration taken on similar coherence and similar grace. All this has been sustained and nourished by the conviction that it responds to an inspiration, to a revelation that has come from on high."

Father Teilhard de Chardin loves to demonstrate how the Incarnation of Christ came to crown this tremendous ascent of matter towards spirit, an ascent made in reality for Him, the Christ Alpha and Omega, the Christ who is Pan-

tocrator, "the universal Christ"; that is, the Christ who is not only the destiny of each of our souls, but the Christ who is the summit of the whole universe, according to the cosmic perspective of scriptural revelation in St. Paul.

## 4.

You can see what a magnificent coherence the whole scheme of things takes on when you come to accept this view-point. You can also see how evolution, thus considered, appears not materialistic, but essentially spiritualistic, not pantheistic but theistic, not deterministic but directed by God, not immanent but requiring the transcendental, not anti-Christian, but leading logically to the Christian supernatural. Those who think they see in this view pantheism, totalitarianism, immanentistic naturalism, do not understand its profound inspiration.

And so, in his own way, within the framework of a Universe no longer cyclical as was the Aristotelian system—a great clock which eternally moves—but the Universe of modern science—which is an evolutionary Universe, a Universe in progress, and one which, unless it be radically absurd, must necessarily go in a certain direction—Father Teilhard de Chardin successively demonstrates the personal immortality of souls, and the existence of a personal God, the motivating force of all this evolution.

It is still the sign of Aristotle which guides the procession of all the elements of the world; only this procession is a true progress instead of only a perpetual "going around in circles." And we find that the heart of these two demonstrations is really nothing else basically but the Aristotelian and Thomistic principle, *desiderium naturae non potest esse inane*. "The desire of nature cannot exist in vain." Only, in place of applying this principle merely to the desire of a spirit, considered in its individuality, it is now extended to the totality of spirits, which is considered in the evolutionary perspective of the whole of modern science, as the actual term of the Universe. Likewise, when Father Teilhard de Chardin shows how the Christian phenomenon appears, in this perspective, as a divine response to what would be the supreme appeal of this spiritualized evolution, he rediscovers, in a form singularly enhanced, the celebrated apologetic of Cardinal Dechamps.

Finally we must point out how these evolutionary perspectives follow the direction of Revelation, which was progressively granted in the course of ages until the fullness of time, the content of which constitutes the history of salvation, what the Fathers of the Church like to call the "Economy". We can say that the progress of humanity towards the end of time and towards the Kingdom of God finds in these perspectives a setting which is more congenial than that of the cyclic universe, in which for many centuries, theologians had been accustomed to think about them. Certainly I do not intend—I stressed this at the beginning of my address and I want to stress it now—that evolution, even when spiritualized, should be put on the same plane as the *Christian Mystery* which the Gospel has revealed to us. That mystery is in its very nature transcendental compared with a scientific view of the universe. But is it not of the greatest interest to the modern Christian who finds that science almost forces an evolutionary view on him, that he can see that the evolutionary view as well as, and indeed better than the cyclic view of the world, demands for its complete coherence the immortality of the soul and the existence of God?

I REGRET only that I have been obliged to remove, as it were, the flesh from the skeleton in order briefly to set forth the whole of this synthesis of Christian evolution. I have presented to you a cold dialectic skeleton in place of a truly vital work haloed by an infinitely attractive poetry. So I should like, in conclusion, to read to you at least one of those burning passages, a witness *sui generis* to human hope: that of the spirit's indestructibility.

You no doubt recall the magnificent and despairing conclusion of *The Value of Science* of the great mathematician, Henri Poincaré:

"Geological history shows us that life is only a short period between two eternities of death, and that even during this episode a conscious thought has not endured, nor will it endure longer than a moment. Thought is only a flash of light in the middle of a long night. But it is that flash that is everything." (p. 276)

After having developed the line of reasoning which I outlined for you before, concerning the impossibility of an evolutionary Universe proceeding towards total death, Father Teilhard de Chardin, dealing with Poincaré's conclusion, wrote the page which will end my address:

"Following the example of Henri Poincaré, many minds, bowing down to a fashionable agnosticism, or seduced by the false attraction of stoicism and noble disinterestedness, imagine that they can accept without flinching the idea that thought will not endure more than a moment on the earth, and that for that moment we ought to give our all: it is a flash of light in the night. We think they deceive themselves because they have not got to the very bottom of the significance of the term: *total death of the Universe*.

We are convinced that they unconsciously avoid reaching the deepest meaning of the words they use. They suppose that some trace of this "flash" will remain; that something will be gathered into a consciousness, into a memory, into a glance . . . but it is precisely this last hope that they must suppress in order to reach the idea of absolute death (which is probably just as absurd as the idea of Nothingness). No, not even that is enough (for indeed it would be everything, for the Universe to have charmed, even for an instant, eyes which would never close). No, it would be the opaque and total night all about us, a night which would never let *anything* of all that we have understood or achieved filter through *for a single person* . . . But then, why should evolution have occurred at all? Supreme disinterestedness? There is absolutely no virtue in sacrificing one's self when no higher interest is at stake!—A Universe which would continue to operate *laboriously*, with the conscious goal of absolute death, would be a stupid world, a monster of the spirit, a chimera. Since we see as a matter of fact, that the world, *hic et nunc*, is an immense action, developed from the beginning with a powerful sureness, we cannot doubt that it is capable of nourishing indefinitely in its children a vital urge which is always more critical, demanding and refined; we cannot doubt that it carries within itself the assurance of final success. From the very moment that it has thought in its midst, the Universe can no longer be merely temporary or limited in its evolution; it must of its very nature strive towards the absolute. There, no matter how unstable life might appear, no matter how affected by the limitations of space and by the forces



of corruption, one thing is more certain than all the rest (because it is just as certain as the fact of the world): the Spirit will always be able to laugh at determinism and contingency, as it has done up to now. It represents the indestructible portion of the Universe."

Translated by HARRY BLAIR

---

<sup>1</sup> St. John, XVII:3.

<sup>2</sup> G. Viatte, *Bulletin de littérature ecclésiastique*, no. 1, (1947), p. 62.

<sup>3</sup> A. Vandel, "L'évolution du monde animal et l'avenir de l'espèce humaine", *La Science et la Vie*, (Aug. 1932), pp. 1-2.

<sup>4</sup> *Bulletin des facultés catholiques de Lyon*, (July-December 1946), pp. 16-17.

<sup>5</sup> Père Teilhard likes to name something before defining it because science likes symbols, and he is already thinking of Christ, Alpha and Omega, the stress on Omega.

<sup>6</sup> I recall that the properly metaphysical level, not being phenomenalist, is outside our perspective.

# THE DOCTRINE OF ANALOGY

E. L. MASCALL

Ἐκ γὰρ μεγέθους καλλονῆς κτισμάτων ἀναλόγως ὁ γενεσιουργὸς αὐτῶν θεωρεῖται.

*Wisdom of Solomon, xiii, 5*

I  
ANY philosophical system which believes in a genuinely transcendent God is bound sooner or later to find itself faced with the question: How is it possible for men to talk about God? This, as Dr. A. M. Farrer has remarked, is not a problem only for those who believe in natural theology. "There is a superstition among revelationists," he says, that by declaring themselves independent of any proof of God by analogy from the finite world, they have escaped the necessity of considering the analogy or relation of the finite to the infinite altogether. They are completely mistaken; for all their statements about God must be expressed and plainly are expressed in language drawn from the finite world. No revelationist supposes these statements to be perfectly literal; God is not a man and human language requires to be read with some tacit qualification before it applies to him. . . . The problem of analogy is in principle prior to every particular revelation. For the revelation has to be thought about to be received, and can be thought about only by the aid of words or finite images; and these cannot signify of God unless the appropriate 'mode of signification' functions in our minds."<sup>1</sup>

*E. L. Mascall is an Anglican priest of the Oratory of Good Shepherd. A university lecturer in the Philosophy of Religion at Oxford, he is the author of HE WHO IS and EXISTENCE AND ANALOGY (Longmans); the following essay is chapter 5 of the latter volume.*

This is undoubtedly true, however reluctant the revelationists may be to admit it; nevertheless the doctrine of analogy may be expected to play a far larger part among those who believe in natural theology, for in their case it is not merely a question of explaining how God can be spoken about in language derived from our experience of a finite world or of explaining how some notion of God can be contained in finite minds. There is also the question how the infinite God can be seen to exist from the consideration of finite things, and what relation God can have towards them; for the cosmological theist analogy is not merely a matter of linguistics and of psychology but of metaphysics too. What Dr. Farrer calls "the 'cosmological idea'—the scheme of God and the creature in relation"<sup>2</sup> is fundamental.

This being so, it is surprising how extremely small a place the doctrine of analogy has been given in the thought of Anglican theologians, compared with that which it has received among Roman Catholics. In spite of its title, Bishop

Butler's famous work on *The Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and Course of Nature* is concerned with it in only the remotest possible way. Bishop Berkeley devoted a few pages<sup>3</sup> to it, owing to his controversy with Dr. Peter Browne, and had apparently studied it in Suarez and Cajetan, but, as Mr. W. W. S. Marsh has remarked,<sup>4</sup> he failed to work out its applications. Dr. G. C. Joyce briefly outlined it in an article in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*,<sup>5</sup> but obviously did not think it to be of any very great importance; and Dr. Edwyn Bevan, while he devoted nearly half a chapter to it in his Gifford Lectures on *Symbolism and Belief*, confessed himself unable to make any sense of it<sup>6</sup> and found more satisfaction in the theories of Dean Mansel. Modern Roman Catholic theologians, however, under the stress of their controversy with symbolo-fideists and modernists of various kinds, have discussed the doctrine of analogy at great length; for the most part their work is little known in England, but some idea of its extent may be gained from the list of books and articles given in the Abbé Penido's treatise *Le Rôle de l'Analogie en Théologie Dogmatique*.<sup>7</sup> And it may well be that the neglect of this doctrine among English-speaking thinkers outside the Roman Communion is responsible for much of the unsatisfactoriness of Anglo-Saxon natural theology to-day, for their common failure to find any alternative to a transcendence which makes God altogether unknowable other than an immanence which makes him and the world necessary to each other, is precisely what the doctrine of analogy was elaborated to avoid. It is therefore a matter for satisfaction that quite recently two works by Anglican philosophers have appeared which take it thoroughly seriously, namely Dr. Farrer's *Finite and Infinite* and Miss Dorothy Emmet's *Nature of Metaphysical Thinking*. I intend to give a fairly thorough discussion of both these books later on;<sup>8</sup> in the present chapter I shall deal with the doctrine of analogy in its traditional form, which, like most scholastic doctrines, derives its ultimate parentage from Aristotle, though it received its full development, under the stimulus of the Judaeo-Christian belief in a fully transcendent and yet genuinely creative God, at the hands of the Angelic Doctor and the great Thomist commentators, especially Cajetan and John of St. Thomas.

One preliminary remark may be made before the discussion is opened, namely that the function of the doctrine of analogy is not to make it possible for us to talk about God in the future but to explain how it is that we have been able to talk about him all along. In spite of all that has been said by positivists, logical and other, we do in fact find ourselves talking about God, and talking about him in a way that is significant. It is, I would maintain, transparently clear to anyone whose judgment is not shackled by a predetermined dogma that, if two men respectively affirm and deny that God exists, they are in fact disagreeing about the nature of reality, and not merely expressing different emotional or aesthetic attitudes. There is, unfortunately, a recurrent tendency among philosophers, in analysing the mental activities of human beings in general, to assume that until their analysis and criticism have been satisfactorily completed, nobody has the right to make any affirmations at all; so deeply has Cartesianism entered into our heritage. The consequence is that the plain man laughs at the philosophers and goes on his own way without them. Against this tendency we are, as I see it, bound to assert that the task of any philosophical critique is to account for, to render precise and, if necessary, to correct



the body of doctrine that the human mind has acquired by the natural exercise of its own powers, but not, except in a purely relative and *ex post facto* way, to provide a justification for the activity of thought itself. To forget this is to doom oneself to a kind of intellectual suicide. For the critical philosopher is himself the heir of his past; before he was a philosopher at all he was a man, and before he was a man he was a child. To enter a second time into the womb and to be born again equipped with a fully developed critique of knowledge is a sheer impossibility. The fact is that, however fallible it may be, the human mind does acquire knowledge by the exercise of the powers which it possesses, and a sane philosophy will recognize this fact. To return, then, to the subject of our present discussion, the doctrine of analogy is not concerned to discover whether discourse about God is antecedently possible, or to endow it with a possibility that was originally absent, but to account for the fact that discourse about God has, as matter of experience, been taking place in spite of various considerations that might seem at first sight to rule its possibility out of court.

I would further add that the question of analogy does not arise at all in the mere proof of the existence of God; it arises only when, having satisfied ourselves that the existence of finite being declares its dependence upon self-existent being, we then apprehend that no predicate can be attributed to finite and to self-existent being univocally. Penido's remarks seem to me to be of the first importance here. "Formally," he writes, "the problem of analogy is a problem of nature, not of existence. We can arrive at the existence of God without *explicit* recourse to analogy, while it is impossible to think about the divine nature without conceiving it as equivocal, univocal or analogous to our own." And again: "It is quite true that the proofs of God are analogical *realities*, otherwise they would prove nothing. But they do not fall under the jurisdiction of the *method* of analogy, as theology employs it. Let us distinguish carefully—without separating them and still more without opposing them—the problem of analogical knowledge and the metaphysical problem of analogy. The former belongs in full right to the treatise on God, while it is only after the treatise on creation that we can approach the latter in its fullness. . . . Does this mean that analogy in no way depends on the *quinque viae*? By no means. Analogy begins at the precise point where the rational demonstration ends."<sup>9</sup> We had no need of any doctrine of analogy in the last chapter, in arguing from the existence of finite beings to the existence of God. When, however, the argument was complete, we saw that the God whose existence we were now asserting was a being of so radically different an order from everything else in our experience that it became a real question whether the word "God" in that context meant anything at all. There can be little satisfaction in demonstrating the existence of a being whom the very demonstration shows to be altogether inapprehensible. God would seem to have slipped from between our hands at the very moment when we had at last laid hold on him. It is at this point that the doctrine of analogy becomes altogether necessary, and it is for this reason that its full investigation only began among Christian philosophers who gave primacy of place to the existential approach to God.

The doctrine, as we find it in the Thomist tradition, appears in at least three distinct departments of philosophy, namely the metaphysical or ontological, the epistemological or psychological, and the logical or linguistic. This

is only what we might expect in a fundamentally realist philosophy, which holds that words are not merely noises and that thought is not merely about ideas, but that speech with its words and thought with its ideas are ultimately about things.<sup>10</sup> It is well to make this point clear at the start or we shall find ourselves puzzled to know what precisely is the question with which analogy is concerned. Is it "How can we talk about God?" or "How can we think about God?" or "How are things related to God?" In fact it is about all three, and we need not be worried by the way in which it slips from one to the other, so long as our attitude is confidently realist.<sup>11</sup> I shall, however, take the first question as my starting-point and consider the problem of analogical predication.

Is it possible, we therefore ask, for statements expressed in human language to mean anything when made about God—that is to say, are theological statements meaningful or meaningless? (The relevance of this discussion to the questions raised by the logical positivists will be immediately clear to those who have any acquaintance with their works.) Starting from a famous distinction made by Aristotle,<sup>12</sup> we remark that, even within the realm of discourse about finite beings, one and the same word, when applied to two things, sometimes bears the same sense in both applications and sometimes different ones. In the former case it is used *univocally* (συνονύμως), as when Carlo and Fido are both called dogs. Even if Carlo is a great Dane and Fido a Pomeranian, we mean the same thing about each of them when we call them both *dogs*; the characteristics in each that distinguish Carlo as a Dane from Fido as a Pomeranian, while they cannot be found in their totality except in dogs, are additional to caninity as such. But sometimes we use words purely equivocally (ὁμωνύμως), as when we apply the word "mug" both to a drinking utensil and to the victim of a fraud. (The neglect of this distinction can lead to unfortunate consequences, as the choirboys found who were starting a cricket team, when they asked the vicar for one of the bats which the verger had led them to believe were in the belfry.) But in addition to these two uses, it is alleged, a word is sometimes applied to two objects in senses that are neither wholly different nor yet wholly the same, as when we say that Mr. Jones and Skegness are both healthy, the former because he *enjoys*, and the latter because it *induces*, health; in this case we are said to use the term "healthy" *analogically* (ἀνάλογως).

At first sight the introduction of this mode of predication might seem to be unnecessary and trivial, and certainly Aristotle did not accord to it anything like as much attention as the scholastics do. We might be tempted to suppose that analogy is only a dignified kind of univocity, and that it is quite sufficient to say that the healthiness of Mr. Jones and the healthiness of Skegness are merely two ways of being healthy, just as the Danishness of Carlo and the Pomeranianity of Fido are merely two ways of being canine. Or, alternatively, we might go to the other extreme and say that analogy is only equivocality in sheep's clothing, that to enjoy health and to induce health are two altogether different activities and that only for the sake of economy in words can there be any justification for using the same term "healthy" *tout court* to denote them both. Furthermore, it might be asked, even if we admit this *tertium quid* of analogy, can we ever be quite sure when it applies? When we say that Mr. Jones is alive and that an oyster is alive, is the difference between the life of Mr. Jones and the life of the oyster something additional to a quality, namely life, which is found univocally

in both, as the Danishness of Carlo and the Pomeranianity of Fido are additional to their common caninity? Or, on the other hand, is the life which is attributed to Mr. Jones and to the oyster, as the scholastics would say, an analogical perfection, contracted to each subject not by external *differentiae* but by different internal modes of participation? Can one possibly settle this kind of question? Can we even give the distinction any real meaning?

Now, so long as we are merely considering qualities and properties of finite beings, the introduction of analogical discourse, in addition to univocal and equivocal, might well appear to be an unnecessary and artificial complication. There are, however, two instances in which it—or something like it—seems to be unavoidable, namely when we are discussing transcendentals and when we are discussing God. And it is worth noting that, in Christian thought, it is precisely the necessity of talking about God that has given rise to the great development which the doctrine of analogy has undergone. Let us consider these instances in order.

The transcendentals, in scholastic thought, are those six primary notions—*ens, res, unum, aliquid, verum* and *bonum*—which, because of their very universality, refuse to fall in any of the Aristotelian categories, but cut across them all.<sup>13</sup> The last five ultimately reduce to the first, so it will be sufficient to consider that. What, then, is meant by the analogy of being? Why is it denied that being is univocal? Simply because there is nothing outside being by which it could be differentiated. When we say that Carlo and Fido are both dogs, the word “dog” means precisely the same when applied to each of them; the differences that distinguish them as dogs are, as we have seen, extrinsic to caninity as such. But when we say that Carlo and Fido are both *beings*, the differences that distinguish them as beings cannot be extrinsic to being as such, for being, in its altogether universal reference, must embrace everything, including differences; if differences were not instances of being, they would be non-existent, and then no two things could be distinct from each other. So the scholastics tell us, being is not a genus,<sup>14</sup> since there is nothing outside it which could act as a differentia to it, to subdivide it into species; nevertheless everything is an instance of being, and being is differentiated by its own inherent analogical variety. To be is to be in a certain way, and the way is the very heart of the being. So the whole order of beings, of *entia*, from the triune Deity down to the speck of dust and the electron, consists of nothing more and nothing less than analogical instances of being: self-existent being and dependent being, actual being and possible being, substantial being and accidental being, real being and notional being, not in any pantheistic or monistic sense, as if being were some kind of cosmic material, a metaphysical modelling-clay appearing now in this shape and now in that, but in the far more profound sense that every being must *be*, and must be in some determinate way, and—the theist will add—in the sense that the way in which it has being depends in the last resort upon its relation to the self-existent Being which is the prime analogate of all.

Now what is true about beings as such in their relation to one another must be true *a fortiori* about finite beings in their relation to the God who is self-existent Being. If being is not a genus, then the supreme Being transcends all genera, and the principle of analogy, which we have seen applies even between creatures when they are considered as they participate in the trans-



cententials, will apply with even greater force when creatures are brought into comparison with the altogether transcendent God and when God is spoken about in words whose meaning is derived from their application to finite things. Here, if anywhere, the distinction between the *perfectio significata* and the *modus significandi* will hold; here, if anywhere, will the classical definition of analogy apply, namely that it is the application of a concept to different beings in ways that are simply diverse from each other and are only the same in a certain respect, *simpliciter diversa et eadem secundum quid*.<sup>15</sup> It is noticeable that St. Thomas does not deny that analogues are equivocal but only that they are purely so.<sup>16</sup>

Let us now proceed to consider in more detail this classical doctrine of analogy. The precise classification of the various types of analogy that can be distinguished is to this day a matter of considerable controversy; the method that I shall adopt will, however, bring out the salient points.

## II

In the first place, we may distinguish between analogy *duorum ad tertium* and analogy *unius ad alterum*; this is the fundamental distinction made by St. Thomas in both the *Summa Theologica* and the *Summa contra Gentiles*.<sup>17</sup> Analogy *duorum ad tertium* is the analogy that holds between two beings in consequence of the relation that each of them bears to a third (the analogy considered is, it must be noticed, between the *two*; the *tertium* only comes in as something in the background to which they are both related). For example, if the adjective "healthy" is applied both to Skegness and to the complexion of Mr. Jones who lives there, this double attribution of the adjective can only be seen to be legitimate if it is grasped that in its strict and primary application the adjective applies neither to Skegness nor to the complexion but to Mr. Jones. It is he who is (in the scholastic sense) *formally* healthy and is the *prime analogate*. His complexion is healthy only in the sense that it is a *sign* of health in him, Skegness is healthy only in the sense that it *induces* health in him (or in others like him); we cannot rationally justify the attribution of the same predicate "healthy" to things as diverse as a complexion and a seaside town except by referring them both to human beings to whom the predicate formally and properly belongs.

This type of analogy can, however, have little or no application to the case where we are attributing the same predicate to God and to a creature, for there is no being antecedent to God to whom the predicate can apply more formally and properly than it applies to him. We therefore pass to the other type of analogy, analogy *unius ad alterum*, which is founded not upon diverse relations which each of the analogates bears to a third, but upon a relation which one of them bears to the other. And this type of analogy itself subdivides into two.

The former of these sub-types is that which is known as analogy of *attribution* or of *proportion*, analogy *unius ad alterum* in the strict sense. In this case the predicate belongs formally and properly to one of the analogates (which is thus not merely an analogate but is the *prime* analogate), and only relatively and derivatively to the other. Thus it is by an analogy of attribution or proportion that Mr. Jones and his complexion are both described as healthy; health is

found formally and properly in Mr. Jones, and his complexion is described as healthy only because it bears a certain relation to his health, namely the relation of being a sign of it. In its theological application, where the analogates concerned are God and a creature, the relation upon which the analogy is based will be that of creative causality; creatures are related to God as his effects, by all those modes of participation by the creature in the perfection of its creator which are indicated, for example, by the Thomist Five Ways. Thus when we say that God and Mr. Jones are both good or that they are both beings, remembering that the content which the word "good" or "being" has for us is derived from our experience of the goodness and the being of creatures, we are, so far as analogy of attribution is concerned, saying no more than that God has goodness or being in whatever way is necessary if he is to be able to produce goodness and being in his creatures. This would not seem necessarily to indicate anything more than that the perfections which are found formally in various finite modes in creatures exist *virtually* in God, that is to say, that he is able to produce them in the creatures; it does not seem to necessitate that God possesses them formally himself. (In the case of Mr. Jones, of course, his complexion did indicate his formal possession of health, but there is, literally, all the difference in the world between the relation between two analogates in the finite realm and that between God and a creature.) Analogy of attribution certainly does not exclude the formal possession of the perfections by God, but it does not itself ascribe it to him. The mode in which the perfection which exists in the secondary analogate also exists in the prime analogate will depend on the relation between them; and if this relation is merely that the latter analogate is the *cause* of the former, the possession by the latter of a perfection that exists formally in the former will not, so far as the present mode of analogy is concerned, be necessarily anything more than a virtual one. Creatures are good (formally but finitely), God is the cause of them and of all that they have, therefore the word "good" applied to God need not mean any more than that he is able to produce goodness.<sup>18</sup> It is at this point that the second sub-type of analogy comes to the rescue.

This is analogy of proportionality, also called analogy *plurimum ad plura*. In it there is a direct relation of the mode in which a perfection is participated to the being by which it is participated, independently of any relation to a prime analogate. (There may be a prime analogate, and indeed some would maintain that there must be,<sup>19</sup> but it does not come in at this stage.) A spurious, though sometimes useful, form of this type of analogy is *metaphor*, in which there is not a formal participation of the same characteristic in the different analogates but only a similarity of effects. Thus, to take a classic example, the lion is called the king of the beasts because he bears to savage animals a relation similar to that which a king bears to his subjects, but no one would assert that kingship is to be found formally in the lion. Again, God is described as being angry, because his relation to the punishments which he imposes is similar to that which an angry man has to the injuries which he inflicts, but no one (at least, no scholastic philosopher) would say that anger was to be found formally in God.<sup>20</sup> In the strict sense, an analogy of proportionality implies that the analogue under discussion is found formally in each of the analogates but in a mode that is determined by the nature of the analogate itself. Thus, assuming that life is an analogous and not a univocal concept, it is asserted that cabbages,

elephants, men and God each possess life formally (that is each of them is, quite literally and unmetaphorically, *alive*), but that the cabbage possesses life in the mode proper to a cabbage, the elephant in that proper to an elephant, the man in that proper to a man, and finally God in that supreme, and by us unimaginable, mode proper to self-existent Being itself. This is commonly expressed in the following quasi-mathematical form, from which, in fact, the name "analogy of proportionality" is derived:<sup>21</sup>

$$\frac{\text{life of cabbage}}{\text{essence of cabbage}} = \frac{\text{life of elephant}}{\text{essence of elephant}}$$

$$\frac{\text{life of man}}{\text{essence of man}} = \frac{\text{life of God}}{\text{essence of God}}$$

We must, however, beware of interpreting the equal sign too literally. For the point is not that the life of the cabbage is determined by the essence of the cabbage in the *same* way as that in which the life of the man is determined by the essence of the man, but that the way in which cabbage essence determines cabbage life is proper to cabbagehood, while the way in which the human essence determines human life is proper to manhood. But at this point various objections rapidly spring to the mind.

In the first place, it may be asked, has not the remark just made landed us in an infinite regress? We began by denying the univocity of the identity,

$$\text{life of cabbage} = \text{life of man},$$

and substituted for it the proportionality:

$$\frac{\text{life of cabbage}}{\text{essence of cabbage}} = \frac{\text{life of man}}{\text{essence of man}}$$

But we now have denied that the equal sign in this latter equation really signifies equality and have substituted for it a proposition which, in quasi-mathematical form, can be written as follows:

$$\frac{\text{way in which life of cabbage is determined by essence of cabbage}}{\text{essence of cabbage}} = \frac{\text{way in which life of man is determined by essence of man}}{\text{essence of man}}$$

And again we shall have to remember that the equal sign means not identity but similarity, and shall now have to write:

$$\frac{\text{way in which way-in-which-life-of-cabbage-is-determined-by-essence-of-cabbage is determined by essence of cabbage}}{\text{essence of cabbage}} = \frac{\text{way in which way-in-which-life-of-man-is-determined-by-essence-of-man is determined by essence of man}}{\text{essence of man}}$$

and so *ad infinitum*.



To put this more briefly, if we write *L* for "life of" and *E* for "essence of," *c* for "cabbage" and *m* for "man," and use *A/B* to signify "determination of *A* by *B*," we began by denying  $Lc = Lm$ , and put in its place

$$Lc/Ec = Lm/Em;$$

then we said that what we really meant was

$$(Lc/Ec)/Ec = (Lm/Em)/Em;$$

then we found that for this we should have to substitute

$$[(Lc/Ec)/Ec]/Ec = [(Lm/Em)/Em]/Em.$$

The next stage will be

$$\{[(Lc/Ec)/Ec]/Ec\}/Ec = \{[(Lm/Em)/Em]/Em\}/Em,$$

and so we shall go on for ever, at each successive stage denying progressively more complicated relationships between cabbages and men, and never managing to assert a relationship which we shall not immediately have to deny. And at the end of it we shall have nothing but a series of negations:

$$Lc \neq Lm,$$

$$Lc/Ec \neq Lm/Em,$$

$$(Lc/Ec)/Ec \neq (Lm/Em)/Em,$$

$$[(Lc/Ec)/Ec]/Ec \neq [(Lm/Em)/Em]/Em, \quad \text{etc.}$$

Our proportionality has completely collapsed, and all we are left with is the fact that cabbages have nothing in common with men except the fact that, for no valid reason, men have described them both as being alive. In fact, the introduction of analogy as a *via media* between univocity and equivocity has turned out to be nothing more than an imposing piece of mystification. This is the first objection of which we must take account; it is obviously a serious one. It strikes, not in particular at the analogical application of terms to God, but to analogical predication as such. I shall not attempt a full reply until I have stated another objection which is concerned with the specifically theological case, but I shall offer a few observations in passing.

First, then, we may remark that the objection, while on the surface plausible, has something of the appearance of a conjuring trick. It brings to mind two somewhat similar feats of philosophical legerdemain. The first is Lewis Carroll's *What the Tortoise said to Achilles*.<sup>23</sup> In this problem, which its originator did not perhaps intend to be taken as seriously as it really demands, Achilles maintained that, if two premisses *A* and *B* logically implied a conclusion *Z*, then anybody who saw this and also accepted *A* and *B* as true would have to accept *Z* as true also. The tortoise objected that this would only be the case if he accepted a further proposition *C*, namely that if *A* and *B* are true then *Z* must be true. Achilles was thus forced to modify his original assertion, so that it now took the form "Anyone who accepts *A*, *B* and *C* as true must accept *Z* as true also." But again the tortoise objected that this involved the acceptance of another pro-

position D, which was that, if A and B and C are true, Z must be true as well. And so on for ever! This corresponds, of course, to the well-known fact that the principle of inference is incapable of formal symbolic statement within the logical calculus to which it applies.<sup>23</sup> A logical system cannot, as it were, operate under its own steam, without help from outside; we shall derive from this fact a pointer towards the solution of our present problem. The other puzzle to which I wish to refer is one which its originator took much more seriously: I mean Mr. F. H. Bradley's famous argument that relations are illusions.<sup>24</sup> It is, he urged, of the essence of a relation to unite terms, but how is each term united to the relation? It can only be by another relation, but if so, what unites the term to this? To make the first relation intelligible we have to presuppose an infinite sequence of relations antecedent to it, and none of these is yet intelligible. Hence, Mr. Bradley concluded, relations are mere illusion. Lord Russell has caustically remarked that if Bradley's argument were valid it would prove that chains are impossible—and yet they exist.<sup>25</sup> Dr. C. D. Broad has dealt with Bradley's problem in some detail. He takes as an instance of it the fact that A is father of B. "Here," he writes, "we have a perfectly intelligible statement, involving the non-formal<sup>26</sup> relation of *fatherhood*. At the next stage we get the fact that A is referent to *fatherhood*, and the fact that B is relatum to *fatherhood*. The 'relations' introduced at this stage are purely formal. At the next stage we get the fact that A is referent to *referent to*, that *fatherhood* is relatum to *referent to*, that *fatherhood* is referent to *referent to*, and that B is relatum to *referent to*. Thus no new 'relations' are introduced at this or any subsequent stage. The fact that at every stage after the first the relating relations are purely formal and are merely repeated shows that we are now embarked on the self-evidently impossible task of explaining, by means of particular relational judgments, that general relational form which is presupposed by all relational judgments whatever."<sup>27</sup> We might, in fact, say that, while it is of the essence of relations to unite terms, they are not themselves terms in this context (though, of course, in another context they may become terms, as when we pick out two relations, or a relation and a term, and ask what is the relation between them). Similarly, in the case of analogy of proper proportionality, we might reply to our objector that we are simply concerned with the fact that essences determine their qualities, and that the truth of this is not in the least affected by the fact that they can only do this if they also determine the way in which they determine their qualities, and the way in which they determine the way in which they determine their qualities, and so on to the crack of doom. *Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte*.

Such a reply would, I think, go a very long way, though I am doubtful whether it is altogether sufficient. For the fact remains that we have denied that our equal signs really stand for equality and we have not indicated anything definite that they do stand for. Can we in some way re-establish this bond that we have broken? Clearly we cannot by analogy of proportionality, but I shall suggest that we can by analogy of attribution, and that the two types of analogy, while either in separation is insufficient, can in combination do what is required.<sup>28</sup> But this is an anticipation. I will pass on now to consider the second objection, which is specially concerned with analogical discourse about God.

## III

Let us therefore see what happens when we attribute life both to a creature and to God; any other perfection which can be formally predicated of God would, of course, do as well. Analogy of proportionality asserts:

$$\frac{\text{life of man}}{\text{essence of man}} = \frac{\text{life of God}}{\text{essence of God}}$$

Now, the objector urges, even if the first objection has been successfully overcome, so that we have no longer to bother about the fact that the equal sign does not indicate an exact identity of relationship, our formula will not in fact tell us in what sense life is to be predicated of God. For the essence of God is as little known to us as is his life; indeed his life is, formally considered, identical with it. Our equation has therefore two unknowns and cannot be solved. Nor can we get out of our difficulty by comparing essence with existence and saying that the essence of a being will correspond to, and be determined by, the act in virtue of which it exists:

$$\frac{\text{essence of man}}{\text{existential act of man}} = \frac{\text{essence of God}}{\text{existential act of God}}$$

Once again, both the terms on the right-hand side are unknown. Sheer agnosticism seems to be the outcome. What reply can we make?

Some scholastic philosophers, of whom Garrigou-Lagrange is one, claim to answer this objection, while remaining in the realm of analogy of proportionality, by denying that there are two unknown terms on the right-hand side. This last-mentioned writer, for example, taking the analogy

$$\frac{\text{creature}}{\text{its being}} = \frac{\text{first cause}}{\text{its being}}$$


asserts that only the fourth term is in fact unknown. "We have," he says, "(1) *the very confused concept of being in general*, which a child possesses from the moment of its first intellectual knowledge, (2) *the concept of finite being*, of which we know positively the finite mode and which is nothing else than the essence of the things that we see, stones, plants, animals, etc., (3) *the concept of analogous being*, imperfectly abstracted from the finite mode . . . ; it is a precision of the first very confused concept possessed by the child, and the metaphysician acquires it by recognizing that the formal notion of being does not in itself include the finite mode which accompanies it in the creature, (4) *the concept of the divine being*, the cause of created beings. These latter," he continues, "not having in their essence the reason of their existence, require a cause which exists of itself. In the concept of the divine being, the divine mode is expressed only in a negative and relative way, e.g. as non-finite or as supreme being. What is positive in this analogical knowledge of God is what God has that is proportionally common to him and the creature."<sup>20</sup> Again, he writes, "*being designates that which has relation to existence; this relation is implied in the very nature of that which exists and it is essentially varied accord-*



ing as it is necessary or contingent. The created essence in its inmost entity is altogether relative to its contingent existence, which it can lose; the uncreated essence is conceived only relatively to that necessary existence with which it is identified. . . . Analogous perfections are thus not pure relations. They are perfections which imply in the creature a composition of two correlative elements, potentiality and act, but which in God are pure act. Our intelligence conceives that they are realized more fully according as they are purified of all potentiality; in God they exist therefore in the pure state. We thus see that they are not two unknowns in the proportionalities set up by theology."<sup>30</sup>

For this distinguished French Dominican, therefore, the third term in the formula is given us as that in which essence and existence are identical, and this gives us a limited and analogical, but nevertheless genuine, knowledge of the fourth term, while remaining within the realm of analogy of proportionality.<sup>31</sup> We can transfer the notion of any perfection from a finite being to God, remembering that the difference of mode is that which corresponds to the difference between a being whose essence involves merely a possibility of existence and one whose essence involves existence of necessity. Of course, we do not know positively what the mode of the perfection in God is; to demand that would be to demand a quidditative knowledge of the divine essence and to abolish analogy altogether in favour of univocity. We are given all that we have a right to ask for; the comparison of the finite and the infinite modes of perfection is based on a comparison of the relations to existence which are proper to finite essence and to the divine essence respectively.

Now all this seems very satisfactory so far as it goes, but does it go far enough? Is it sufficient simply to base the comparison of the finite and infinite modes of a perfection upon a comparison of the finite and infinite modes of the essence-existence relation, without bringing in an explicit reference to the concrete relation which the creature has to God? There are indeed traces in Garrigou-Lagrange's own discussion of an awareness of the need of this further step; the very form in which he writes the formula last quoted suggests this. For he does not describe the finite being as a being in whom essence does not necessarily involve existence, but as a "creature"; and he does not describe God as a being whose essence necessarily involves existence, but as the "first cause." In these equations, he writes, "two created terms are known directly, one uncreated term is known indirectly *by way of causality* and we infer the fourth term which is known indirectly in a *positive* manner as regards what is analogically common with creatures and in a *negative* and relative manner as regards its proper divine mode."<sup>32</sup> And the first cause and the creature are directly related by the relation of creation, which thus, as it were, cuts horizontally across the analogy of proportionality with an analogy of attribution.<sup>33</sup> The equal sign does not, as we have seen earlier, express a mathematical identity, but, on the other hand, the two sides of the formula are not left in complete separation. They are bound together by an analogy of attribution *unius ad alterum*, of the creature to God in the case which we have just been considering. In the cases considered earlier, where the two sides of the formula both refer to finite beings, the linking analogy is an analogy *duorum ad tertium*, which holds in view of the fact that each of the analogates is in an analogy of attribution *unius ad alterum*, of itself to God. The figure below may help to make this plain.<sup>34</sup>



The conclusion would thus seem to be that, in order to make the doctrine of analogy really satisfactory, we must see the analogical relation between God and the world as combining in a tightly interlocked union both analogy of attribution and analogy of proportionality. Without analogy of proportionality it is very doubtful whether the attributes which we predicate of God can be ascribed to him in more than a merely virtual sense; without analogy of attribution it hardly seems possible to avoid agnosticism. Which of the two forms of analogy is prior to the other has been, and still is, a hotly debated question among scholastic philosophers. Sylvester of Ferrara, in his great commentary on the *Summa contra Gentiles*, asserted the primacy of attribution and alleged that in this he was expressing the true thought of St. Thomas,<sup>35</sup> but the "prince of commentators" Cajetan, in his luminous little treatise *De Nominum Analogia*, asserted that only proportionality was analogy in the true and strict sense<sup>36</sup> and the majority of Thomists have followed him, down to Garrigou-Lagrange,<sup>37</sup> Penido,<sup>38</sup> and Maritain<sup>39</sup> at the present day, though Descoqs is a notable exception.<sup>40</sup>

#### IV

It is perhaps necessary at this point to make a clearer distinction than has yet been made in this discussion between the three orders of thought—the logical, the epistemological, and the ontological<sup>41</sup>—to which the notion of analogy applies. However anxious we are to maintain the realist position that words and concepts are both about things, the fact remains that words, concepts and things are not identical and that at some point the distinction must be made. (Cajetan himself remarks that for the logician analogy of attribution is merely a kind of equivocity, while for the philosopher it is a kind of analogy.)<sup>42</sup> And it is vital to the whole position which I have been maintaining to insist that in natural theology we are not merely instituting comparisons between two orders of concepts but considering created and uncreated being as the former actually exists in dependence on the latter. That is to say, we are not merely concerned with the question "How can an infinite, necessary and immutable Being be described in terms that are derived from the finite, contingent and mutable world?" but with a question that is anterior to this and without which

this cannot be properly discussed at all, namely "How is the possibility of our applying to the infinite Being terms that are derived from the finite order conditioned by the fact that the finite order is dependent for its very existence on the fiat of the infinite and self-existent Being?" In the order of predication or of conceptualization it may well be the case that the two types of analogy are disconnected, that proportionality is prior to attribution, or that, as John of St. Thomas suggests,<sup>43</sup> the analogy of attribution between God and the creature is only virtual; but when we are concerned with the affirmation of God as the supreme existent, whose existence can nevertheless only be affirmed by us as a result of our prior recognition of the existence of finite existents, it would seem that our statements about God can hardly exclude all reference to the relation in which he stands to his creatures in existential fact.<sup>44</sup> M. Gilson has developed this line of thought in a most stimulating way in one of the sections which, in accordance with his enhanced recognition of the existentialism of St. Thomas, he has added to the revised edition of his book *Le Thomisme*.<sup>45</sup> He begins by commenting on the contrast between the paucity and restraint of St. Thomas's own treatment of the subject and the immense volume of the discussions that it has provoked among his disciples. He suggests that this is largely due to "a secret desire to rescue from a too glaring lowliness the knowledge of God which St. Thomas Aquinas allows us to have. People thus come," he says, "step by step to speak of analogy as a source of almost positive knowledge which would allow us to conceive more or less confusedly the essence of God. But perhaps," he continues, "it is not necessary to force the Thomist texts in order to obtain from this notion the services desired. It is enough to interpret them, as St. Thomas does himself, not in the order of the concept but in that of the judgment."<sup>46</sup> For M. Gilson, then, the purpose of the doctrine of analogy is not to allow us to form concepts of the divine essence, but to allow us to affirm the divine existence; not to compare God's features with those of finite beings, but to allow us to assert that he exists when we can identify him only by describing him in terms derived from the finite order. As we have seen,<sup>47</sup> the great problem for a radically transcendent theism is how to keep God, as it were, from slipping out of our grasp at the moment in which we affirm his existence. The world requires as its cause a being totally transcending it in every respect; but how can we even affirm the existence of such a being, if our experience of the world gives us no words by which to define him? There is no solution, says Gilson, in terms of essences and concepts. Referring to the perennial controversy between those who stress the element of agnosticism in St. Thomas's theology and those who insist in contrast on the positive value which it guarantees to our knowledge of God, he writes as follows: "On the level of the concept there is no middle way between the univocal and the equivocal. At that point the two interpretations are irreconcilable, but they would surely cease to be so if we transferred them to the level of the judgment. We must observe, in fact, that in the case of God, every judgment, even if it has the appearance of a judgment of attribution, is in reality a judgment of existence. When we speak, with reference to him, of essence or substance or goodness or wisdom, we are doing nothing more than repeating about him: he is *esse*. That is why his name *par excellence* is *Qui est*. If then we take the divine attributes one by one and ask whether each of them is to be found in God, we must reply that it is not there, at least as such



and as a distinct reality, and since we can in no way conceive an essence which is nothing but an act of existing, we cannot in any way conceive what God is, even with the help of such attributes. . . . On the other hand," he adds, "St. Thomas undoubtedly does allow us a certain knowledge of God, [and] unless we are to admit that St. Thomas has grossly contradicted himself, we must suppose that the knowledge of God which he grants us does not in any way bear upon his essence.<sup>48</sup> . . . Every effect of God is analogous to its cause. The concept which we form of this effect can in no case be transformed for us into the concept of God which we lack, but we can attribute to God, by our affirmative judgment, the name that denotes the perfection corresponding to this effect. To proceed in this way is not to posit God as similar to the creature, it is to ground oneself on the certitude that, since every effect resembles its cause, the creature from which we start certainly resembles God (*S.c.G.*, I. xxix)."<sup>49</sup>

This point is so important that I will try to make it in a slightly different way. So long as we are talking about finite beings we can make statements about their natures or essences without any assertion about their existence. I can say that a unicorn has a horn on its nose and that a rhinoceros has a horn on its nose without suggesting that any animals with horns on their noses exist; that rhinoceroses do exist and that unicorns do not is a purely empirical fact. But I cannot say that God is good without asserting the existence of a good being; for since God is by definition self-existent being, to affirm that God is good is to speak of self-existent goodness, that is to say of goodness that cannot but exist.<sup>50</sup> Again, in talking about finite beings, we can ascribe to them properties not necessarily included in their essences. If I say that the Cambridge buses are red, I am not asserting that redness is necessarily inherent in the nature of a Cambridge bus; in fact there was a time when the Cambridge buses were green. When, however, I say that God is good or wise or just, I am inevitably asserting that goodness, wisdom and justice are inherent in the nature of God, for in God there are no accidents, no qualities that are not included in his essence.<sup>51</sup> It follows that all our statements about God have a directly existential reference, such as is possessed by none of our statements about finite beings except those in which existence is explicitly asserted. The only way in which I can assert that beings with horns on their noses exist is by affirming existence either of such beings in general or of some such being (for example, a unicorn or a rhinoceros) in particular; but I can assert that a good being exists simply by affirming that God is good. Since in God essence and existence are identical, any assertion about God's essence is at the same time an assertion about existence; anything which is affirmed to be included in God's nature is at the same time affirmed to exist, and indeed to be self-existent.

It is then, I suggest, in virtue of this inherently existential element in all our affirmations about God that the possibility of analogical knowledge of God and of analogical discourse about him can be maintained. If it were possible to make a statement about God that bore exclusively on the essential or conceptual order, that statement would collapse into sheer equivocity and agnosticism, for no concept of the essence of God can be formed by a finite mind.<sup>52</sup> Since, however, God's essence necessarily involves his existence, no statement about him can remain in the essential or conceptual order; it passes over immediately into the order of existence and the judgment. What begins as an attempt to conceive

God's goodness—an attempt which is doomed to failure—issues in an affirmation that self-existent goodness exists; but even this last statement needs careful interpretation if it is not to be taken as implying that we form a concept of "self-existent goodness."<sup>53</sup> It would perhaps be better to say that goodness exists self-existently, for then the fundamental dependence of analogical predication upon the metaphysical analogy of being is made clear. We can then see how we must interpret the formula

$$\frac{\text{goodness of finite being}}{\text{finite being}} = \frac{\text{goodness of God}}{\text{God}}$$

as holding not merely in the order of essence but in that of existence, as expressing not a comparison of concepts but an existential judgment. The second term on the left-hand side of our formula ("finite being") expresses precisely that contingency of existence which arises from the fact that in finite beings essence and existence are really distinct; the second term on the right-hand side ("God") expresses that necessity of existence which arises from the fact that in God essence and existence are really identical. And the two sides of the formula are held together by that analogy of attribution which asserts, not merely in the conceptual but in the existential order, that finite being can exist only in dependence upon God. The goodness of God is thus declared to be self-existent goodness, and, as such, identical not merely with God's essence but with the act by which God exists. Analogy does not enable us to *conceive* God's goodness as identical with his essence but to *affirm* it as identical with his existence. Hence all our assertions about God are grossly inadequate in so far as they apply concepts to him, but they are thoroughly adequate in so far as they affirm perfections of him. Here the relevance of the distinction between the *perfectio significata* and the *modus significandi* can be seen at the full, as can also the reconciliation of the apparent contradiction between St. Thomas's "agnosticism" and his conviction that we can make genuine assertions about God. The names which we apply to God, he says, "designate the divine substance and are predicated of God substantially, but they fall short of representing him."<sup>54</sup> We cannot, in short, know God's essence by forming a concept of it, but we can know it analogically in our concepts of finite beings. I shall conclude at this point this already over-long discussion of the scholastic doctrine of analogy, and in doing so I will remind the reader again that its purpose has been, not to discover whether it is possible intelligibly to talk about God, but to explain how it is that we have been able to do so and to analyse what it is that we have in fact been doing. It is too much to hope that the explanation has been entirely adequate; it is perhaps sufficient if it has revealed some intelligibility in what by its very nature must be a mystery.<sup>55</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Finite and Infinite*, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 16.

<sup>3</sup> *Alciphron*, Dial. IV, xx, xxi.

<sup>4</sup> *Theology*, June 1942.

<sup>5</sup> Vol. I, pp. 416 f.

<sup>6</sup> p. 315.

<sup>7</sup> p. 12, n. 1.

<sup>8</sup> Ch. vii *infra*.

<sup>9</sup> *Rôle de l'Analogie*, pp. 85-7. The point, as I see it, of the assertion that, while the proofs of God

are analogical realities, they do not fall under the jurisdiction of analogy is that, while any *mode of existing* can only be predicated analogically of God and creatures (since mode of existence is essence and falls under the concept), the act of existing, which is not conceptualizable, can be affirmed without any analogical reservation. There is thus no concession to the doctrine of univocity of being.

<sup>10</sup> "I am not yet so lost in lexicography," wrote Dr. Johnson in the Preface to his Dictionary, "as to forget that words are the daughters of earth, and that things are the sons of heaven."

<sup>11</sup> "Tripliciter quaelibet res, ad nos quantum attinet, considerari potest: ut est nempe *in se*, ut est *in intellectu nostro*, ut est *in nostro ore*, 'vox a postremo nunc incipiendo, *conceptus in anima*, et *res extra seu conceptus objectivus*', uti ad rem Cajetanus docet (*De Nom. Anal.*, cap. iv, no. 31). Triplex hinc exsurgit ordo: ordo videlicet *essendi*, ordo *cognoscendi*, ordo *significandi*" (S. Alvarez-Menendez, Introduction to Cajetan, *De Nominum Analogia* (1934), p. viii).

<sup>12</sup> *Categories*, I. It is true that in this text Aristotle mentions only univocity and equivocity, though elsewhere he makes considerable use of the notion of analogy. Cajetan remarks *à propos* of this text that logicians (in contrast to philosophers) call analogy of attribution equivocation (*De Nom. Anal.*, cap. ii, no. 19).

<sup>13</sup> It should be noted that they are called transcendentals because they transcend the categories. This is not the meaning which the word "transcendent" has when applied to God to indicate that he transcends the realm of finite being. Nor is it the meaning that "transcendental" has for Kant: "I apply," he says, "the term *transcendental* to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible *a priori*" (*Critique of Pure Reason*, Introduction, ch. vii, trans. Meiklejohn). Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Dieu*, p. 200, n.1

<sup>14</sup> R. G. Collingwood surprisingly asserts that for the traditional metaphysics being is the *summum genus* of which the ten Categories are species; in consequence he has little difficulty in arguing that there cannot be a science of pure being (*Essay in Metaphysics*, pp. 9, 10 f). What Aristotle actually thought will be found in *Met. B.*, 998b.

<sup>15</sup> This is the Thomist definition of analogical discourse. For the Suarezians, however, with their conceptualist bias and the consequent sharp line drawn between thought and the extra-mental thing, an analogical concept applies to different beings in ways *simpliciter eadem et diversa secundum quid*.

<sup>16</sup> *Hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce pure neque univoce* (S. Theol., I, xiii, 5c). We may compare the well-known statement of the Fourth Lateran Council that "between the creator and the creature no likeness can be discerned without a greater unlikeness having to be discerned as well" (*inter creatorem et creaturam non potest tanta similitudo notari quin inter eos major sit dissimilitudo notanda*, cap. ii; Denzinger-Bannwart, *Enchiridion*, 11th ed., no. 432). It is easy to see what this means, but it would be difficult to defend it as a precise philosophical statement, as it appears to assume that likeness and unlikeness are two different species of a measurable genus. One can validly say that two objects are less alike in one respect than they are in another, but to say that they are less alike in one respect than they are *unlike* in another does not seem to be strictly intelligible.

<sup>17</sup> S. Theol., I, xiii, 5c; S.c.G., I, xxxiv.

<sup>18</sup> It is important to observe that we are not arguing that the formal possession of goodness by creatures does not *prove* that goodness is formally in God; the argument is not here on the metaphysical but merely on the linguistic and logical plane. All that is asserted is that if the only analogy between God and creatures was analogy of attribution then the word "good" applied to God would not necessarily *mean* any more than that goodness was in God virtually. *In fact* the metaphysical relation of the world to God implies analogy of proportionality as well, and it is at this latter stage that the formal attribution of goodness to God becomes clear.

<sup>19</sup> Thus Garrigou-Lagrange writes: "It is not necessary here to mention the principal analogate in the definition of the others, but there nevertheless always is a prime analogate. In metaphorical analogy of proportionality, it is the one to which the name of analogue belongs in the strict sense. In strict analogy of proportionality, the principal analogate is that which is the higher cause of the others: the analogical similitude that exists in this latter case is always based on causality; it exists either between the cause and the effect or between the effects of the same cause" (*Dieu*, p. 532, n. 3). This last remark seems to imply the assertion that will be made later on: that in its theological application analogy of proportionality needs to be reinforced by analogy of attribution; Garrigou-Lagrange does not, however, explicitly make the assertion. We may add here, as a point of terminology, that the word "analogue" (*analogum*) refers to the common predicate (or common quality or transcendental signified by it), while the word "analogate" (*analogatum*) refers to the various subjects to which it is attributed, or to its diverse modes in them. An alternative nomenclature refers to the analogue as *analogum analogans* and the analogate as *analogum analogatum*.

<sup>20</sup> A further example of purely metaphorical proportionality is provided by Canning's celebrated epigram:

"Pitt is to Addington  
As London is to Paddington."

<sup>21</sup> "Let magnitudes which have the same proportion (*logos*) be called proportional (*analogos*)" (Euclid V, Def. 6). For the sake of clarity it may be useful to indicate by a diagram the classification of analogy which I have adopted:

I. Analogy *duorum ad tertium*.

II. Analogy *unius ad alterum*.

(i) Analogy of attribution or proportion, strictly *unius ad alterum*.

(ii) Analogy of proportionality, *plurium ad plura*



- (a) in loose sense (metaphor)  
(b) in strict sense.

Slightly different classifications may be found in Garrigou-Lagrange, *Dieu*, p. 351; Maquart, *Elem. Phil.*, III, ii, p. 36.

<sup>22</sup> *The Complete Works of Lewis Carroll*, pp. 1104 f.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. B. Russell, *The Principles of Mathematics*, pp. 16, 35, where explicit reference is made to Lewis Carroll's puzzle.

<sup>24</sup> *Appearance and Reality*, I, ch. iii.

<sup>25</sup> *Outline of Philosophy*, p. 263.

<sup>26</sup> "Formal," for Broad and all the modern logicians, means "purely logical," "having no reference to particular concrete individual entities." This is very different from the scholastic use of the word.

<sup>27</sup> *Examination of Mc Taggart's Philosophy*, I, p. 86.

<sup>28</sup> It may be interesting to see how Dr. A. M. Farrer deals with this difficulty. For him "this proportionality claims to hold between four terms, and not two relations. We are not saying," he continues, "The way in which the divine intelligence is related to the divine existence resembles the way in which the creaturely intelligence is related to the creaturely existence' for that is exactly what we have to deny. The way in which the several aspects of the divine being (e.g. intelligence) have their synthesis into one, itself differs from the way in which the several aspects of the creaturely being have their synthesis into one, as the divine being itself differs from the creaturely. What we are saying is completely different, viz. 'Divine intelligence is appropriate to divine existence as creaturely to creaturely'" (*Finite and Infinite*, p. 53, italics in original).

Dr. Farrer's first point seems to me to be valuable, at least as denying equality of relations; in this respect the older mathematical notation for proportionality,  $a : b :: c : d$ , might be less misleading

than the more modern  $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{c}{d}$ . But I do not think any scholastic would deny that proportionality was

some sort of relation between two relations or would reduce it simply to a polyadic relation uniting four terms. Dr. Farrer himself in the quotation above seems, by italicizing the word "as," to admit the equal sign at a subsequent stage and, while denying

$$\frac{\text{divine intelligence}}{\text{divine existence}} = \frac{\text{human intelligence}}{\text{human existence}}$$

to be asserting

$$\frac{\text{synthesis of aspects in God}}{\text{being of God}} = \frac{\text{synthesis of aspects in creature}}{\text{being of creature}}$$

but I cannot think that this was his intention. He has previously said that the formula "presupposes that intelligence can be attributed to God, and declares how it is to be understood when it is attributed to him and not to the creature, viz. as differing from its creaturely mode with a difference analogous to that by which the divine existence differs from the creaturely. And so it presupposes also the 'proportion' between the two 'existences.'" He goes on to say: "Proportion logically underlies proportionality, but this need not mean that we originally entertain the notion of the proportion 'divine existence/creaturely existence except as the foundation for a proportionality; the two are distinguished by philosophical analysis only." The proportion now mentioned is, it will be noticed, not either of the proportions that form the two sides of the proportionality, but the proportion between a term on one side and a term on the other. This seems to be in line with my assertion that, in the relation of God to creatures, analogy of proportionality and of attribution (proportion) are interlocked. Dr. Farrer continues: "The natural use of the proportion is inseparable from that of the proportionality, as the apprehension of the very fact of the divine being is inseparable from some apprehension of its mode."

<sup>29</sup> *Dieu*, p. 541.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 542.

<sup>31</sup> Penido's answer to the objection (*Rôle de l'Analogie*, pp. 136 f.) rests upon his assertion previously noticed (p. 53, n. 9, *supra*) that no use of analogy is necessary in the mere demonstration of the existence of God. Thus, in the proportionality,

$$\frac{\text{essence of creature}}{\text{existential act of creature}} = \frac{\text{essence of God}}{\text{existential act of God}}$$

the fourth term is not unknown; it is already given to us as self-existence, *ipsum esse subsistens*, existence not really distinct from essence. Thus, whereas for Garrigou-Lagrange the *third* term is given to us *in and through* the analogy, for Penido the *fourth* term is given to us *prior to* the analogy; thus he writes, "L'analogie . . . n'apparaît pas explicitement au début de notre marche vers Dieu, elle ne s'occupe pas de la question 'an sit', elle n'entre en jeu que lorsqu'il s'agit du 'quomodo sit' (*Rôle*, p. 138). I cannot help feeling that at this point Penido is nearer the truth.

<sup>32</sup> *Dieu*, p. 543 (first set of italics mine).

<sup>33</sup> Garrigou-Lagrange himself writes: "If the analogy of being is formally an analogy of proportionality it is virtually an analogy of attribution, in the sense that if, *per impossibile*, being did not belong intrinsically to the creature it could still be extrinsically attributed to it, in so far as the creature is an effect of the prime Being" (*Dieu*, p. 541, note). It is the word "virtually" in this passage from which I am disposed to dissent. Penido lays great stress upon the "mixed" nature of the analogy between God and the world (*Rôle de l'Analogie*, p. 134 *et al.*).

<sup>34</sup> It should here be noted that analogy *duorum ad tertium* is itself an instance of analogy of attribution.

<sup>35</sup> *Comm. in S.c.G.*, I, xxxiv. In this place in *S.c.G.*, and in *S. Theol.*, I, xiii, 5c, where (with purely verbal differences) he divides analogy into (a) *duorum ad tertium*, and (b) *unius ad alterum* and asserts that only the latter of these applies when creatures are compared with God, St. Thomas certainly seems to hold this view. However, in *De Veritate*, ii, 11, he writes: "There are two kinds of proportional association and so there are two kinds of community by analogy. For there is a certain association between things which have a proportion between them, because there is a determinate distance or other relation between them, such as 2 has to 1 because it is its double, and there is another association when two things are compared with each other between which there is no proportion but rather a likeness of two proportions to each other, as when 6 is associated with 4 because 6 is the double of 3 and 4 is the double of 2. The former is an association of proportion, the latter of proportionality. So by the former mode of association we find something analogously said of two things of which one has a relation to the other, as substance and accident are both called beings because of the relation between them. . . . But sometimes something is said analogically in the latter mode of association, as bodily sight and understanding are both given the name of sight, because as sight is to the eye so is understanding to the mind. Therefore because in things said analogically in the former mode there must be some determinate relation between the things which have something in common analogically, it is impossible for anything to be said in this mode of God and a creature. But in the other mode of analogy no determinate relation holds between the things which have something in common analogically, and so in this mode nothing prevents a name from being analogically spoken of God and a creature. Nevertheless this can happen in two ways: [metaphorically and strictly]." We may note: (i) that the passages can be reconciled if we take proportion (attribution) and proportionality as a subdivision of analogy *unius ad alterum* (as in *n.* 21 on p. 54), and see the passage in *De Ver.* as defining precisely the way in which this type of analogy can validly be given a theological use, (ii) that the rejection of proportion in *De Ver.* is made only on the assumption that proportion and proportionality are mutually exclusive. It would be consistent with the passage in question to hold that, whereas we should have to reject proportion if proportion and proportionality were taken as being mutually exclusive, nevertheless proportionality needs to be combined with proportion (or even to be subordinated to it) if the two are taken as mutually consistent. It must, of course, be admitted that St. Thomas does not actually assert this, and it is in any case possible that he changed his mind when he came to write the *Summa*. Cf. the quotation in the next note from the Commentary on the Sentences, which is a still earlier work than the *De Veritate*.

We may add that Suarez and his followers strongly hold to the primacy of attribution, but in their case the matter is complicated by the conceptualist bias of Suarezian epistemology.

<sup>36</sup> *De Nom. Anal.*, cap. iii, no. 23. He says that the name of analogy is given only improperly (*abusive*) to that "analogy of inequality" (not mentioned in my discussion) in which the analogue is found in the various analogates in different degrees but in the same precise sense in all, and which is therefore only a form of univocity. St. Thomas makes this threefold distinction in his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard: "Aliquid dicitur secundum analogiam tripliciter: vel secundum intentionem et non secundum esse [*analogy of attribution*], et hoc est quando una intentio refertur ad plura per prius et posterius quae tamen non habet esse nisi in uno . . . ; vel secundum esse et non secundum intentionem [*analogy of inequality*] et hoc contingit quando plura parificantur in intentione alicuius communis, sed illud commune non habet esse unius rationis in omnibus . . . ; vel secundum intentionem et secundum esse [*analogy of proportionality*], et hoc est quando neque parificantur in intentione communi neque in esse" (*In I Sent.*, d. 19, q. 5 a. 2 ad 1).

<sup>37</sup> *Dieu*, pp. 530 f.

<sup>38</sup> *Le Rôle de l'Analogie en Théol. dogm.*, pp. 46, 145.

<sup>39</sup> *Distinguer pour unir*, app. II (not in E.T.). He stresses "the profound remark of John of St. Thomas that, in mixed cases (where analogy of attribution and of proportionality are joined together), the analogy of attribution is only virtual. When from the existence of created being we conclude that of its uncreated Cause, we are in fact (even if unconsciously) using analogy of strict proportionality, for this reasoning implies that the notion of *cause* is itself analogous with strict proportionality and also that the uncreated Being with which it ends and the created being with which it begins are both called by the same name 'being,' not only because the former is the cause of the latter but because what the concept of being signifies is found in both of them according to a similitude of proportion. From the fact that the relation of causality gives rise to an analogy of attribution between the effect and the cause, it does not follow that we formally use analogy of attribution whenever we follow the way of causality to establish the 'existence of the source' of the created perfections" (p. 826).

<sup>40</sup> See his *Praelectiones Theologiae Naturalis*, II, pp. 795 f., for his controversy on this point with Penido. Penido himself writes very reasonably: "From a certain point of view, it is perfectly true to say that proportionality is not primary, since it presupposes the causality which gives us the third term of all our proportions. Without the analogy of attribution which establishes the existence of a source, it is clear that proportionality would have no real support; we should remain enclosed in possibilities and conditional propositions. But is such an answer 'equivalent to putting all proportionality

out of service'? By no means. It is simply equivalent to putting proportionality in its true place, which is the centre. As our opponent admits, causality demonstrates the *existence* of an X. But what is its *nature*? This is the proper domain of proportionality."

(*Rôle de l'Analogie*, p. 146. Note that what Penido here calls the *third* term is what he has previously called the *fourth*, i.e. the term which stands for the divine *existence*. He is here thinking of the proportion in the form:

$$\frac{\text{finite existence}}{\text{finite essence}} = \frac{\text{divine existence}}{\text{divine essence}}$$

For my own reflections see the text.

<sup>41</sup> See p. 39 *supra*.

<sup>42</sup> *De Nom. Anal.*, cap. ii, no. 19, 20.

<sup>43</sup> *Cursus Phil.*, q. 14, a. 3. (Cf. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Dieu*, p. 541 n.)

<sup>44</sup> Thus St. Thomas writes: "We cannot grasp what God is, but only what he is not and how other things are related to him" (*Non enim de Deo capere possumus quid est, sed quid non est, et qualiter alia se habeant ad ipsum* (S.c.G., I, xxx).)

<sup>45</sup> Part I, ch. v, sec. ii, "La connaissance de Dieu par voie d'analogie."

<sup>46</sup> *Le Thomisme*, 5me éd., p. 153.

<sup>47</sup> See ch. iv *supra*.

<sup>48</sup> He is referring, of course, to the knowledge of God that we can have by our natural powers and in this life. But even in the Beatific Vision, although the divine essence is known by the blessed, it is seen *totum sed non totaliter*.

<sup>49</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 155 f.

<sup>50</sup> I am assuming here, of course, that God has been already shown to exist. Until that has been done, to assert that God is good does not ascribe to goodness existence *ut exercita*, but only *ut signata*; to hold otherwise would be to accept the ontological argument.

<sup>51</sup> The apparent exceptions to this statement, arising from God's action in the finite realm, are discussed elsewhere in this book. (Ch. vi *infra*.)

<sup>52</sup> On this ground one can, I think, justify Sertillange's description of Thomism as "an agnosticism of definition" (*Le Christianisme et les Philosophies*, I, p. 270), for definition is concerned with the essence and the concept. One could not validly describe Thomism as "an agnosticism of the judgment." It is important to grasp that, whereas in the case of analogy between finite beings, the doctrine of analogy has merely to grapple with the distinction between the *perfectio significata* and the *modus significandi*, in the case of analogy between a finite being and God it has to grapple with the far greater difficulty of the gulf that separates the finite creature from the infinite Creator.

<sup>53</sup> The tendency of the human mind to take refuge in concepts is as ineradicable as its tendency to turn to sensible images: *convertit se ad phantasmata*, indeed, but also *ad conceptus*! It is always trying to conceptualize existence instead of affirming it.

<sup>54</sup> *Nomina significant substantiam divinam et praedicantur de Deo substantialiter sed deficient a repraesentatione ipsius* (S. Theol., I, xiii, 2c).

<sup>55</sup> I have received much help in writing this chapter from an article on "God and Analogy," by Fr. Columba Ryan, O.P., in *Blackfriars*, April 1944.



# PROTESTANT PSYCHOLOGY AND CATHOLIC PSYCHOLOGY

PIERRE BURGELIN

**I**N PROPOSING this subject I did not wish to be simply descriptive or polemic, but rather to submit to criticism the psychological situation which is at the basis of polemics and of all our discussions. First of all, it is a question of an examination of conscience and of a positive contribution to mutual understanding. We often feel that on all sides theological oppositions are extremely difficult to state precisely because they must be placed on the level of intelligence, while in reality the fundamental difficulties lie in a sort of willful rejection stemming more from sensibility than from reason. How simple human affairs would be if man were merely a rational animal. But he is also made up with a complete set of prejudices, habits, repulsions and attractions which sometimes make very simple questions insoluble; we can find as many examples of this as we like in racial, national, political and social relations where the principles are clear but their application impossible.

*Pierre Burgelin is a professor of history at the University of Nancy. The following article was originally delivered as a lecture at the Assembly of French Protestantism at Nancy, October 1950, and appeared in FOI ET VIE, February 1951. Anyone who has followed Protestant literature on the subject of Catholic-Protestant relations will have noticed a change in tone and in point of departure. Prof Burgelin's lecture is representative of this new orientation and indicates the best values in it.*

However, here the principles are not universally clear. Where is true fidelity, true doctrine, the true Church? In order to consider such problems we must first of all cleanse ourselves of any traces of bad faith, and purge ourselves of whatever our nature, led astray by pride and conceit, might insert between the light and ourselves. If we wish to arrive at the pure theological core and seek in truth that which validly separates us, we must begin by dissolving the ensemble of our complexes.

Our task, therefore, is not to confront official texts, professions of faith, catechisms, encyclicals or synodal decisions, but to reflect on those human, social and living realities such as they appear to anyone who opens his eyes and simply questions his own intelligence.

The existence of Roman Catholicism presents a problem for us: that which we would do well to call the *échec* of the Reformation. This latter is for us the true fidelity of the Church, and nevertheless a great part of Europe has refused it. Catholicism has known how to reconquer a great deal of the ground it had lost at the outset. Certainly there are very obvious causes for this: persecution, the loyalty of its subjects, the prestige of the traditional religion. Nevertheless it must be admitted that many of the reconversions of the 17th century were the acts of pious, loyal and informed men, and we must say as much of many others

of which we have been witnesses. If in certain areas Catholicism is triumphant in the Protestant domain, it is because of Catholic spirituality. Doubtless there is considerable movement in both directions. But if it seems to us a simple matter that one goes from false doctrine to the true, and not the inverse, we must ask ourselves about the nature and value of the Catholic seduction. What do they who leave us seek which they do not know how to find with us? How can we fathom this mystery of the divine will which allows the co-existence of several Churches, permits souls of good will to go from one to the other, and denies us that sign of seeing all true Christians agree on the true Church?

There is the arbitration of the theologians, but what do theological reasons weigh alongside the testimony of the saints? If Christianity were a doctrine, we might be satisfied with the dictates of our intelligence, but it is a life which manifests itself by its fruits. Would we dare to say that only ours are good, and those of Catholicism bad? Dare we say that God is better served, that Christ is present in more souls, that we are more overflowing in love and rich in deeds? Who would measure these things? Who does not see that for 400 years Catholicism too has produced men and women of faith and prayer, innumerable missionary and charitable undertakings, and that neither papal infallibility nor the Immaculate Conception have slackened this fervor and charity? How deny that the Holy Spirit is also at work in many souls of whom it would be impious to be the adversary and from whom it is scandalous to be separated?

**T**HE MOST profound Catholic seduction, the only valid one, comes from the prestige of its saints. To be sure, their writings show a curious mélange of affirmations which are ours and of statements which we reject. Nevertheless, if we can discern the pure Gospel in completely Catholic lives, do we not then risk insinuating that against these facts doctrine does not count and of considering these doctrines as purely human and of no importance?

This suggests two remarks. The first is that in Jesus Christ Life is not distinct from Truth, and that the demands of an upright life cannot be separated from the witness borne to Truth. For the pagans also have their works, they often love their god and their brothers better than we do. The testimony of the saints, just as that of the martyrs, is ambiguous. It could not dispense us from seeking Truth. The second remark is that Catholicism is not to be confused with its saints, but is also the weighty machine which many times leaves men in darkness, produces many difficulties for the best men and remains capable of oppressing consciences. For these two reasons, no prestige should mislead us or embarrass us in the demands of a judgment which is not made on men but on the value and concrete meaning of institutions, and finally, as has been done by others, on theological interpretations.

In order to clarify my viewpoint, I will be content to begin with just one text. It is very beautiful and I think that many would subscribe to it even today.

It is taken from the diary of a great 17th century Protestant scholar, Isaac Casaubon. Tormented with the desire to know where was the true Church, he resisted all attempts to convert him to Catholicism and found peace in the Church of England.

"It is my desire, O Lord Jesus, to serve thee faithfully; I desire to be found in thy bark, and let all my friends and loved ones be there also: this is my most

ardent wish. But the weight of different reasons seizes me and draws me in confusing directions. I see some, under the pretext of antiquity, uphold vulgar errors; others, desirous of fleeing those errors which they believe new, themselves invent novelties; and in order to eliminate abuses, I see them condemn and suppress by their private authority many of the holiest institutions—at least, in my opinion. Finally I see those originators and leaders of a reformation, necessary in other respects, and they agree so little among themselves that they have become devouring wolves. In my mind this is already a recommendation that the name of your ancient Church, O Christ Jesus! and that which she has approved, that which she has set forth, and that to which she has consented, and which is moreover not at all in contradiction to your Scripture, cannot be rejected or indifferently changed; but on the other hand, I am horrified at the open and wholly anti-Christian tyranny of the Bishop of Rome. . .” (cited by Sainte-Beuve, *Causeries des Lundis*, XIV, p. 400).

This voice is the echo of many others which weigh upon us. If we have mixed so much of the human with the purity of doctrine, by what right should we condemn the impurity of others?

But we must go further. I have said that the existence of Catholicism is a problem. I will formulate it this way. Because there is a Catholicism at our sides, has it not perhaps happened that we have become more sensitive to this nearness than to the teachings of the Gospel? Because we have found it in error and seen its abuses, have we never fallen into inverse errors? Have we never been the dupe of what psychologists call an inferiority complex? You know that it is first manifested by a refusal to have an exact knowledge of oneself, and the desire to see oneself with another's eyes, and consequently to adopt his prejudices. It then happens, however, by a phenomenon of compensation, that it exalts its own peculiarities beyond measure. This uncertainty of judgment must be dispelled. It is not Catholicism which is the measure, but our necessity of fidelity, which should not be ruffled either by a concern with being too Catholic, nor of being anti-Catholic.

If there are souls which look towards Rome this should warn us and make us dissatisfied with ourselves. First of all we should listen to what Catholicism says.

Would we still be the Churches of the *Reformation* if we did not know how to listen and to reform ourselves? or if we were not capable of seeing how our habits and our psychology can be obstacles to the hearing of truth?

This *examen* can only be lightly suggested today. I will group a few of its elements around four themes which seem central, and in their connection I would like to seek out, behind the abuses which many Catholics regret, those principles which are in direct opposition. This may help us to uncover with more precision the question which is validly placed before us.

**T**HE FIRST theme will be that of *mediation*. All Christian theology is built on the fact of the Christ-mediator between man and God. Protestantism refuses anything that can alter the unique character of this mediation. The Catholic system, on the contrary, tends to multiply the mediations. Between the faithful and Christ the mediation of the Church is interpolated under the double form of the Church militant and the Church triumphant.



First of all, the faithful have access to sacred things only through the intermediary of a priesthood which disposes of the sacraments and the *magisterium*. In it resides the power to bring Christ down on earth, and it is this which can tie or untie. Besides, in its hierarchy, bishops and pope, it teaches and fixes doctrine, leads souls. Between Holy Scripture and its reader, the legitimate interpretation is interposed.

It could be shown that the Church's mediation is extended even to objects, clothed with a sacred character by the priest's benediction: the relics of saints, water, rosaries, places of worship and all the small objects of devotion whose usage or even mere presence introduces the Church into every act of life.

Secondly, between Christ and the faithful is interposed the prayer of the saints. It is from the over-abundance of their merits that the Church draws the treasure of indulgences of which she disposes for the living and the dead. Above all, the Virgin Mary possesses pre-eminent merit, she is the mother of the faithful, to whom popular devotion willingly turns as the most receptive, the most generous and the most patient of women, capable even of turning away the anger of her Son, as the revelation of La Salette says.

It is a matter of daily experience that this system results in two excesses. First in *clericalism*, which extends the power of the priest to all domains, through the network of protections and directions he imposes upon the faithful. The Church tends then to become a society which, under pretext of defending spiritual interests, has its purpose in the exercise of its own power. The priest seems to think and decide for each one, without regard for the dignity of consciences.

The second excess is *superstition*, which every-day custom, and not pure theology, encourages by the use of the word merit. Pilgrimages to venerable statues, the specialization of the saints for each of life's worries, the use of candles and medals, lead to the belief that these practices suffice.

Behind these abuses there is, nevertheless, something else. The Catholic is the man who is never alone; through the intermediary of these signs and the help of the saints the whole faithful community accompanies him in his prayer and his life. The Catholic does not understand when we become indignant at the oppression of consciences and the regimentation of acts, because he is judging on the level of the entire Church what we judge on the level of the individual. Catholic solidarity expresses this great idea that we can truly do something for each other, that those most endowed with spiritual gifts share them with the poorer, that this quantity of superstitious piety on the part of some is as though compensated for by the holiness of others. All are led on together. And if we have some difficulty in making man a sort of co-redeemer, still we must not forget that Catholic doctrine holds that there are no merits except those of Christ and that men have access to them only by participation.

When we observe what the spiritual life of so many Catholics draws from this role of the saints, the question which seems to be raised is this: What value do we give to intercession? Is the solidarity of men before God which marks the "we" of the Lord's prayer a reality for us? Is the intercession of the entire Church for each one felt by us as the living bond of the universal Church? Is each one so absorbed with the drama of his own salvation that he knows only moral relations with others, or do we constitute a single body? Does death break all ties? Do we not speak so much of community because

we have the feeling of being a Church of solitary men, juxtaposed in their singular relationship with Christ in whom they meet, rather than finding each other there?

Because we have chosen to be the Church of the universal priesthood and because we believe that in the Church there is no difference between men who are consecrated and those who are not, have we not overlooked the fact that it is through the Church that God speaks to us, and that we are nothing without the Church? We confuse the objections of our conscience with the inspirations of the Holy Spirit, always preferring to believe that He speaks to us rather than to the Church, and paying no attention when we consider her in error. *Illuminism* and *sectarianism* are the bitter fruits of this attitude. Each one believes himself the prophet charged with the reform of the Church.

Between the oppression of consciences and conformism, and the canonization of no matter which of our ideas, the holy anarchy which makes each man—according to Boileau's cruel phrase—"a pope, Bible in hand", can we not find that just order which allows true prophets to speak, but leads back the lost sheep? There is the first question which Catholics put to us.

**I** WILL arrange my second theme around the idea of *apostolicity*. Let us briefly recall the principle. We know Christ only through the written or oral teaching of the apostles. They received the deposit of faith and transmitted it, with their powers, to their successors the bishops. These latter can then make explicit that which was only implicit, and this constantly enriched deposit constitutes tradition, which has the same value as Scripture—even greater value, one might say, since Scripture is after all only a moment of tradition. We are also sufficiently aware that the Reformation, on the contrary, considers the role of the apostles ended when they expressed in the Scriptures that which it was necessary to know, and we believe with Saint Paul that if an angel from heaven brought us another doctrine, it would not be acceptable.

Nevertheless, it would be possible to uncover a Catholic temptation at this point, the very one mentioned by Casaubon, which is perhaps even stronger four centuries later. The Reformation came about at a certain moment of history, after many centuries during which our fathers were members of the only Church. It represents a rupture. Historians may argue about where responsibility should be placed, but even though our minds might be convinced that the "innovation" of the Reformation was but a restoration of the primitive Church, our sensibility will not allow itself to be as easily persuaded.

The first reason is that we are of the West, Frenchmen brought up in a country of Catholic tradition which has impregnated our culture and our mode of feeling. The village churches, the cathedrals and the monasteries are a part of our affective heritage, just as are our religious art and literature from Villon to Bernanos. How can we avoid feeling somewhat uneasy in the realization that we are estranged and separated from the way of seeing, feeling, and speaking of the French continuity—which is part of our very flesh—because of the act of our own will?

The second reason is the anguish we must experience in feeling separated from a tradition of Fathers and Doctors which was, until the Reformation,

almost unanimous. We are well aware that this unanimity was the result of oppression, that Luther was not without predecessors who often paid for their fidelity with their blood. It remains true that the more valid Fathers contain, in germ, what Catholicism will become, that there is a continuity between these men, nourished on the Scriptures, and modern men.

Historians would certainly answer that the hardening which shaped Roman Catholicism at the Councils of Trent and of the Vatican was gradually established, making a reform without rupture more and more difficult, and that the consequences of such and such a principle—for example, the primacy of Rome—only became felt slowly, in a progressively growing *malaise*. The veneration of saints or of the mother of the Lord, responded to a sentiment that was too natural for someone to be able to foresee immediately that it would some day endanger the mediation of Christ alone.

This unrest would have little value if it were nothing more than a very human nostalgia. Fidelity is capable of leading us to many renunciations of completely natural acts and feelings. Still we must know that they are necessary. Our real problem is the value of tradition.

It would be very naive of us to believe that we do not have any tradition; perhaps it would also be naive to imagine that we never canonize it. Because we have broken with Roman customs, we have taken on others which are anti-Roman. But are they always better for that reason? We can admit that Scripture does not give us a categorical command, that a place is left for a choice according to circumstances. When the Reformation broke with so many practices—monastic life, liturgical ceremonies, devotions—we must believe that it was necessary to give notice in a very precise way that all of that has nothing to do with salvation.<sup>1</sup> It is, however, permissible to ask oneself whether we have not also broken with an entire spiritual pedagogy, whose absence sometimes makes itself felt, and whether we have not cruelly detached from the acts of our lives those signs which everywhere were a reminder that God was not absent.

Because we wished to bear witness to Christian freedom, we did not wish to multiply obligations, and we were right. But freedom in turn risks transforming itself into law, which is hardly more charitable. We hardly accept any but one kind of piety and reject needs which nothing authorizes us to consider illegitimate. Let us not be surprised if, in spite of appearances, the attraction of Catholicism can sometimes be the attraction of freedom, a freedom that our collective conscience represses in the name of its own traditions.

The illegitimate meaning of tradition is in the Roman doctrine of the transmission of a sacred power, of the explanation of dogmas formerly implied, so that today one must believe more and something different than the primitive Church. Nevertheless, on the immutable basis of the apostle's faith, we must face changing situations and maintain our fidelity in conditions always new. Such is tradition: always to receive, but always to rectify; always to live, but always to find. Let us be fearful of denying that the Holy Spirit has been able to speak to our fathers, too, or of seeing in the past only a fabric of errors to be corrected, of denying that there is a wisdom of the Church and lessons from her experience. History is not a



norm, but a treasure to exploit, and too often we are condemned to seek what we ought to have received.

It was perhaps fortunate for the Church that Latin became its official language, although in other periods that which had been a vehicle became an obstacle to preaching. Perhaps it was providential that the bishop's authority and the abbeys saved the Church during the invasions, while in other times these institutions were harmful. Who knows what new forms the death and birth of civilizations may engender? Two thousand years invite us to praise God, that through miseries and sometimes crimes, the Gospel was nevertheless transmitted to us across centuries of darkness where everything might have disappeared. We should not be ungrateful nor regret that we too are heirs of this Middle Age which was not ignorant of either God or his Love. The Reformation was only possible through what remained of the Christian foundation behind the disorder of the Church.

**T**HE THIRD theme is the *catholicity* of the Church. For the Church to be universal means first that she knows no boundaries. The Catholic conscience goes further, however. It tends to establish the identity of the world and the Church: to build a Christendom. If so many minds are haunted by the dream of the Middle Ages, it is precisely because they sometimes imagine that this had almost been achieved. Not, certainly, that sin had been done away with, nor that men were better at that time, but because the Church was omnipresent: she was culture and charity, she was sometimes the government and the employer. She dictated rights and duties; temporal sovereigns were only her ministers. The reality of history is of little importance, the fact remains that Catholicism sometimes aspires to be the City which takes in everything, and that is why the notion of tolerance is so difficult for her to accept. Catholicism is not merely a faith, it is a society in which each act from the harvest to the hunt, from the judge's decision to the teacher's instruction, should be truly Catholic, that is to say consecrated. The zone of the sacred gradually encroaches upon that of the secular until the latter finally disappears. Everything in creation—and not only the world of men—would share in the immense liturgy of the world; the souls of believers are thus filled to overflowing by the Church. The basis of ascetic practices or funeral services consecrating the body can be seen here, just as the blessing of various objects like holy water, palm, even including houses and automobiles, and those crosses or statues which place the seal of the Church on fields and mountains.

This results above all in a theory of the Church which often disconcerts us. While for us evangelization proceeds from the interior to the exterior, from the conversion of hearts to membership in the Church, and we propose strict conditions of understanding and change of heart for admission, Catholic practice goes from the exterior to the interior: it is because one is already in the Church that the conversion of heart becomes possible. The important thing is to bring blocs of population into the Church through baptism, without concerning themselves too much with changing their customs or their thinking. A sort of osmosis is created which gradually Christianizes itself. By placing men in a Catholic atmosphere, by devotional practices or instruction, they are prepared and to some degree open to the possibility of some day hearing the call from within. In them

is created that nostalgia for the faith which Pascal saw as one of the objects of apologetics.

We know how far Roman tolerance goes in this direction. It is important to underline it, because it is one aspect of what we sometimes call the double face of Catholicism: narrowness in principle and liberality in practice. Though sometimes there is a reaction as against the Jesuits in China formerly, we know with what ease it has Catholicized perfectly pagan cultural practices. We are aware of the moral laxity which prevails in many areas. Sometimes we get the impression that a minimum of practices is enough to gain heaven—but this has already been discussed from another point of view.

Of course, no true Catholic confuses the act of wearing a medal around his neck with the faith which listens to the Word of God. Nevertheless, there is a sort of generosity of the Church for the human condition, a material attitude towards the child who needs milk, which ought to make us reflect.

The Church has deliberately chosen to be impure, not to be a Church of saints, but the Church of everyone, even the superstitious, the weak, and the incredulous. She consents to the juxtaposition in herself of the austerity of St. Jerome or M. de Saint-Cyran for those who cannot save themselves in the world but only in the desert, and to the lighting of a candle near the statue of St. Anthony of Padua to find a lost jewel. There are the Carthusians for the strong; there is the Virgin of Boulogne for the weak.

Means generally become ends, and the easy way is taken. Sometimes there is satisfaction in Catholicizing the mass, forgetting that hearts must be converted. In the end the Gospel is no longer preached, but remains veiled behind liturgical words in an unknown language.

However, let us leave the abuses and return to the foundation of those practices, and let us try to see what questions they pose for us. Protestantism is dominated by a concern for purity which is translated into the consistency with which she emphasizes the word *only*: sola fide, soli Dei gloria, God alone, without any concessions to man, faith alone, without any place for works. This is, indeed, St. Paul's lesson, but the same apostle tried to make himself all things for all men. Our purity has its own bent: it is called puritanism. It is the refusal to consider man other than in the solitude of his moral conscience. We have enough evidence to know what psychological inadequacy, spiritual tyranny—in other words, lack of love—this can mean in practice. Sometimes we say that man is sinful even under grace, but we do not accept his weakness. Because we refuse to distinguish between venial and mortal sins, we become so adept at transforming everything into mortal sin that the atmosphere soon grows unbearable. We protect the honor of God as though he needed policemen. We refuse to "Protestantize" man or his environment and leave him to fight with himself and his surroundings like a perpetually inferior warrior. We overpower him by stating his problems in terms of sole responsibility, drunkenness, adultery, theft, lying, as though we did not know how behind what we call vices there might be a poor human defense against suffering, a poor search for joy which ends only in a new bondage.

Man is not only conscience and will, he is body and instincts, bound by a million ties of sentiment and custom to an environment which has formed and persuaded him. Do we not become so obsessed with the idea that all conversion is a break and a discontinuity that we deny that in all humans there

can be a more or a less of conversion? Do we not transpose to the level of relations between men a dualism without nuance so that it might appear that all these things are equally disdainful? Instead of helping men do we not heap up obstacles in their path? Are we condemned to oscillate from an edifying moralism of laws to an immoralism which denies man all order and all hierarchy?

We like to say that the word Christian can be used as an adjective. Behind the brutality of this affirmation, is there not hidden the denial of all effort to put men in a situation where they can live, in the most root meaning of this word?—As though we refused to clothe the naked or feed the hungry on the pretext that food and clothing are of little value alongside the single truth of salvation! Do we not transform concrete, living, complex man into a pure being capable only of saying aye or nay in the total isolation of any intelligence, as though this yes and no did not arouse a whole harmony in one's subterranean depths of which the conscience reaches only a small portion?

**T**HE FOURTH theme is that of *unity*. Since the Reformation this argument has often been used in polemics. You claim, they say, not to accept any authority but that of the Scriptures. But this is an uncertain authority since your doctors cannot even agree on fundamentals. Scripture is a source of endless division. Secularism is the destiny of this sort of Protestantism which is so protean and intangible that it escapes all definition.

It might be said that it is the Catholic who puts the unity of the Church above everything, and we know how doubts on essential doctrines are often repressed by the primordial feeling that this unity must not be broken at any price. As a consequence of this concern there has been the need of reinforcing the living *magisterium* of the Church which infallibly interprets Scripture and tradition; since 1870 it has been concentrated in the person of the Pope, who is himself infallible, and is not taken from the consent of the Church. The Pope is Peter, the Vicar of Christ, the Word of God in the Church.

In fact it is easy to perceive in the Catholic Church an uneasiness on this subject, and a very general tendency, of which the Pope himself complains in the encyclicals, of minimizing this extraordinary power. The tendency is to insist on the letter of the decree of infallibility, the fact that the Pope must speak *ex cathedra* and that this hardly ever occurs, and also that he merely confirms what has long been the faith of the entire Church. It seems that the position of the popes has been different. They insist on the fact that all acts which emanate from them in their ordinary ministry are inspired, and that to them should be applied the words: "He who hears you hears me." The encyclical *Humani generis* says, "If the Popes in their acts bring a judgment on a matter which was formerly disputed, every one should understand that this matter in the thought and will of the Supreme Pontiff is no longer to be considered as an open question among theologians."

I do not want to argue, but simply to underline that this interpretation, presented with such authority, can place, and in the history of the past four centuries often has placed, many consciences in a difficult position when what was truth for them comes into conflict with the magisterial authority. The unity of the Roman Church is primarily a unity of legislation. This juridical spirit has resulted in defining dogma in a more and more precise manner.



Also, a certain logic, which theologians might well call decorum, presides over the development of Roman dogma. It can be very clearly seen, for example, in the development of Mariology; it was fitting that the Mother of the Lord should always have been a virgin, that she should have escaped original sin, and that her body should have been free from corruption.

We well know that this point, the existence of an infallible Pope and all the increasingly exuberant and rigid dogmatic development, is the most visible point of rupture and the most irreducible obstacle to all reunion. We ought to feel distressed over it, especially to the degree that the reaction against Protestantism was one of the conditions favorable to this evolution. The more that we give the impression that we are incapable by our own principles of becoming one visible Church with unity of doctrine and of sacraments, the greater the need will be felt for an authority to settle differences and to discern infallibly the true from the false. The Catholic temptation arises out of our own uncertainty.

Indeed, the principle of the sovereignty of Scripture constrains us to a certain relativism, for it is quite evident that Scripture does not explicitly settle problems which are objects of controversy among us: neither on the interpretation of the Last Supper, nor on baptism, nor on ethics, nor even on the meaning of the Scripture's authority are we unanimous among denominations or within the confines of each denomination. We have not yet been able to discover which points could, beyond all question, make us one Church. The unity of the Church is a point of faith for us; we profess to believe this every Sunday. Nevertheless, too often it is enough that this unity be invisible, that it have an eschatological character; and we do little to translate this invisible unity into visible institutions. We tolerate a sort of rivalry among the confessions. We do not accept the legitimacy of difference when it is possible. Sometimes we harden these differences, although there exist so many visible bonds among us, as if we could only agree when our private or ecclesiastical interests were at stake.

The existence of the oecumenical council is the sign that we have the obscure feeling of scandal. We often talk about it, but we are incapable of re-uniting even within Protestantism. Perhaps we of the west have fallen into a Roman trap. Perhaps we sometimes push dogmatism to the boundaries of theological opinions and believe we compensate for that by the vagueness which allows certain fundamental differences to co-exist in the Church. How can we be so severe and so tolerant at the same time? How can consciences not be troubled by so many certainties and so many uncertainties?

Here the existence of Catholicism poses a particularly precise question. It presents a call to unity, first of all to our unity, then to the total unity of Christians. It reminds us that we must not satisfy ourselves with hope, because the division of the Church is a sign of human disobedience. The Roman example, however, invites us to be suspicious of a severity which ends in being an oppression of consciences, and to discover under what form we can be at the same time perfectful faithful to truth, exclusively maintained without failure, and perfectly capable of accepting our differences—on the contrary, of considering them as signs of the infinite richness of God's works.<sup>3</sup>

A few weeks ago I visited an Italian cathedral with two Spanish pastors. It was obvious that they went in against their will; this Mediterranean piety was quite visibly what they wanted to escape at all costs; for them it was the

sign of the Church's corruption, of the oppression which weighs on men, of the darkness which surrounds the pure Gospel. I confess that for myself there was primarily the curiosity of seeing, but there was also the feeling that behind those inadmissible forms a whole acceptance of human misery is made manifest, as well as a certainty—ambiguous and false if you like, but whose final reference is nevertheless the same. There would perhaps be some among us who would go even further and think that so much good will for the human condition, and the fact of belonging to an uninterrupted tradition, also have their value and are worthy of sacrifice. Others might go even further and deplore that material absence of Christ in the host, which, as we are sometimes told, makes our meeting-places so empty.

On the level I have chosen for my particular discussion—leaving others to go to the roots of the problem and confining myself to the psychology—here seems to be the fundamental cleavage. What place should be given to man? It would evidently be absurd to say none or to say all. In the first case, the story of our salvation soars into the heavens, over our heads, remaining foreign to our lives. In the second, everything is a mere invention of man, interpreting, at the whim of collective representations, the ineffable presence of the transcendent. For the purposes of our discussion the Church is an environment for man. She speaks and organizes for him; she is our responsibility in the world. This definition is not theological, it remains secondary to other definitions which are more just and which take into account the primary fact that it is God who builds the Church as He pleases. But it is the mystery of our lives that God's decrees never allow themselves to be separated from our responsibility and our decisions. This is so true that to say it is God's business to build the Church is also to say that it is our business. Until the end of time the Church will also be a human work, and that is why, until the end of time, she must aspire to be reformed.

**B**ECAUSE Catholicism sees in man the traces of his original goodness it deliberately gives a larger place to the human. There is no feeling which does not find itself accepted in it, and the aesthetic, psychological and social properties are such that it cannot fail to hold an extraordinary attraction for us. For our minds, by the rigorous apparatus of its theology; for our sensibility, through its worship and devotions, its design and its ritual, by this incarnation of presence which the least act manifests; finally on the will, by the multiplicity of the forms of life it can offer, by the exaltation of obedience, by the security which affirms everything by the ends it proposes.

Protestantism tirelessly recalls man's fall, his pardon and his responsibility. It is without obligingness for the human, but demanding for the person. The tendency of Catholic teaching is to submit man—to whom so much is granted in other ways—to a sort of spiritual and moral minority, protecting him against himself and his environment. The tendency of Protestant teaching is to exalt the conscience and base everything on it, taking into account only the moral man. The Catholic weakness is the fear of the man who risks involving the whole Church with himself. Ours is the assurance with which each man disdains consulting before acting, this solitude of the lonely decision

which involves each man for himself, but which often leaves the individual in the grip of his demons.

Catholicism takes man at his roots, in that zone below conscious decision, but in which piety can be born, and which it is sometimes capable of guiding to such heights. We stay on the level of action, and sometimes correct our fear of the mystical and the stiffness of our principles with a sentimental pietism.

Perhaps it is in this zone of psychology that we must teach one another. Where is true respect for man, without which there is no charity? We believe it could not be in any accommodation of truth. Nevertheless, we must not, in the name of truth, transform freedom into law, make our opinions absolutes, or make light of the multiplicity of human paths or of the unforeseeable ways of grace.

We are never more than poor mortals *en route* who will never understand more than fragments of the Gospel. We need to be reminded that there are many houses in our Father's mansion, and that we cannot fathom the richness of His Love, nor of His Truth. It is not a question of confronting ourselves with other religious forms, or wondering if these are more or less efficacious, but rather of asking ourselves with humility what limits our incomprehension imposes on the action of the Holy Spirit.

Our hope should be that the more faithful we are to the principles of our Church, that is to say the better we allow ourselves to be enlightened by the light of the pure Gospel, the better we will be able to discern that which is valuable among our Catholic brethren, that which perhaps our blindness prevents us from seeing today with serenity, as well as the results among them of those errors of principle which are a matter of theological exposition. It is when we do not look for anything from men that we can receive something from them. There will never be unity except in Truth. But Truth will only manifest itself on the day when, members one of another, we will know how to accept our differences.

Translated by LÉON KING

---

<sup>1</sup> We could find a biblical foundation for many Catholic customs, on fast, celibacy, etc. Do we never exalt Martha to the detriment of Mary?

<sup>2</sup> "We do not like it said that Protestantism has succeeded Catholicism; we do not want it proclaimed in its name that the fifteen centuries that preceded the Reformation are nullified and unacceptable. What existed for fifteen centuries and has not been interrupted by the Reformation is the Christian Church, which belongs to us and to which we belong in so far as we are Christians. We deny only the principle that has been imposed on this Church, and under which for a long time it could hardly breathe." Vinet, *Mélanges théologiques et religieuses*, 1943, p. 23. Let us not forget that the Bible was read at that time, even in French.

<sup>3</sup> There are, Vinet says, two errors: "one of the partisan of unity without liberty, the other of the defenders of liberty without unity." *Mélanges*, p. 16.



# TOWARDS RELIGIOUS UNITY IN GERMANY

MARIO BENDISCIOLI

**T**HERE EXISTS a traditional conception of religious Germany as the land of the Lutheran Reformation, which has left in its wake surviving Catholic minorities in the Southern and Western regions in a condition of such cultural and socio-political inferiority that only a prolonged and dramatic struggle such as Bismarck's *Kulturkampf* has been able to gain for them an equal juridical status in the Protestant states. Germany thus emerges as a country in which Catholics and Lutherans (most people ignore the active presence of Calvinists and still more their theological and ecclesiastical positions) constitute groups marked off by territorial and psychological differences which would have been formed even without the migrations precipitated by industrialization; such groups are not always homogeneous since we often find Catholic nuclei in the midst of Protestant regions and Protestant nuclei in the midst of Catholic regions. Today this view of religious Germany characterized by regions predominantly either Protestant or Catholic or by mixed groups has radically changed.

*Mario Bendiscioli, a professor at the University of Milan, has published an important document, GERMANIA RELIGIOSA NEL III REICH, (Morcelliana, 1936) which appeared in London under the title NAZISM VERSUS CHRISTIANITY. Prof. Bendiscioli is also one of the editors of HUMANITAS, an Italian monthly, where this article appeared in June 1951.*

First of all the change has come about on the political level and as a direct consequence of the War, the Potsdam agreements and the *de facto* situation which has been developing since then. There is an East Germany constituted by a Soviet political tutelage and a military occupation in the form of a democratic republic with approximately 20,000,000 inhabitants in regions predominantly Protestant. There is a Western Germany with approximately 45,000,000 inhabitants which includes regions historically Catholic along with some Protestant zones; the Catholic element in this region has been greatly strengthened by the German refugees from Silesia, Poland and Czechoslovakia who are estimated to be over 7,000,000. This migration has increased the Catholic population from one third to one half and has brought about such a shift in democratic religious ratios that out of the Länder which make up the federal Republic of Bonn only three or four are predominantly Protestant.<sup>1</sup> Moreover the depopulation caused by the War in its destruction of the great urban centers and the influx of refugees evacuated from the Eastern regions have effected a substantial modification in the geographical distribution of Catholics and Protestants; in zones fully solid with one homogeneous faith there have been developing large *diaspora* centers of such vast proportions as to dislodge the original local elements, and the influx of co-religionists has precipitated the growth of small communities up to tenfold. The care of souls has been forced into emergency conditions: re-organization was

necessary and much had to be done by sheer chance. Thus in order to remedy the shortage of houses of worship, the mixed use of churches has been practised on a large scale, and in the absence of churches and opportunity for worship according to their own faith, it has by no means been unusual to watch Protestants frequenting Catholic churches and vice versa.

The organizational psychological result of the new situation has led to a sociological breakdown of Catholicism and Protestantism as two closed and autonomous worlds, each with its own confessional schools, youth organizations, cultural and welfare institutions (even in regions solidly confessional) and has brought about an encounter and mixing of Catholics and Protestants, a direct and immediate knowledge of each others' ideas, customs, practises of worship and life of prayer, a knowledge gained without the conventional schemata and categories of the schools. It is on this psychological and in part organizational plane that the most substantial and profound change of the religious life of Germany has taken place: *the souls of Catholics and Protestants have come together* and in direct personal contact the traditional Protestant prejudices towards Catholics and of Catholics towards Protestants have collapsed.<sup>2</sup>

THE reasons for this *rapprochement* of the Christian bodies are more numerous and profound than the external circumstances of war we have just described.

Let us recall, at first, the common persecution suffered at the hands of Nazism and the common resistance against the pressures of racial and totalitarian secularism. This solidarity, as we know, had already become manifest in the Weimar republic when the confessional parties in the Reichstag and the regional parliaments had not only defended the confessional school from the encroachments of the secular schools promoted by the Social Democrats and the radicals, but had assured, by their pooled votes, the ratification of the Catholic concordats with the Holy See and of similar agreements between the Länder and the regional Protestant Churches. The decision of the Prussian Landtag to finance the imposing *Bibliography of German history at the time of the religious schism 1517-1585* which later was published by Schottenholer in five volumes, (1933-1939), had for its aim the reconciliation of the Churches.

Catholic and Evangelical groups were thus faced with similar situations both in the Weimar Republic and in Nazi Germany and were forced to work out similar plans in order to insure an efficient means of caring for souls, a genuine and free right to preach, an effective, organic and sound religious instruction in the schools, freedom of organization and action for youth organizations, religious direction of hospitals, etc. The struggle for the right to live and act according to one's religious beliefs, particularly in the regional Evangelical Churches, soon reached the point of an open resistance which was directed in some cases against pastors who adhered to the politico-racialist postulates of Nazism and were known as 'German Christians.' This resistance to any adaptation of doctrine in line with Nazi desires and designs was organized ever since 1934 in 'Synods' and thereafter in a Church which called itself *confessional* in order to reaffirm "the profession of faith" received as the exclusive norm for its own structure and doctrine.<sup>3</sup>

The common resistance against Nazism brought together in the same prisons

and concentration camps Lutherans and Calvinists, Catholic priests and religious, militant laymen of all denominations who became united by the same accusations and were not infrequently shot or hung together with or without legal formality, as happened in the great repression of the attempt against Hitler's life in July 1944.<sup>4</sup> It is therefore not surprising that, upon the fall of the Nazi dictatorship, the events of the common struggle for the faith should have been jointly recalled: under the title *Sieger in Fesseln* (Victors in chains), a joint initiative has been undertaken by the Catholic publishing house Herder and the Protestant house Furch of Tübingen to publish a series of pamphlets which are to bear witness to "Christian Germany from 1933 to 1945." In presenting the first issue of the series the Catholic Reinhold Schneider, known in Italy for his biography of Las Casas, insists on underscoring the significance of the unity achieved in the common struggle for the Faith. "That which is common and close to the hearts of these men and women is perhaps best expressed in the words of Ludwig Stein, 'Away from me, on to Christ.' These documents express a movement, a craving, not a consciousness of being perfect; but the movement and the craving take place on the highest level and fulfilment is reached only in death. Against all the temptations of the flesh, against every earthly intimidation, anxiety and need, these men and women have dared come close to the Lord: in the very measure in which they approach Him they become, unknown to themselves, united one to another. Their paths are so marked out that they must perforce converge in the Lord; they must and will become united the more faithful they are to their own creed and the more forceful such faith becomes in the trial of suffering." Referring more explicitly to the practical problem of reconstituting the Unity of the Churches, Schneider observes: "The dialogue among the Christian denominations which we desire with great insistence is no longer unfolding, is no longer taking place. For there is a unity which goes beyond intellectual understanding, a unity formed by souls caught up in Christ, by the aspiration to die in Him and by this very dying itself."<sup>5</sup>

This struggle side by side against a common adversary and for a common heritage has brought about a revision of traditional prejudices and hostilities and, most of all, has led Catholics and Evangelical Christians to stress that which unites more than that which divides. This area of agreement consists of a common faith in Christ the Redeemer, and of the acknowledgment of the truth and efficacy of His Word, of His Will that His faithful live in the community enlightened by His grace bestowed through the sacraments, and of the Church as a community so willed by Christ.

**T**HIS new situation has given rise to a fresh reciprocal appreciation of the genuinely Christian elements present in the Catholic Church and in the Protestant Churches, an attitude which constitutes a significant revision of traditional historical evaluations.

In the Catholic camp we must begin by noting the work of Lortz, *The Reformation as a Religious Problem Today*,<sup>6</sup> which summarizes his *magnum opus* of a decade earlier, *The Reformation in Germany*, and reconsiders three themes, "the causes of the Reformation," "Luther as monk and reformer" and "the internal reform of the Church in the 16th century" so as to bring to light certain subjective and objective justifications of the Reformers, and to show that what



they have affirmed or created has taken place within a polemical situation and has gone beyond their own intentions; how the Catholic renewal has made its own and has realized many of the deepest requirements of the Reformers. This writing had been preceded by the work of a philosopher of Augustinian orientation, Hessen, *Luther from a Catholic perspective*, subtitled, "Foundations for an oecumenical dialogue." Hessen made substantial use of Lortz' earlier work and even accentuates certain criticisms of the Church and certain psychological-historical justifications of Luther, and concludes by indicating what contemporary Catholicism ought to learn from Luther (suspicion of a certain moralism and mysticism, and the right way of praying).<sup>7</sup>

The intention of promoting an encounter among the believers of the Christian Churches, evident in Lortz and Hessen, becomes openly primary in the very title "Three conferences on the question of the reunion of the separated Christian confessions," *Una Sancta in a Catholic Perspective* by the authoritative theologian of Tübingen, Karl Adam. He too begins with ample citations from the work of Lortz, recalls "the roots of the Reformation" as revealing the nature of the "problem of union," describes "Luther's detachment from the Church," examines the problem whether "a reunion is possible" and finally suggests "how ecclesiastical unity may be achieved."<sup>8</sup> Karl Adam is also of the opinion that "if a lasting meeting of the Catholic Church with the Protestant communities were to be realized it would have to be constituted by a mutual give and take. Such a meeting will be, at first, only a meeting of person with person and not of Church with Church." (pp. 138-139). "By way of conversion, only single individuals will find the way to Mother Church. No union of the faiths is to be expected in the near future so that in the meantime we should achieve unity through love while awaiting its fulfilment through the unity of faith." (p.142)

The most mature experience of German Catholics is expressed in a brief but profound study of Otto Karrer in *Hochland*, "On the oecumenical attitude and hope."<sup>9</sup> This experience has been ripened, along with an historico-religious rethinking of the ecclesiastical schism, by an active participation in many meetings between Catholics and Protestants, a participation sensitive to the psychological aspect of the problem, particularly to the frequent use by Catholics of the most unwelcome terms 'return' and 'conversion.'

In the light of this experience Karrer believes that "a *rapprochement* through a mutual hearing" is possible on three points: (a) in regard to the idea of ecclesiastical authority, in that both parties agree that "Christian freedom as the personal responsibility of conscience is well fitted to respectful obedience to authority" (p. 8); (b) in regard to the relation between Holy Scriptures and Tradition, in that Evangelical Christians find it easy to acknowledge "that Christianity lives by historical Revelation, and that whoever speaks of history speaks of development and growth of divine-human life in the 'flesh of the times'" (p. 11); (c) in regard to "tracing the sacramental elements to the religious origins of the Reformation, justification by faith." (p. 12) Karrer then states, recalling section 87 of Canon Law, that in virtue of Baptism, valid also for heretics, non-Catholic believers belong to the Church in a sacramental sense, even though they are not members of the visible body and do not enjoy the full rights and duties which the Church bestows. This is a special way of expressing the familiar idea of membership in the soul of the Church of those who are separated in good faith by virtue of the right intention of conforming to the will

of Christ. It also expresses very well the idea of many German and non-German Catholics that all those who believe in Christ the Lord, in His word and deed, belong to the *una sancta Ecclesia*.

A parallel effort towards mutual understanding is taking place among Lutherans who show an appreciation of the essential elements of Catholicism quite different from the traditional attitude. I have been unable to examine the most characteristic work on this aspect of our problem, *Catholicizing Tendencies in the Evangelical Church*, by the Lutheran bishop of Oldenburg, Wilhelm Stahlin. Yet of sufficient significance is the pamphlet published in the same series by August Rehbach, retired pastor of Munich who devotes his study to *The World of the Catholic and the Evangelical Faiths*.<sup>10</sup> At the end of his analysis of the Catholic and Evangelical dogmatic systems, he too raises "the question of understanding one another" and writes: "Is there any hope that such a unity may be realized? What is the condition for understanding the two principal requirements of the two faiths, the Evangelical justification by faith alone and the Catholic insertion of the single person into the structure of the Catholic Church? Is there, among the Churches, any possibility of understanding these needs? With regard to the Evangelical I can answer in the affirmative. The doctrine of salvation by faith alone is not foreign to the Catholic Church, which gives such a doctrine the right to exist. . ." (p. 52) Concerning the Catholic necessity for "a proper structure and organization of the Church" Rehbach notes that "Evangelical Christians find it infinitely difficult to understand the Roman Catholic form of Church organization, particularly the papacy and the hierarchy (p. 58); yet he recognizes that "even the antipathy for the hierarchy has its own historical justifications." (p. 60)

In regard to the "insistence on the primacy of the Pope," Rehbach admits that in itself the idea that among bishops one should be supreme is not to be so peremptorily excluded." (p. 61) Further on in Rehbach's book we find a significant passage: "No attentive observer can rightly deny that the papacy in the course of history has not only committed disgraceful acts but has also brought blessings on herself in many ways by performing helpful deeds. The jurisdictional power of the Pope has assured the Church freedom within the State, while the Churches which have never enjoyed this office of autonomous leadership, both the Oriental and Protestant Churches, have repeatedly fallen into subjection to the State. Again today, in the face of the recent experience with the totalitarian demands made by the modern State, the Churches find themselves in a difficult situation. Wherever the Pope is silenced, Caesar immediately takes his place; the Pope is, moreover, at once a symbol and a guarantee of the unity of the Church. If the Church is to exist in the world as a visible unity, she requires a unified leadership; and if she is to assume the struggle against the anti-Christian forces she needs a banner around which all will gather. . ." (pp. 62-63) Rehbach offers a good understanding of such Catholic dogmas as papal infallibility (p. 64) and the structure of the Catholic Church as formed at the very origins of Christianity, and acknowledges that the Catholic Church demands uniformity but a uniformity in essential matters, and that she respects the distinctive peculiarities of every people.

Even among Lutherans the traditional figure of Martin Luther as a radical subverter of Catholic ideas and institutions has undergone a significant revision which tends to underscore the conservative and positive aspects in Luther, particularly his treatment of the devotional life and his belief in the divine action working precisely within the Church. This attitude is characterized by the *Breviarium*, a collection of Luther's writings published under the title, in itself revealing, *Faith and Work*, compiled by Karl August Meissinger<sup>11</sup> who contributes an inner biography of the reformer. Now what matters for our purposes is the fact that this "breviary" brings together a great many passages taken not from the more familiar polemical writings but from the edifying works among which the most important, those on "good works," were composed in 1521. Even the hostile Cochlaeus, the first and most authoritative biographer of Luther, was forced to acknowledge that these writings contained "many good things."<sup>12</sup> In his selections Meissinger has not forgotten Luther's terribly disconcerting judgment on his own works which he had called, in the preface to the Latin writings (Wittenberg, 1545), "confusions of my own lucubrations," and had described as unorganized and "*quoddam rude et indigestum chaos*," which at that time not even he was able to digest, "*quod nunc nec mihi ipsi sit facile digerire*."<sup>13</sup>

THE believers in Christ, Revelation, and the Church as bearers of God's Word and the Sacraments—Catholic and Evangelical alike—intend to carry over the community achieved on the defensive front to the winning back of those who have lost contact with the great truths of Faith and of its authorized spokesman, the Church—all those who have believed in the myths of the 19th and 20th century, in the false idols of science and race, from Marxist historical materialism to Rosenberg's Nazism. These men are now disillusioned and are either reduced to an arid and bitter pessimism or throw themselves into the arms of new myths and organizations; they are defeated by a propaganda which is hardly conducive to thought and which seeks to impose conviction without the necessary reasoning and control of facts.

A book representing the large number in Catholic and Evangelical camps who bear witness to this apologetic of winning over non-Christians as well as Christians of a different Church is that of Thielicke, a Lutheran professor at the University of Tübingen who has spent years in concentration camps. Thielicke states *The problem which Christianity poses to the world*<sup>14</sup> by an interesting inversion of the traditional presentation of the situation; he turns the "modern world" from the prosecutor of Christianity into the accused and prosecuted party. He contests the consequences borne by the secularization of modern life, of technique uncontrolled by moral ideas, the ambivalence of material progress which, though resolving some problems, raises others no less disturbing. The Tübingen theologian goes on to stress the fact that "the modern world" seeks in vain to escape distinctly religious problems such as the drama of Evil as presented in the Gospels, for in the modern world, too, there exist demoniacal forces that only Christ is able to conquer.

In the revival of the Christian spirit in contemporary Germany among circles of great prestige and authority, we should remember the great physicist M. Planck who has not only developed a fundamental conception of the physical nature of the universe known as the 'quantum theory,' but has spoken and written, at the



height of Nazi power and thereafter, particularly in his lecture "Religion and Science" (1942) that religion and science can and should encounter each other.<sup>15</sup> It is above all in the field of medicine that both Catholic and Evangelical believers have indicated the importance of religion precisely in the interpretation and treatment of nervous disorders. Psychiatrists and neurologists have been accumulating abundant evidence to show that such disorders depend, in the last analysis, on a want of conviction and on depressions caused by delusions; that neither adequate physical treatments nor injections nor tonics are sufficient to cure those who suffer from nervous disorders; the sick must be capable of giving themselves an explanation of the why of life, of the reasons for pain and suffering, a task which only a vision inspired by the great teaching of Christianity can accomplish. This thesis has received the authoritative support of Frankl, a Viennese physician of Jewish origin, in his important book *The Medical Treatment of souls* (1947),<sup>16</sup> and the same orientation may be found even outside the numerous specific treatises of pastoral medicine written by physician-theologians. We may mention, in this connection, the Munich physician Gebattel who, in a friendly polemic with the well-known psychoanalyst Jung, maintains, in a collection of essays entitled *Humanism and Christianity*, (1948) that "the Christian vision of life is necessary in order that man may understand himself."<sup>17</sup>

Another phase of the *rapprochement* of the Churches, the awakening of a disillusioned youth, is seen in the well-frequented retreats and similar meetings for recollection and edification in the great monasteries. The Benedictine monastic vocations have been resumed, and as in the experience of the great monastery of Maria Laach, they have not attracted the traditional rural populations so much as the workers of the cities.

Traditional aid-programmes are again flourishing under auspices specifically Catholic or Evangelical, or interconfessional, though professedly religious. Such are, in the Catholic field, the houses for apprentices known as *Kolping*, the popular libraries (*Borromäus-Vereine*) with an imposing central branch at Bonn. Inspired by the solicitude for new and growing problems new works have been instituted. In this category we may mention the houses for assisting veterans who not infrequently have been left without family and home; such houses provide room for the veterans and help them to find employment which carries the right to permanent residence in veterans' housing projects. The work of assistance for refugees is more complex, for besides the grant of immediate emergency aid, it aims at an organic integration of refugees into local communities and activities so that they may rebuild their lives anew; it is also concerned with keeping family and national bonds intact and provides for the formation of a clergy for refugees, recruited from the refugees themselves.

It is significant, finally, that Catholics and Lutherans, united by the same responsibility and in part by the same party, the Christian-Social Union, have been able to play a predominant role in the material and political reconstruction of Germany, a country devastated by ideologies and a cruel war, humiliated by defeat and torn by territorial mutilations and divisions.

THE movement towards the union of the believing Christians of different faiths seems, however, to have been ruptured in recent years. We have witnessed, for example, the bitter denunciations of the exuberant "Reformed," i.e. Calvinist

pastor Niemöller of Hamburg, who besides being a national hero of the first World War as the commander of a submarine, was one of the leaders of the anti-Nazi "professing Church" since 1935. According to Niemöller, Protestantism has lost a battle in contemporary Germany because of the predominance gained by Catholics. This attitude reopens the slumbering confessional polemic and makes of the relations among Christian groups a problem of power tactics. Niemöller's position is to be related, moreover, to his attitude in support of the campaign for a unified Germany, notoriously launched by the Communist government of East Germany. His view is shared by authoritative Lutherans such as Bishop Dibelius of Berlin, and is based upon two more or less openly professed reasons: first, the compelling attraction which the idea of unity as the supreme national good exercises upon Germans who have lived through the Bismarckian Empire and the Nazi Reich, exponent of the Greater Germany (*Grossdeutschland*); secondly, the desire to reestablish the traditional Protestant supremacy with the assistance of the East which is itself in great part Protestant.<sup>18</sup> Let us add, as a negative element, the persistent influence of the Swiss theologian Karl Barth, theorist of the "theology of crisis", who rejects any idea of a visible Church as something radically foreign to the Gospel, irremediably mundane and hence substantially demoniacal. Barth's influence, very strong among young pastors, prevents an appreciation of the organized Church and its full actualization. At the other extreme, we must not conceal the fact that in the theology taught at the universities and through the young pastors formed by such teaching, in their work of caring for souls there are reappearing the liberal or rationalistic positions which seemed to have disappeared after 1945 because of its compromise with Nazism and the cooperation of its most representative men in the ecclesiastical party of "German Christians", in brief because of its opposition to and rejection of Christian believers.

THESE elements of contrast and opposition do not seem, however, to affect the substantial lines of religious Germany we have drawn, and particularly the fundamental characteristic of the new situation, i.e. the mutual understanding among the Christian faiths and the Christian initiative in the spiritual and political reconstruction of Western Germany, the only positive work about which we can speak through direct experience.

Already in the 1948 celebration of the inauguration of the partially restored Cathedral of Cologne, a sign could be seen that the reconstruction of Germany was to take shape under the banner of Christianity, precisely because its moral and material devastation had taken place under anti-Christian auspices. This was true simply because believers, in virtue of their faith, have been the first to awaken from the bewilderment of the catastrophe, and in behalf of themselves and their brethren, to think of reconstructing a future without fear of obstacles and without believing that a loyal and necessary cooperation with the occupying powers must imply a betrayal of the nation.

The existence of this new religious spirit does not mean, however, that the a-Christian forces have been dispersed and conquered. Not only do the gloomy shadows of destroyed quarters linger on in Germany, but also the living shadows of those stubbornly a-religious, the inert aridity of the despairing and the dis-

illusioned, the proud resentment of those who are nostalgic for the German power of yesterday; there remain, too, the masses seduced by new ideologies, and many who have lost contact with Christian reality and consider it something foreign, something of times past. There is also a very large number of Catholics and Protestants who are merely recorded on a statistical chart and whose religious practices have been either drained or suffocated by secularistic ideas. There is, finally, the difficulty of providing religious education and caring for souls in East Germany, where the occupying power and the party it serves tolerate the Churches solely as organizations of worship for those who have not reached the full maturity of Marxist ideology, an existence like that of the Orthodox Church in Russia.

The living Church is thus a minority, but a minority which possesses Christ and His promises, which has confessed Him in trial and has been tempered by persecution. To this Church is entrusted the spiritual destiny of Germany, a destiny which is also ours because, just as a unified and efficient Europe cannot exist without Germany, so a Christian Europe is impossible unless the Christian forces take hold of the new Germany at last called to live in peace within the European community.

Translated by ALFRED DI LASCIA

<sup>1</sup> Cf. A. Grosser, "Deutschland 1950", in *Dokumente, Zeitschrift in Dienst Uebernationaler Zusammenarbeit*, 1950, No. II, pp. 114-28.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the lively description, rich in documents and perspectives, of the new religio-ecclesiastical situation in Germany, of I. Zeiger, S. J. "Um die Zukunft der katholischen Kirche in Deutschland" in *Stimmen der Zeit*, LXXIII (1948), pp. 241-52.

<sup>3</sup> For details, cf. M. Bendiscioli, *Germania religiosa nel III Reich*, Morcelliana, 1936, and for the events of the years 1936-1939 the English edition, *Nazism versus Christianity*, London, 1939. For a study of the post-War documentation of the religious resistance in Germany, cf. M. Bendiscioli, "L'altra Germania in testimonianze postume e rievocazioni" in *Humanitas* V (1950), pp. 373-83.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. in particular the list of those condemned and massacred for the attempt against Hitler on July 20, 1944 in Rudolf Pechel, *Deutscher Widerstand*, Erlenbach-Zurich, Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1947, p. 339 ff. This is the first synoptic account of the German resistance against Nazism.

<sup>5</sup> *Sieger in Fesseln*, in the collection *Das Christliche Deutschland 1933 bis 1945: Gemeinsame Reihe*, Heft I. Verlag Herder und urche-Verlag Tuebingen 1947, p. 7. For the other volumes in the collection, cf. the article by M. Bendiscioli cited in fn. 3.

<sup>6</sup> Joseph Lortz, *Die Reformation als religiöses Anliegen Heute. — Vier Vorträge im Dienste des Una sancta*, Trier, Paulinus-Verlag, 1948. Lortz' magnum opus is *Die Reformation in Deutschland*, Freiburg, Herder, 1941, 2nd edition, two volumes.

<sup>7</sup> Johannes Hessen, *Luther in katholischer Sicht (Grundlegung eines ökumenischen Gesprächs)*, L. Rehrscheid Verlag, Bonn 1949, 2nd edition.

<sup>8</sup> Karl Adam, *Una sancta in katholischer Sicht (Drei Vorträge über die Frage eines Wiedervereinigung der getrennten christlichen Bekenntnisse)*, Duesseldorf Patmos-Verlag, 1948. This booklet has just been issued by Sheed and Ward under the title, *One and Holy*.

<sup>9</sup> Otto Karrer "Von ökumenischer Haltung und Hoffnung" in *Hochland*, XLIII (1950), October, pp. 1-15.

<sup>10</sup> A. Rehbach, *Katholische und Evangelische Glaubenswelt* (Peter-Paul Buecherei) Schwabeverlag-Stuttgart, 1948. An even more advanced point of view is that of F. Heiler, founder of the "movement for the high Church" in Germany in *Oekumenische Einheit, Archiv fuer ökumenisches und soziales Christentum*, No. I, 1948, under title "Utopia or reality of Christian unity?" (pp. 6-31).

<sup>11</sup> Martin Luther, *Glauben und Tun*, ein Brevier zusammengestellt und eingeleitet von Karl August Meisinger, Munich, R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1947.

<sup>12</sup> We think it worthy to transcribe in its entirety the following passage from *Commentaria Johannis Caeblaci, de actis et scriptis M. Lutheri* (Coloniae 1558) ad annum 1521, pp. 29-30: "Before Charles V inaugurated the Diet of Worms, Luther had published very many books in both Latin and German and, in order to gain fame for erudition and piety and secure the favor of both people and princes, mixed many good things together with his pessimistic fulminations in the writings on the Scriptures and the exhortations to men. He accomplished this work with such remarkable success that several persons, some of even greater authority, thought he was moved by the spirit of God and a zeal for



virtue to cure the abuses of hypocrites, to reform the practises and studies of the clergy, to incite the souls of men to the love and worship of God. The following works are of such a nature: *The Exposition of the Decalogue*, the *De libertate christiana*, the *Commentary on the Pater Noster*, the *Commentary on the epistle to the Galatians*, the *Sermons on the Epistles and the Gospels of the Sundays in Advent*, the exposition of *The Seven Penitential Psalms*, the exposition of the *Magnificat*, the book on *Good Works*; and of such a nature were other works which seemed to stress doctrine and devotion" (*quae speciem et doctrinae et pietatis prae se ferre videbantur*).

<sup>13</sup> Cf. the Weimar Edition, vol. LIV, p. 179, and *Luthers Werke in Auswahl*, edited by O. Clemen (Berlin 1935), vol. IV, p. 421.

<sup>14</sup> Thieliicke, Helmut, *Fragen des Christentums an die moderne Welt* (Untersuchungen zur geistigen und religiösen Krise des Abendlandes), Tübingen Mohr (P. Siebach, 1948.)

<sup>15</sup> Cf. M. Bendiscioli, "M. Planck nella resistenza tedesca," in *Humanitas*, III (1948) p. 40.

<sup>16</sup> V. E. rankl, *Aerztliche Seelsorge*, Vienna, Verlag Deuticke, 1947.

<sup>17</sup> V. E. von Gebattel, *Christentum und Humanismus* (*Wege des menschlichen Selbstverständnisses*), Stuttgart, Verlag E. Klett, 1947.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. the note signed A. F., "Konfessionszwist in Deutschland?" in *Dokumente*, VI, No. III, pp. 265 ff.

# ATTITUDES TOWARDS REFORM IN THE CHURCH

YVES CONGAR

**L**ET US examine the attitudes which can be and actually are adopted in regard to a reform movement in the Church.

On this subject, there are two considerations. They correspond to two successive choices, which are presented in such a way that the second is offered only when the first choice has been made in favor of the reform tendency. First, one must discover whether the idea of reform has been accepted; then it is a matter of knowing how, among those who accept it, the actual division is made between those who remain faithful and those who initiate a schism.

*Yves Congar is a French Dominican, whose study *Divided Christendom* is recognized as a source-book for students of Christian unity. The present article is taken from the conclusion of his recently-published *Vrai et Fausse Réforme dans l'Eglise* (Cerf).*

## FOR OR AGAINST REFORM

**T**HE FACTS show that before a wave of criticism or a somewhat profound surge of reformism, the attitude of the Church—in the third sense of the term as previously distinguished,<sup>1</sup> i.e., the ensemble of responsible persons of the hierarchy—has often first been one of rejection. Of course, there are exceptions; in the person of Innocent III we met one of the most remarkable of them.<sup>2</sup> But when the Church finds herself in the presence of novelty, she more often waits and sometimes seems even to be keeping her distance and retiring within herself. It seems as if, leaving to the future the task of satisfying the demands of the present, she walls herself in and refuses to recognize anything to which she has not always been accustomed.

There are very profound reasons for this, reasons which are—as is generally the case—both dogmatic and pastoral at the same time. Before all else, the Church desires to insure the purity and integrity of her principles. It is possible that responsible churchmen sometimes confuse what are simply “accepted ideas” with the principles of tradition. It is also possible that in a concrete situation of crisis and criticism, it is found impossible to save the essentials without at the same time taking up the defense of peripheral and relative elements which are historically linked to what is essential.<sup>3</sup> Let us regret that such is the case, even though we explain it to ourselves, but even more important, let us understand the seriousness of what is at stake. The Church must before all else safeguard its very being and the integrity of its principles. *Depositum custodire* (1 Tim., VI, 20). Adaptation to the needs of the world, openness to the requests of the faithful, even real improvements in the domain of the theological sciences or in that of pastoral activities, are surely desirable, but they are things which concern the *life* of the Church, her *bene esse*. The primary concern of her responsible leaders is for her *esse*, her *structural* elements.

This kind of contraction by the Church to its principles is balanced quickly enough in other directions in a very positive fashion. At the same time that it constitutes an obstacle, it provides the condition which ultimately enables a growth, an adaptation or a reform to represent a true development.<sup>4</sup> On the other hand, as history itself shows us, this type of contraction or retreat of the Church within herself has a meaning in the general rhythm of her life. Often it prepares the way for a movement of expansion or missionary activity. This can be observed in the 13th century, after Innocent III; in the 16th and 17th centuries, after the Council of Trent; and in the 19th century, in which a magnificent missionary expansion and a great flowering of activity and of sanctity followed the completion of the Church's retirement within herself. Finally, the movement of Catholic expansion which followed World War I certainly profited from the restorations insured through the efforts of Pius IX, Leo XIII, and Pius X. In the final analysis, life stands to benefit from the strengthening of the underlying structure.

Pastoral motives are scarcely less decisive. They proceed from experience, which learns how to foresee factual consequences and to take account of them. It is a fact, for example, that the reformist criticism of the 15th century upset the confidence and undermined the meaning of the Church in many consciences.<sup>5</sup> Equally true is the fact that for the mass of the Christian people, unaccustomed to follow subtle discussions, certain extremely radical liturgical innovations were sometimes the path-way in the 16th century for the penetration of heresy.<sup>6</sup> Here we meet for the first time with the idea that the state of culture of the Catholic milieu can sanction, or render impossible in practice, as the case may be, attitudes or activities which may be desirable in themselves. Pastoral experience and even experience in general learns to mistrust the attraction of novelty as the taste of forbidden fruit;<sup>7</sup> for error, in Christianity, is essentially a novelty. They likewise show that a most exalted and rare ideal can serve as a disguise for a temptation of pride and an evasion of concrete duties. All these considerations have their weight. Ecclesiastical superiors are right to take them seriously into account.

**T**HIS does not exclude the fact that attitudes of mind less essentially Catholic sometimes add their weight to that of the *pure* motives of doctrinal or pastoral order which we have just mentioned. Our resolution to be objective and frank requires us to explore briefly the realm of minor motivations which are less a part of Catholicism itself, and more a part of the Catholic world, of the environment, the "mentality", and even, finally, of the realm of "accepted ideas".

Going very much beyond the dogmatic principle essential to the tradition of Catholicism, there is first of all a general disposition of maintaining what has been held, and of insuring regularity before everything else.

We have noted that an imperfect but stable order is often preferable to change. We must be mindful, however, of the impressive declarations of St. Cyprian, St. Augustine, Nicholas I, St. Gregory VII: "Custom without truth is nothing but the seniority of error"; "The Lord did not say, 'I am custom', but 'I am the Truth'".<sup>8</sup> In a still more general—one might say more fundamental—fashion, Catholics, and particularly churchmen, are educated and trained to



an obedience *ad litteram*.<sup>9</sup> This is a very great force, and serves marvelously for submission to what, in the Church, is *given*, in terms of which the imperative requirements of its structure are translated. But it sometimes makes room for an excess, that of considering in practice that there is only one virtue—obedience (just as there is only one sin—the sin of the flesh). This accustoms both priests and the faithful to a certain lack of initiative, even where life would demand that it be taken.<sup>10</sup> Pushed to its extreme limit, it would end up by conceiving religion as something completely ready-made, entirely determined from on high and extrinsic to the personal decisions of conscience, and the *Sentire cum Ecclesia* would become a mechanical docility complying with complete and meticulous regulations, admitting no margin for personal decision or adaptation.<sup>11</sup> This would be a degradation and almost a caricature of the real *Sentire cum Ecclesia*, and of the true meaning of tradition;<sup>12</sup> rather it would be a flat fidelity in which the mind of Catholicism would be only very superficially honored.

In our opinion there would also seem to be a certain pusillanimity present in such an attitude, a manifestation, if not of fear, at least of small confidence in the truth and strength of our principles. Whatever may be the conclusions of zoölogy on the matter, there is a profound truth of a spiritual nature in this maxim of Père Mersch: "It is for lack of skeletons that certain animals have to be enclosed in shells."<sup>13</sup> There is, in attitudes of defense which above all else seek to avoid risk—and consequently, anything new, even change and life itself—a sentiment of weakness and sometimes even of fear. It is because one is not sure of himself, and feels himself overwhelmed by the culture and dynamism of a world he knows principally from afar, that one is timid and sets up barricades. An Innocent III, a Leo XIII, a Pius XI, on the contrary, have been boldly open-hearted and enterprising because they dominated their times by their intelligence and strong personality. There is something other than chance to be found to account for the fact that a timid and defensive Christianity easily becomes a religion of women and children which is afraid of mature men and scarcely pays any attention to them. It is not an accident, either, that in a regime of rigorous authority and strict regimentation, the clergy has above all the tendency to seek security in what has already been accepted and to like "ready-made" recipes.

They are encouraged, and at the same time confirmed in a certain opposition to change, by their isolation from the life of the world and by their lack of habit and formation which would enable them to consider the state of society with a degree of realism. This point must be precisely stated, because in a sense there are no men more sanely realistic or better informed than priests. A curé knows his people not only in their moral and religious life, but in their social habits and surroundings. Nevertheless, one sometimes meets—especially before the last few years—priests who know far too little of the historical situation or of the technical resources of society, or who, though having some idea of these things, draw no practical conclusion from their knowledge. On the other hand, it appears that every clear grasp of the real state of the apostolic field has brought with it conclusions of a reformist nature. The junction is then effected between the knowledge men have of their sociological situation and the technical aspects of the ministry, or even, at the spiritual level, of the very precise exigencies of Christian reality. It is not enough to have a knowledge of what is unchangeable

in man and represents the eternal truth about souls and simple human situations; it is necessary to have a knowledge of the historical and sociological contexts in which the moral and religious man is situated. If one is observant, he notes that the proportion between the churchmen who are ultimately open to reform and the churchmen who are *a priori* closed to reform varies exactly as these men are open or closed to a real consideration of social-historical conditioning. There is one reservation; those who obtain knowledge of this conditioning will not be open to reform if their attitude to it is one of opposition and *a priori* condemnation of their times (guilty of the unpardonable original sin of being modern, i.e., present, and not past).

For this disposition sometimes exists. There are minds for whom everything which has come into existence after a certain date finds itself *ipso facto* in a state of mortal sin and damnation. We shall not stop to criticize this curious disposition, from which, surely, few of us totally escape, since there exists in almost every man a kind of instinct which comes to consider as an offense, as a lack of what is due to him, as something suspect and in a way treasonable, everything that is novel in relation to what he has accepted and held, and with which life has made him satisfied. It may be jealousy, or a complex of the members of the older generation who are inwardly irritated with a new generation which enjoys opportunities they have not known;<sup>14</sup> it doesn't matter. What is necessary is to give a clear account of the attitude and practice a healthy auto-criticism in regard to it. To complete this rapid survey\* of the motives for opposition to change, it is necessary to mention two attitudes which are generally linked together—there are, of course, exceptions—: what is called, in our socio-political language, *the rightist mentality*, and what is given the name *integralism* in theology.<sup>15</sup>

**I**NTEGRALISM is especially a certain manner of feeling and affirming one's Catholicism, a mentality and attitude which determine a certain way of holding Catholic positions. In this respect, integralism includes more than the historical framework of the modernist crisis. It is a disposition whose manifestations may be marked out in all the great crises of the modern epoch. When, for example, Charles V and Ferdinand asked, as means of helping fidelity to Catholicism, for permission for communion under two species in German countries, there was a very lively reaction from some Catholics, especially Spaniards: there should be no "concession"; every policy aiming to establish unity which would be based on giving easy terms would be false; those who left the Church did not deserve to have their return made easy, etc.<sup>16</sup> On all evidence, this was not a question of dogma, and the Holy See will end by allowing the use of the chalice; it was purely a question of attitude. In fact there were men, especially among those who were on the spot, in contact with heresy, who wanted to facilitate the return to unity by moderate decisions, a reprieve for certain measures, even exterior concessions; there were also those who were enemies of all concessions,

---

\* To give a continuity to the article, and present Congar's thought more fully, the heart of his discussion of Integralism, presented in the book as a separate appendix (Appendix III, "Mentalité 'de droite' et Intégrisme en France", pp. 604-622), is here inserted. (Tr.)

wishing to keep all the steepness of the demands of Catholicism, sometimes even to bring it out in greater relief. It is this tendency which, victorious in Caraffa—founder of the Theatines, first cardinal, and then Paul IV—and after him in Pius V, contributed to a hardening of the positions of the Counter-Reformation.

It was the 19th century which gave an opportunity for these tendencies to become clear-cut attitudes, especially because of the problems posed by the French Revolution, the latter considered not so much as a political fact but as a spiritual fact, and because the Revolution gave issue in all domains of public and social life to a spirit which for more than a century animated a modern world that was foreign, even hostile, to Catholicism.<sup>17</sup> A great option was given to minds, not between Jacobin philosophy and Catholicism, but between the acceptance as valuable of a certain number of things and the *a priori* refusal of every acceptance of this kind. This option, taken too quickly and in too absolute a manner, animated *L'Avenir* and the activity of Lamennais. Lacordaire also took this option, both by instinct and by lucidity, but he did it in a purer and more moderate way than Lamennais. . . He thought that Veuillot had done what Lamennais had not had the time to complete: he had divided Catholics by taking such an extreme position in such an excessive polemical language that their union became impossible. . . The history of intra-Catholic political battles in France between 1871 and 1945 tells a story of a peaceful victory, slow but constant, of the *juste milieu* over the sectarianism of the two extreme positions, a victory in which Leo XIII, Benedict XV, Pius XI, Cardinal Verdier and Cardinal Suhard have all aided.

This has been very difficult because France is an ardent country, fervent about ideas, high-minded, where disputes easily get raised to the level of religious wars. This is also because France had known an extraordinary success of "Christianity" in the middle ages and under the *Ancien Régime*, with the result that an idealized remembrance, without great care for historical reality, has for a long time weighed on French Catholics and brought them to think of the "conquest" of France for Christ as a restoration of a glorious past. On the other hand, the historical weight of the "Christian world" was such, adhering to the very fibres of our culture and habits, that those who promoted a new order were scarcely able not to end in fighting the influences of the Church, and sometimes even of Christianity, which adhered to the past.

It is understandable that among Catholics themselves, perhaps because of the lack of a powerful enough contact with the sources of the Christian realities, or of a sufficiently courageous lack of concern for immediate results, the defense of Christianity often took on a political tone. . . The integralist tendency was particularly prone to this, because it was from this tendency that the *manner of existing (quo)* was most linked up with *established things and fixed objects (quod)*. To be opposed to the modern world, to the Revolution, to the republic, taken in their concrete reality and *en masse*, almost necessarily brings it about that one stands for things as they used to be, and that in every case one has a solidarity of thought and action with the past. That is why integralism has almost always been tied, in France, with a rightist political attitude. . . In history, the reaction against what was called "Americanism", the integralism of the modernist period, or that of Cardinal Billot or Cardinal Merry del Val, came from men totally committed to rightist attitudes.



OF WHAT is this rightist attitude composed when it is translated, on the religious plane, into integralism?

It has been said that the right puts order before justice, the left placing justice before order.<sup>18</sup> I am not sure that the interested parties would recognize themselves in this description, but I believe it is accurate to characterize the right by its concern for order. It has also the virtues of order and fidelity which are neither small nor negligible, especially when the Christian spirit is crowned by charity. But it is for order because the bias of its disposition is for what is determined from outside and from on high, by way of authority and precept. . . A fact of every-day experience is explained by this. It happens that rightists may have large-minded and positive social ideas; at least, if they are good Catholics, those the Church imposes. But the people never have the feeling that they are truly on their side. They discover in them the smell of paternalism. Because they are men of order, they think instinctively that it is the outward decision that counts, and that others will do well only if they are told what to do. Those of the right do not have confidence in man; in the face of initiatives or new requests, their attitude is that of refusal or condemnation, or even condescension. They see things accomplished validly only from the top down, by the intervention of authority. This is the ecclesiastical principle itself; but does life obey, even in what it contains of value, only the hierarchical principle?

As the Church is hierarchical by structure, and traditional by its very law, it is understandable that Catholics have often established a union between their rightist attitudes and their Catholic fidelity. It is this transposition which is the principle of integralism. We can see how this could easily be strengthened by a certain way of conceiving the "supernatural", and by combatting, in the name of this mentality, even healthy manifestations of nature, by calling them "naturalism".

The descriptive definition of Father O. von Nell-Breuning seems extremely apt: considered as a total system, integralism wishes to fashion or determine all domains of life, by proceeding from the (specifically or properly) Catholic element.<sup>19</sup> I believe that integralists would not consider themselves misunderstood or slighted by this definition. It is indeed in this direction that they appear to us as people of a typically rightist disposition. Their refusal of the modern world, their taste for everything that is determined by way of authority, comes at bottom from a suspicion or misunderstanding in regard to what a contribution of man would represent, or a development or emergence of new elements in history.

The more I reflect, the more I see that the modern world as a total fact can be characterized by what I would call the discovery of the subject. . . The middle ages and the *Ancien Régime*, which may be legitimately taken as *ensembles* having a relative spiritual homogeneity, may be characterized by two facts: objectivity . . . (thus the middle ages was hardly interested in psychology or history); and traditionalism. . .

The modern world—to which one may, depending on what aspect of it is being considered, assign a beginning anywhere from the end of the 12th century to around 1680, covering the beginning of the 14th century, the Italian Renaissance, the great discoveries, the Reformation—is, on the contrary, characterized by two opposed traits: the discovery of the subject and the role of the subjective . . .

(the moderns gladly concern themselves with the psychological and historical); and the research and interest in the direction of new contributions. A position almost inverse to that of the middle ages is held: the past is considered over and done with because it is past; the ideal is presented of not being in the steps of the preceding generation.

That there is here an exaggeration and even a sickness of judgment would seem to be easily recognizable today, when we have already eaten a few bitter fruits of this new tree. The point of view of the subject has turned into subjectivism (Kant), into confidence in everything that comes from man (Rousseau), or becomes an *a priori* refusal to accept anything from anyone (ideological secularism). Nevertheless, a number of serious Catholic minds have thought there was a certain truth in the subjective point of view, and in particular in the idea of a conditioning of knowledge and assent by subjective dispositions. It is remarkable that the same men who gave a place to this point of view, applied the idea of development to Christianity, gaining greater acceptance within Catholicism for the psychological and historical. Such is the great interest of Möhler and Newman; doubtless too, this is also the reason why, rightly or wrongly, some wanted to see them as ancestors of modernism. But Pascal already had opened the way to a theology of the act of faith and a notion of apologetics of which Dechamps and Blondel might—in quite different conditions, moreover—revive the fundamental inspiration. Towards the end of the 19th century, movements open to the point of view of the subject were everywhere knocking on the doors of Catholicism and asking for Baptism. This is the meaning of "Christian democracy", the "new apologetics", the claim for a place for the historical, the controversy over Father Hecker. Modernism was carried along in the same current. At bottom it was an attempt to introduce into Catholicism the point of view of the subject, such as it had been erroneously developed in certain philosophies and in liberal Protestantism: the Church could only expel it from herself as contrary to her structure and her being. What was valid in the claims previously mentioned did not suffer the same reaction as modernism experienced,—a reaction which was, on the Church's part, a reaction of life. The marvel is that the discernment of the impossible and the possible was made so quickly. For if Christian democracy, the new apologetics, and the historical and critical point of view received some rough blows in a hard battle in which the very fidelity of the Church was at stake, they have survived the destruction of modernism and today are rather in good standing. . .

When the integralist attitude is applied to religious matters, it takes positions of which here are a few elements:

(1) Insistence on the corruption of nature and original sin; condemnation as naturalism of things in themselves inoffensive (like the Scout movement, or wearing shorts); an *a priori* suspicious attitude towards modern amusements; a taste for the affirmation of what is most repugnant to man. (2) Inclination to strength and the method of authority; corresponding choices in education; (3) *A priori* aversion for the notion of evolution; hostility towards that of development, a frown every time one speaks of "life" or "experience". (4) Aversion for everything that might represent an inclined plane in the approach to Christianity; tendency to retain all the steepness of Catholicism, sometimes even to add to it. (5) Affection for a notion of faith extended particularly in the intellectual sense, insisting very strongly on its objective aspect (*fides quae creditur*),

on the dogmatic data as something cut and dried imposing itself on the faithful, and not wanting consideration of the subjective reality of the faith (*fides qua creditur*) or of its advances. (6) Great attachment to the rational element, to demonstration by way of reasoning; taste for deduction; on the other hand, little practice in induction and no appeal to experience, to the testimony of consciousness; attachment to Scholasticism, but of the "Christian philosophy" restored by Leo XIII, only St. Thomas is kept, to the practical exclusion of St. Anselm, St. Bonaventure, and St. Augustine; St. Thomas is considered to have said practically everything, at least as regards the essential; the "moderns" are suspected *a priori* of having been ignorant of everything, deviated in everything, and of bringing nothing valuable, even at the level of problems. Few problems, moreover, are considered as such; one tends only to the demonstration of conclusions, in the defense of acquired results; confronted with a different thought than one's own, one is careful not to see that it is a response to certain requirements and is bringing valid elements, but one is intent on disclosing its errors and pulverizing them by a demonstration starting from one's own definitions. (7) In the doctrine of the Church or in her practical directives (free here in practice to make unconsciously a choice in the direction of one's own opinions), there is the tendency to accentuate the authoritative and strict aspect; an exaggeration of the character of definitive determination in statements coming from Rome, which are, nevertheless, very often directives given in the movement of ideas and of Catholic life which move with the current while directing it from within. In a general way, the truth is rarely experienced as a fullness to which one strives in the society of other minds and the communion of the Church, but rather in a linear, schematic fashion—on one side, as a statement to be given, and on the other side, something cut and dried to be accepted. Heresy is easily detected among those who are still searching, on the watch for every valuable contribution, and for whom there are not only conclusions, but also problems. (8) A certain ecclesiology corresponds to these attitudes. The Church is, of course, considered as a mystery of grace, and the aspects of mystical life are solidly affirmed; and the very positive consideration of the spiritual life and of God's work in souls is even the way by which an opening exists so that many elements not recognized in the above-indicated positions make their re-entry. But these things remain confined to the order of personal life, and when one thinks, ecclesiological doctrine is expressed in an authoritative sense, quite exterior to the religious subject, and in such a way that everything is considered under the aspect in which it comes and is completed from on high (typical example of this type of approach is A. Doerner, *Sentire cum Ecclesia*, already mentioned in note 11).\*

**R**ESISTANCE to demands for reform, eventually coming to ignore them, and systematically rejecting them, might have serious consequences.

The first would be to exasperate and almost push outside the Church a desire for reforms which, however much it may be lacking in patience and

---

\* The text of the Conclusion is resumed at this point. (Tr.)



moderation, has not on that account less claim to be heard. It has often been observed that certain souls have in this way been driven to a point of leaving the Church. Erasmus pointed this out in regard to Arius, Tertullian, and Wycliff, and he asked if they wanted to drive him out, too.<sup>20</sup> Actually, these are examples of heretics who were very resolved not to surrender to any advance, and the same remark might be made about those for whom similarly favorable considerations have been suggested. The most that can be said is that responsibility is divided. Consider Peter Valdès who comes to Rome to place his budding movement before the council assembled at the Lateran (1179). The manner in which he was treated does not permit them to have a completely clear conscience. One cannot help thinking that things would have been different in 1210, if in the place of Walter Mapes, there had been Innocent III and Ugolino. But also, unfortunately, Valdès was not Francis Bernadone, and it is quite clear that he came to Rome with the resolution of maintaining his position regardless of what ecclesiastical authority might decide.<sup>21</sup> The idea has been suggested that in the Czech movement of the 16th century, along with serious doctrinal errors, there was an appeal and an aspiration which were those of nationalism, at the dawn of modern times.<sup>22</sup> One is tempted to think that if they had met acceptance and comprehension on the part of the Church, if the use of the chalice had been recognized in time, schisms which have weighed on history until our own day would perhaps have been avoided. . . It has been said—I am not in a position to have an opinion on this subject—that the “Jan-senist” Church of Utrecht owed its origin to the incomprehension and stubbornness of Catholics.<sup>23</sup> It has been suggested that if Doellinger had been called to Rome to work on the preparation of the Vatican Council, he would perhaps have remained a Catholic.<sup>24</sup> That seems doubtful to me, and Doellinger placed himself beyond such a possibility by his attitude. I myself have heard an English prelate, who had known George Tyrrell very well, say that the latter would have been able to remain within the Church if he had not been pushed to a point of exhaustion. I cite this opinion without making it my own, and add this case to those others, not to draw up an accusation against the hierarchy, but to show that there is really a problem: the problem of being sufficiently open to valid demands, if such they are, in order that those who formulate them may not be pushed to the point where they despair of making heard what they believe to be true. Ultimately, the Church herself recognizes that there is a problem. That is why we have so often seen her treat men prudently, and in certain cases sometimes even their errors, in order to avoid forcing them to a break. Alexander VIII avoided pronouncing a solemn condemnation of the Four Articles of 1682 in order to prevent a schism. The way in which Lamennais was first dealt with was full of similar prudential tactics. The Church knows that “He who blows his nose too hard causes blood to flow”.<sup>25</sup>

But one cannot expect the Church to put up with everything, any more than one expects parents to yield to their children's whims to prevent them from running away. The bad disposition of reformers who are secretly resolved to be right against the whole Church makes the most positive attitudes of acceptance and understanding quite useless. Impatience, obstinacy in one-sidedness, the spirit of revolt, at a certain moment permit no other consequence but expulsion.<sup>26</sup> There must be in the structure an open disposition towards life, in order to be ready to welcome it, but on the part of life there must also be

a similar attitude to the structure, in order to accept its regulations. The life must be developed within the structure and in accordance with it: this is an absolute condition in order that its demands be realized. The structure ought to be attentive and open to these appeals. Without this it would be failing in its role of assuring the growth of the body; it would assume before history the terrible responsibility of having contributed to depriving the Church of creative forces. Adaptation would be made too late or not at all. The movements which entreat a response would secede or they would exhaust themselves and fade away within the Church. The latter would remain herself, but minus a more or less notable portion of living forces which had arisen in her (peripheral and frontier forces of contact and assimilation, the most "missionary" forces).

Despite certain errors to which we will call attention in the notes, Foerster has written some profound pages in which he explains very well how a schismatic reform compromises for a long time in the Church that portion of truth (sometimes quite considerable) which had at its origin given it its spiritual value and perhaps its mission:

The most painful injury that the Church sustained in the great schism of the 16th century is that she saw herself obliged from then on to consider suspect and even as an enemy, religious liberty in Catholic Christianity. Thus the individual conscience, subjective devotion, mysticism, and evangelical spontaneity, which till then formed a body with the *anima catholica* and sustained the spiritual life in the Church side by side with the work of the intellect and dogma, became little by little entirely suspect.<sup>27</sup> The battle against schismatic Protestantism extended to the faculties of the soul, which were comprised in the secession to the point where the word "life" itself was denounced as a symptom of Protestant free will. For a great number of zealous Catholics even today it is enough for something to be Protestant for it to be no longer Catholic. For them Catholicism is contained in the formula: *Christianity minus Protestantism*...

All these repercussions of separation were bound to provoke in modern Catholicism that exaggerated defiance with respect to the personal element in religion. Instead of assimilating and incorporating libertarian tendencies, the Church made cause against them, and renounced spiritual elements which up till then formed a portion of her own domain.

She was thus bound more and more to lose contact with her mystical element,<sup>28</sup> and more and more exclusively to recruit her directive agencies from among formalistic spheres. This fact contributed to the defection from her of a growing number of souls who prized personal liberty.<sup>29</sup> As a result today she resembles a mother who can find soft words for only one of her sons, while the other, the one who really has the greatest need of her solicitude, finding nothing but lack of understanding in her, hardens in his obstinacy and leaves home...

The first schism which divided the Orient and the Occident already jeopardized not only the amputated limb, but the very body of the western Church. . . It is permissible to believe that except for this first schism Protestantism would not have had the occasion to be born, for the Church of the Renaissance would have found in the vitality of Slavic intensity a corrective for her own superficiality. For her part, the Orthodox Church would have found in her contact with the Church of the West a corrective against Czarist absolutism. This would not have been lacking in its repercussions on Russia's political life and would have spared her certain social convulsions.<sup>30</sup>

Foerster makes similar statements of no less importance concerning certain political attitudes of modern man and the cause of liberty for which whole masses have gone into secession.<sup>31</sup>

TO THIS loss of creative forces—of which many other examples could be found—there corresponds on the part of the Church a failure or a delay in producing its fullest development, since we have seen that it is through the market-places of the world that the Church takes growth and gives to the body of Christ its dimensions. Instead of a deep fidelity to tradition, which, through the work of discernment and assimilation we have mentioned, leads to an adaptive development, there is a static kind of fidelity, without dimension for the future, making only for an attitude of “anti-innovation”.

However, though the movement of life can be slowed up, it is impossible to arrest it. As the grain sprouts its stalk, and as the stalk makes its way overcoming all obstacles, so a movement which proceeds truly from the conscience ends by affirming itself, and if it is valid, by having its triumph.

On the other hand, to oppose such a movement involves the risk of seeing it make its way in the “underground”: the transposition of such a thing within the Church would be heart-rending and odious. When the frame-work is too rigid, however, a similar danger can take hold. The biographers of John Wesley<sup>32</sup> clearly note that he wanted to be only a reformer of morals, not even a reformer of the abuses of the *Church*. If the official Anglican Church, instead of refusing to accept him, and exhausting him, had admitted him, there would never have been any secession. If there was a Methodist “Church” created, it was because Wesley found no place in the sclerotic body of the Established Church for a purely evangelical ministry. The danger described could be illustrated by examples drawn from the history of the Catholic Church. The suppression of national and political aspirations in the Papal States under Leo XII, Pius VIII, and Gregory XVI provoked the development of Carbonarism. Reflecting on the motives which had led so many enthusiastic Catholics to Lamennais, Père Lacordaire has observed that in the moments when the Church seems inert with respect to the movement of the age, youthful unused forces “vainly seek the home where their ardor might be sustained, purified, and put to use in a common work, in a Catholic way. They languish in isolated exaltation, they feel themselves perishing without profit for God. What a profound misfortune is the loss of so many intelligent men capable of carrying on an action for good! But in the movement which is carrying them towards their end, they can never be stopped with impunity. Minds which have not been given an outlet in the normal way, will sooner or later meet each other in their unhappy quest; they will band together with an unhealthy delight, and will be stirred up by the feeling of their present force and the remembrance of their past inaction. Some day this lawless society, which has been preparing itself for a long time, will fall like a thunder-bolt upon a Church without doctors”.<sup>33</sup>

It is in such a way that a sort of secession-from-within could be constituted, composed of generous elements which had been disappointed in their progressive aspirations, and which would come more and more to feel themselves foreign and indifferent to a community which they had loved and earnestly desired to serve.<sup>34</sup> Magnificent resources would be lost, left unused; ardent Christians would succumb to an indifference which one often rightly complains of meeting among the masses of the faithful. This waste of energies would be especially deplorable in the present crisis, since the times are more tragic, the needs more pressing, and since this time there is available that great élan



among the élites of the Christian people, the lack of which has till now rendered sterile the proposals for reform made by the clergy.

IT IS necessary, therefore, that a balance be maintained between creative forces and stability, between new demands and tradition. The advice to Timothy, "keep free from profane novelties in speech and the contradictions of so-called knowledge" (1 Tim., VI, 20) is answered by the reminder, "Do not extinguish the Spirit. Do not despise prophecies. But test all things; hold fast that which is good" (1 Thess., V, 19-21). But we shall borrow the practical formula for the difficult synthesis, which it is indispensable to construct, from Cardinal Suhard, who so remarkably succeeded with it. Here is what he said to his priests on the occasion of the annual retreat in 1946, the year which marked the turning-point in France for the tendency of reform:

One of the real unrests of the present hour is the *critical spirit*. This has two meanings. The "moderns," emphasizing the fact that "the times have changed," are demanding—or undertaking—reforms. Nothing that was accomplished before them finds favor in their eyes. They must tear everything down and move on. The "ancients" are astounded or scandalized at these audacities or this presumption. They sense the danger of this "generation of critics." But do not some of them fall into the very excess they are condemning? To criticize criticism, that is itself a criticism. Is the reaction of defense or rejection to which they yield more discerning and more charitable than the appetite for novelty which they stigmatize?

It is true that it would be naive or conceited for the innovators to reject the fruit of a wisdom proved by time and to erect their own methods into an absolute, as if today's works were not bound to have insufficiencies and their own judges. But do those who condemn these initiatives always take into account the intentions, the efforts, the inevitable mistakes and the hopes for the future? Thus, the solution does not lie in "reciprocal excommunications." It must be sought on a higher plane, in an informed and comprehending charity. A great number of priests have understood this. Out of their mutual concessions progress has been born: excesses are tempered by prudence and conservatism consents to experiment. (*Document. cathol.*, Oct. 1946, col. 1215-1216.)

### THE DIVISION AMONG REFORMERS

IN ACCORDANCE with what history teaches us, can we ascertain something of the dispositions which determine this division and something of the manner in which it is constituted? It would be interesting to learn the reasons, among men whose reformatory aspirations were, at the outset, possessed in common, which caused them to separate and take different paths. In this way we will succeed in making more precise the fact of the preliminary ambivalence of reformatory aspirations, and perhaps in clarifying the conditions of a reform without schism.<sup>35</sup>

We have to return to those principal historical examples—which, moreover, suggest themselves to us naturally—the apostolic and evangelical movements of the middle ages, the 16th century reforms, the *entourage* of Lamennais (we shall limit ourselves to a comparison between Lamennais and Lacordaire). At the same time that we are systematically constructing parallels—on the whole an easy thing to do—let us remember that it would be unfair and unintelligent to paint certain people all white, and others all black. Nevertheless,

some remained Catholics, while others shattered the greatest of all created things, the communion of the Church. . .

### Apostolic and Evangelical Movements of the Middle Ages

UNFORTUNATELY, the men are not very well known to us. In the great aspiration towards an *apostolic* or *evangelical* life which followed upon the Gregorian reform, semi-heretics often resemble Catholics.<sup>36</sup> An interrogation regarding their faith was not neglected, but it happened that at all proceedings there was recourse to an ordeal in order to discern the authenticity of their position.<sup>37</sup> It would seem that the characteristics of the non-Catholic attitude can be gleaned from these two traits, which a certain Master Vicarius noted in the case of Hugo Speroni and for which he reproached him: on the one hand, of being too proud of his own judgment, thinking himself right against all the others; on the other hand, interpreting everything concerning the Church in a bad light, and being excessively critical of her.<sup>38</sup> It is the first of these points which seemed important to Father Spätling in his study of the "Apostolics" (*op. cit.*, p. 213) It is again the same thing, translated into terms of a resolution to change nothing, no matter what the Church might declare, that we see in the case of Peter Valdès and his followers.<sup>39</sup> They were convinced, from the beginning, that *they themselves were the true Church*. A little later, however, certain Vaudois groups, recognizing the possibility of satisfying their demand *within the Church*, will unite and become the Poor Catholics. As for the second point, it is clearly apparent when the Catharist and Vaudois movements are compared with that of St. Francis. The heterodox movement strikes one by its critical and negative display of bitter opposition to the Catholic clergy. On the contrary, it is remarkable that in the relatively numerous writings which we have of St. Francis, not a *single* criticism of the state of things or of churchmen can be found. We find, rather, the expression of a very great respect for the priesthood, the sacraments, and the ceremonies of the Church; in these respects the "Apostolics" clearly appear to be just the opposite.<sup>40</sup>

### 16th Century Reformers

THE INITIAL fact is the following. On the one hand, in the reformative humanistic groups which are formed in the frame-work of the Church at the beginning of the 16th century, a division will be made: some will adhere to the Reform, while others will desire to remain within the Church. Thus, among the disciples of Lefèvre d'Étaples, Gérard Roussel and Josse Clichtoue remain Catholics, while Farel and Louis de Berquin embrace the Reform. On the other hand, the reform tendency of Catholic humanists, that of Erasmus in particular, had, from its inception, a number of important points in common with that of Luther, even in the realm of evangelical doctrine, which alone interested Luther: justification by faith, Christian liberty, criticism of a religion of observances and practices through which, Erasmus said, the Judaism attacked by St. Paul in his Epistle to the Galatians constituted itself anew. . . Several "Erasmians" had their moments of Lutheran sympathy, and if some went over

to the Reform, others maintained or re-discovered their Catholic fidelity: W. Pirckheimer in Germany, Paul Eliassen in Denmark. Closer still to Luther, his friend and superior Staupitz, had everything that was necessary to embrace the Reform: he held the strict Augustinian doctrine on grace and predestination, and Luther says that he was the first to have kindled the spark of the Gospel.<sup>41</sup> Staupitz sought the renovation of studies in a biblical sense, he had acted in this direction at Erfurt, cooperated in the founding of Wittenberg, had Luther nominated as a doctor, and favored the beginnings of his reform program. . . Nevertheless, Staupitz did not follow his friend into secession and died at the Benedictine abbey of Salzburg. As for Erasmus, living a Catholicism of his own, although not committing himself with his whole being in the life of the Church,<sup>42</sup> he nevertheless remained a Catholic by virtue of a formal choice, whose motives, as we shall see, though not heroic, are far from being despicable.

What strikes us first about the reformers who created a schism is their radicalism. Luther himself was violent and irritable. He knew himself to be so, but he thought that this had been of service to his mission, and that without it he would not have been able to accomplish his task—not only because he would not have ventured on it, but because to proceed in too moderate a way, as Erasmus did, would effectively bring about nothing.<sup>43</sup> In the domain of facts, Luther was certainly right: his violence did serve his task such as he conceived and accomplished it. Erasmus—and this also shows us that he had a different conception of reform—thought that the role to which Luther had been called presupposed something else.<sup>44</sup> As a matter of fact, it may be supposed that had Luther set forth only the goodness and Christianity of his thought without the violence, radicalism, and one-sidedness which characterized him, he would better have served the cause of reform itself; in addition, he would have won over the emperor and the whole body of Christendom which was desirous of a reform. But Luther, in his certitude of being inspired, took his own impulses, and even the violence of his own impulses, for the direction of the Spirit. He needed violence to excite and drug him. He said himself that he gave himself courage by representing to himself the abominations of the papacy.<sup>45</sup> This can be seen quite clearly, on several occasions, for example, after Augsburg in 1530, when he deliberately increased his violence, started the fight again, accentuating the opposition, and creating the irreversible. With a much cooler head, Calvin will do the same thing: at Haguenau in 1540, and, after the interim, at Augsburg in 1548.

Because of this radicalism the reformers did not fear to consummate a rupture, but it is necessary also to include the fact that they were servants of a cause to which those who remained in the Church did not fully surrender themselves. On several occasions Luther observed that he had taken things extremely seriously.<sup>46</sup> From the point of view of his own internal problems, to which his action and thought are linked in a very decisive fashion, this signifies that he was not able to live without carrying everything to its maximum intensity and ultimate implication.<sup>47</sup> From the point of view with which we are here concerned, this consisted in immediately drawing the most explosive consequences, those least corrected by the analogy of the faith of the Church. It is just the contrary of what Luther found reproachable in Staupitz—"frigidus est et parum vehemens"<sup>48</sup>—or in John Eck:<sup>49</sup> these men could hold an intellectual position without finally making it a question of life and an object of action.



This point is certainly very important. In the dispositions which make for the revolutionary reformer or the submissive reformer, there are, on the one side, to be found a certain intrepidity, a certain radicalism in the way in which sentiments are carried to the extreme limits of their consequences, and on the other side, moderation, a distrust of self, a care to remain in harmony with the body of the faithful and their pastors. This can be very clearly observed in the Czech movement in favor of the use of the chalice. It is what betrays the great difference between Rokycana, the leader of the Utraquists but a man of the middle course who remained a Catholic, and a Martin de Krčín or the Taborites, who by their radicalism and obstinacy pushed the movements towards schism.<sup>50</sup> It is still more clearly observable in the reform milieu called Fabrian or Fabrician, the name which Béda in 1526 said the sect of "Lutherans" would have borne if they had taken that of their first leader. A Gérard Roussel, for example, certainly drew back before the consequences of too radical an action, and also before the effort required to accomplish it; he thought that things were not yet ripe enough for this.<sup>51</sup> Twelve years later Calvin, who had been closely connected with Roussel and owed him a great deal, reproached him for lacking the necessary courage to refuse a bishopric and leave the communion of Rome.<sup>52</sup> A French initiate of the Reform delivers a similar judgment on Lefèvre himself: "He has no courage," he writes to Oecolampadius; and to Farel: "He is not sufficiently high-minded to bear the charge of the Gospel."<sup>53</sup> Farel, on the other hand, was a resolute man, violent, even a brawler.<sup>54</sup> The division between those who leave the Church and those who remain faithful can almost be made on the basis of their temperamental dispositions. One sees it again, for example, in the case of the group with reformatory tendencies at Lyon, where Castellion received his formation, when the first harshness occurred.<sup>55</sup> There are those who desire to live in peace. They are obedient, but retain their freedom to comment among themselves and with discretion on such things as they are obliged to believe. In this category, to which Calvin will give the name of "Nicodemites", belongs Marot, who abjures, Nicolas Bourbon, etc. But there are those whose temperament will not allow half-way measures: it is a question of character, according to Buisson (p. 87). These latter need only an opportunity and their hearts rise up in revolt: a procession, an image to which they refuse to show reverence, and they will be entangled in a relentless chain of resistance and sanctions.

THE CASE of Erasmus merits special attention. In his estimation, at bottom Luther was right on the principle of Christian liberty and on the matter of Pauline Christianity (in opposition to Judaism), but he thought him in the wrong to try to vindicate his position by revolutionary means, with violence and impatience, destroying things that were good, and, above all, destroying peace.<sup>56</sup> Luther and his followers had done a disservice to the cause of the Gospel by their excesses. Instead of proceeding in the ways of the spirit, with respect for the hierarchies and with moderation, they wanted to change everything in a single blow, *quasi subito novus mundus condi posset*.<sup>57</sup> To describe Luther's manner of acting, which he reproves, Erasmus repeatedly employs the words *seditionum*, *seditione*,<sup>58</sup> a manner that was insurrectional and revolutionary. He himself, convinced that serious reforms were necessary, did not want to change anything without the authority of the Church, on the one hand, and without respect for

continuity, on the other.<sup>59</sup> Erasmus obviously did not have a martyr's temperament. He loved tranquillity. There were several grounds for Luther to accuse him of betraying the cause of the Gospel through lack of courage and spiritual strength, and for Zwingli to treat him as a temporizer.<sup>60</sup> Erasmus also found in his anti-dogmatic attitude and his theological relativism possibilities that favored a flexible position that was hostile to any excess.<sup>61</sup> It cannot be denied that he would have admitted and reconciled everything provided that even the most critical matters might be governed by moderation.<sup>62</sup> But it seems to me that the real quality of his attitude and the value of the teaching it contains is diminished if it is reduced to an amiable liberalism, jealous of its own peace. In the final analysis, Erasmus was perfectly aware of the audience he would have had, and of the historical role he would have played, had he declared himself a Lutheran. His repugnance for an act of disunion and revolt was something quite profound. He desired most positively not to be responsible for a schism, either in his own time or in the future.<sup>63</sup> In agreement with Luther on many intellectual positions from the outset, he did not wish, however, for any reason whatsoever, to disrupt unity. This presupposes a lively sense of the meaning of the Church, for no one at that time realized, as much as they should have, that unity was definitely being destroyed.

There is, of course, a very unpleasant side to Erasmus: that of the intellectual who judges in a superior way and by so doing places himself outside of what he is judging, as Möhler remarks so justly. Besides, such judgments often have something superficial about them, and manifest a rather mediocre understanding of the profound tradition of the Church. The *ressourcement*<sup>64</sup> of Erasmus was that of a humanist and critic, with the short-comings which this entails. His wisdom is frequently a pragmatic prescription to avoid extremes at any cost. But there is also something else: a certain sense of the Church and a deep attachment to unity. Erasmus did not realize the complete depth of the conditions for a true reform,<sup>65</sup> but he did hold to what is essential: the will to preserve unity, in spite of a life in communion with very little mysticism; the sense of and respect for the concrete religious life of the faithful;<sup>66</sup> the feeling for the need for delay and patience;<sup>67</sup> and finally, within the limits of a critical humanism a little too cerebral and short-sighted, an element of "a return to the sources".

### Lamennais and Lacordaire<sup>68</sup>

**I**N LACORDAIRE we have an extraordinarily pure example of the attitude of a priest both progressive and disposed toward true reform, and anxious to live without the shadow of fault, or even of indiscretion, within the Catholic communion. It is not our intention here to denounce Lamennais; Lacordaire did not condemn him, he rather pitied him; but he considered himself obliged to render a judgment in his regard, in order to justify his leaving him. Looking back a century later, the penetration and balance of his judgment become more apparent to us.

With Lamennais, great talent and even genius re-appeared among the French clergy, from which it had been absent for almost a century. He understood that under the Restoration, the support which the Church had sought

up till then from among the princes, must now be looked for among the people: it was necessary to replace the Church-prince relationship with the Church-people relationship. "It is necessary that everything be done through the people, by the people (1828)". Nothing reveals so much as these few words the exaggeration by which Lamennais will compromise the lively perception which he had of the modern social movement. From beginning to end, this excess can be noted, accompanied by an obstinacy in which such pride was to be found that the least disagreement became a great blow. "If my theses are rejected, I see no other way in which religion can be solidly defended. Nevertheless, I have asked Rome to examine my book. If the judgment goes against me, I have decided to write no more."<sup>69</sup> Already the threat of a certain tragic decision can be sensed, accompanied by a tendency to identify his own way of thinking with the cause of Catholicism itself. This conviction of being right, all by himself, remains constant in Lamennais. It inspired in him a cold and haughty disdain for all those who did not think as he did. Numerous expressions of this attitude can be found.<sup>70</sup> Lacordaire said of him in 1826: "To be alone in the world would be for him an infallible sign that he was right."<sup>71</sup> It was with such haughty and stubborn feelings that he went to Rome. He had nothing but bitter judgments to make concerning the high officials of the Curia.<sup>72</sup> With the same obstinacy and extremism, he will set on fire what he had adored<sup>73</sup> and, disavowed by Rome, will see in her nothing more than an obstacle to the truth, which is identical with his own opinions. Since he identified himself with the truth, in his eyes it was not he who was leaving the Church, but it was she who had deserted him. "The old political and ecclesiastical hierarchies are passing away together; they are nothing more than ghosts who are embracing each other in their tomb"; "I would like to change our language on one point and substitute the word *Christianity* for that of *Catholicism*, in order to emphasize better that we no longer want to have anything to do with the hierarchy." Of the Roman hierarchy, he said: "Since I have seen at close quarters the forces which make everything move, those things interest me as little as what takes place in China in the College of the Mandarins."<sup>74</sup> On August 4, 1833, Lamennais wrote to the Holy Father: "For all sorts of reasons, but especially because it belongs only to the head of the Church to judge of what can be good and useful, I have made a resolution to remain, for the future, in my writings and acts, a total stranger to the affairs which concern her."<sup>75</sup> Thus Lamennais put himself immediately on the side of schism in terms of that line of demarcation which Père Dénifle, in connection with the reform movement of the 15th century, defined as follows: to be disinterested in one's family home, or let oneself become a stranger to it, like someone who has made a cross upon his family and follows his own way by himself, now no longer concerned with it.<sup>76</sup>

Poor great Lamennais! He cannot put up with any delay, any passing of time for a better understanding of things, at the end of which he might have begun to perceive, from a more profound point of view, the good foundations for the Church's positions. In his own way, he too has a shallow fidelity. He does not seek for a deeper understanding of his own ideas through communion with something larger. He does not even suspect that he might have to do justice to some aspect of the truth which others might hold, and which would complement, correct and save his own insights. By its constitution, his mind was a stranger to the conditions of development in the sense of plenitude, because he



rebelled against the appeals of communion. "M. de La Mennais was narrow, incapable of grasping a thing under two aspects at the same time, and of ever going back to that aspect of it which he had not seen at first," Lacordaire says.<sup>77</sup> The latter saw in this stubbornness and inability to make contact with another way of thinking a reason for the striking sterility of Lamennais,<sup>78</sup> a relative sterility, of course, for although Lamennais remained alone and isolated, certain of the ideas he had launched, took shape later in Christian democracy, as early as 1848. Speaking of that great moment, Lacordaire wrote in his *Testament*: "What was lacking in M. de Lamennais for him to be one of us in these times? A little patience, silence, and faith, the acceptance of his first failure, and besides these divine sentiments, a natural fidelity to his friends."<sup>79</sup>

Lacordaire and Lamennais came to Rome in December 1831 with very different dispositions. Lamennais was resolved in advance to change nothing of his position. Lacordaire, who felt this, disassociated himself interiorly from him. In the tragic crisis over *L'Avenir*, and in his break with Lamennais, as well as in a number of circumstances in which his acts caused difficulties for him, Lacordaire never departed from an attitude which is to be admired the more it is understood, and which might be expressed in the following formula: obedience and resignation; patience, silence, and faith; submission to the concrete conditions of communion, temperance and moderation.

**T**HIS obedience and resignation was no easy thing. How many times, often publicly, was Lacordaire struck by decisions against the activity in which he was engaged. A discreet disavowal, then the condemnation of *L'Avenir*, after suspicions and accusations from the partisans of mediocrity and routine, the interruption of the Stanislas conferences, at the expressed desire of Msgr. de Quélen (Foisset, I, 239 and 568-569, the letter, so humble and yet so proud, of L.) There was also the dispersion of the first French Dominicans whose novitiate Lacordaire had prepared at Rome—Lacordaire forbade himself ever to say anything about the origins of this decision (Metternich's intervention), with the result that they were discovered only after his death (Foisset, I, 526-527). To this may be added his refusal, on the request of his bishop, to prosecute a newspaper in Nancy on a question which touched on his liberty and honor as a friar-preacher (II, 37); his obedience in giving up his habit in order to preach at Notre Dame, even though he was publicly and fully committed to keep it, and had fought for it so long. The life of Père Lacordaire was punctuated by acts of docility, often of a very meritorious nature, whose profound secret was his will to be in harmony—he who was at the very center of the religious movement of the century—with the ordinary life of the Church, in the comprehension of and respect for her concrete situation. Msgr. Affre could indeed see in this docility "a disposition completely opposed to the character of innovators."<sup>80</sup>

There are also his patience, silence and faith: there are a great number of remarkable texts in this regard, and Lacordaire's conduct splendidly confirmed them. These very three words are his (*supra* and note 61). But Lacordaire was not afraid of battle. He had a maxim which experience proves to be true: "I have always believed that the most favorable times to sow and to plant are times of trouble and storm."<sup>81</sup> He knew how to face contradiction resolutely. But if

he was "contradicted" by ecclesiastical authority, he would desist and withdraw, not to envelope himself in a proud silence, but to give himself time, in his double fidelity to himself and to the Church,<sup>82</sup> to mature and to carefully review his own actions, in order to allow men and things the necessary duration for the work of truth. It is thus that after the failure of *L'Avenir* he works on in silence, knowing that one day he will be given the possibility of speaking and acting "with the strength of men who have known how to be silent. After speech, silence is the greatest power in the world."<sup>83</sup> His conviction was that "a man always has his hour. It suffices for him to wait and to do nothing contrary to Providence."<sup>84</sup> Let there not be read into such texts the rather vulgar idea that he allowed himself to wait until others would recognize his merits. In Lacordaire there is rather a deep feeling for the time which the maturation of truth and the work of Providence requires. If Lacordaire retires and remains silent after the first conferences of Notre Dame, it is in order to give his thought time to develop.<sup>85</sup> It is also because the future prepares itself during the time that the seed which was sown grows and increases: the essential thing is to have sown the seed.<sup>86</sup> Finally, it is because there is a Providential design, a general direction of things, according to which each thing is connected with everything else, and must know how to await the hour appointed for it by God.<sup>87</sup>

Of his submission to the concrete conditions of communion, there are texts and highly significant actions of Lacordaire. Thus, in his farewell letter to Lamennais: "Perhaps your opinions are more correct and more profound, and considering your natural superiority over me, I must be convinced of it. *But reason is not the whole man.*"<sup>88</sup> And in that admirable letter to Montalembert in which he comments upon the so-called submission of Lamennais: "No talent, no service can compensate for the harm which a separation, of any kind, does to the Church, an action outside her bosom. I would prefer to throw myself into the sea with a mill-stone about my neck, rather than maintain a family of hopes, ideas, or even good works, *outside the Church* (Foisset, I, 251). On this account, we find in Lacordaire a very refined eagerness to submit himself spontaneously to the judgment of the Holy Father, as soon as he was seriously attacked and suspected. Whence these practical rules of action which had been for him a sort of conclusion drawn from the history of Lamennais: moderation in polemics; charity in action, the avoidance of forming a faction, of separating oneself from the others; the pursuit of nothing outside the jurisdiction of the episcopacy."<sup>89</sup>

In short, temperance and moderation. One cannot help admiring this sense of the possible, and for what, far from extremes, is true, in this man who had such spontaneity as well as his impetuous side. "Time will always be on the side of what is true, right, temperate, and representative of solid virtue."<sup>90</sup> Lamennais complained that his young companion in battle did not have his ardent radicalism, and he said of Lacordaire, "He has a sort of strange penchant for the middle course."<sup>91</sup> But in Lacordaire this temperament was linked to purity of action and to true strength. "Who are they whose memory has remained pure? Only those who have never been extremists." "The *modus in rebus* is one of the things to which I most apply myself, being persuaded that moderation is at the same time what is most rare and what constitutes the greatest strength."<sup>92</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Congar, *Vrai et fausse réforme dans l'Eglise* (Paris: Cerf), pp. 92-100, "Plusieurs sens du mot 'Eglise' ". There he considers four meanings for the word 'Church', in the light of a first distinction between Church as community, made up of the faithful, and the Church as mystery and institution which precedes its members and engenders them: (1) the elements of the institution itself, *Ecclesia, id est fides et fidei sacramenta*; and *Ecclesia de Trinitate*; (2) *Ecclesia ex omnibus*, the congregation *fideliū*; (3) the hierarchy; (4) the union of the formal divine principle and the material human principle—the *Ecclesia de Trinitate* and *Ecclesia ex omnibus* together in the *Ecclesia in Christo*, the Church of the Incarnate Word, the body of Christ. (Tr.)

<sup>2</sup> Congar, p. 275.

<sup>3</sup> Congar here refers to his discussion of the link between the medieval Church and feudal structures, pp. 372-373. (Tr.)

<sup>4</sup> Congar, Part II, 4th condition, pp. 332 ff.

<sup>5</sup> Congar, pp. 372 ff., and Denifle-Weiss, *Luther et Luthertum . . .*, II, (Mayence, 1909), pp. 61, 65 ff., 79-81.

<sup>6</sup> A. Duval, "Le Concile de Trent et le culte eucharistique," *Studia eucharistica* (Anvers, 1946), pp. 379-413.

<sup>7</sup> A. M. Weiss, *Le péril religieux*, 2nd ed. (Paris, 1906) does not fail to cite 1 Tim., VI, 20 and Prov. IX, 17.

<sup>8</sup> "Consuetudino sine veritate vetustas erroris est." St. Cyprian, *Ep. LXXIV*, ix, 2. "Si consuetudinem fortassis opponas, advertendum est quod Dominus dicit: Ego sum veritas et vita. Non dixit: Ego sum consuetudo, sed veritas. Et certe, ut beati Cypriani utamur sententia, quaelibet consuetudo, quantumvis vetusta, quantumvis vulgata, veritati omnino est postponenda et usus qui veritati est contrarius abolendus" C. 5 D. VIII (Friedberg, I, 14); cf. canons 3 to 9 (Friedberg, col. 14-15), in which several texts of St. Augustine, St. Cyprian, and Nicholas I are cited. In this connection, compare R. Wehrle, *La coutume dans le Droit canonique* (Paris, 1928), pp. 81-82, 85-86.

<sup>9</sup> For an interesting analysis of this formation and attitude, made from the point of view of apostolic contact with the world, cf. A. Rabur, "Pour une psychologie religieuse moderne", *La Vie Spirituelle*, Suppl., August 1949, pp. 123-136.

<sup>10</sup> Some interesting and important things on this subject are to be found in M. de la Bedoyère *Christianity in the Market Place*. Beginning in October 1932, Colonel Rouillet had contributed some excellent remarks on the same theme in articles for *La Vie Intellectuelle*, published as a pamphlet, *Les catholiques dans la vie publique*, cf. pp. 43 ff.

<sup>11</sup> This is the basis of the book by A. Doerner, *Sentire cum Ecclesia. Ein dringender Aufruf und Weckruf an Priester*. (München Gladbach, 1941) This huge book which attempts to combat everything savoring of novelty (if old, then it is traditional) in the life of contemporary German Catholicism, obviously contains many good things. But its basic position identifies the *Sentire cum Ecclesia* with a kind of "statism", the most rigorous obedience *ad litteram* to all the rules and regulations, devotion to the rule for the sake of the rule, everything accomplished and purely determined from on high by way of authority. In this respect, it is a deceptive book, and truly quite deficient. The Bishop of Trèves has refused to accord it his imprimatur.

<sup>12</sup> Congar, Part II, 3rd condition, pp. 306 ff.

<sup>13</sup> *Théologie du Corps mystique* (Bruxelles and Paris, 1944), II, p. 97. Compare Newman, *Essay on the Development . . .*, ch. V, sec. 4:5, p. 188.

<sup>14</sup> Compare Péguy, *L'Argent*: "... those wretches who envy their charges everything—their being young, novel, fresh, candid, beginners, their not being bent over like themselves." (*Oeuvres compl.*, N.R.F., IV, 426).

<sup>15</sup> Congar, Appendix III, pp. 604 ff. Compare with Suhard's discussion of Integralism in *Growth and Decline* (Fides), and with Daniélou, "A Dialogue with Time", *Cross Currents*, Winter 1951.

<sup>16</sup> G. Constant, *Concession à l'Allemagne de la communion sous les deux espèces*, I (Paris, 1923), pp. 170, 175, 229 ff., 233, 308, 361. Typical enough is this vote of Jean Lobera, a theologian of Salamanca, at the Council of Trent: "No concession must be made to any kingdom or country until they themselves come, recognize the Council and become Catholics. But even if they come in this way, and should ask for and obtain the reconversions that might result from their action, we should still not concede this, for in that case they have only to conform to the practice of the Church." (p. 233). The idea of unconditional surrender could not be better expressed.

<sup>17</sup> On this point as constituting the great cause of modern unbelief, cf. "Une conclusion théologique à l'enquête sur les raisons actuelles de l'incrédulité", *La Vie Intellectuelle*, July 25, 1935, pp. 214-249.

<sup>18</sup> It was only after writing this that I knew of J. Labasse, *Hommes de droite, hommes de gauche* (Paris, 1947). Only his first chapter concerns our subject; after that, he studies the political aspect of things, in an analysis of the alignments of 1947; and the relationship of the social-economic antagonisms to the primarily ideological realities of the right and the left.

<sup>19</sup> Article "Integralismus", in *Lexikon für Theol. u. Kirche*, V (1933), col. 431-432: "Der Integralismus als religiöse Ganzheitslehre, will alle Lebensgebiete 'aus dem Katholischen heraus gestalten'." The author is, moreover, speaking of integralism in regard to its claim in the domain of culture and social and political life rather than in the properly dogmatic sphere.

<sup>20</sup> Renaudet, *Etudes érasmiennes*, p. 264. Without excusing him, the kind of threat which runs through the text of Erasmus can be understood by considering the situation of a man perpetually



denounced, threatened, and ensnared wherever he went. The completely simple and unrelaxing serenity and trust of a Père Lagrange, a Touzard, a Père Sertillanges, presupposes souls of exceptional religious profundity.

<sup>21</sup> P. A. Dondaine, *Arch. Fratr. Praed.* XV (1946), pp. 220-221.

<sup>22</sup> Dvornik, *National Churches and the Church Universal* (London, 1944), pp. 44-45.

<sup>23</sup> Such is the opinion of B. A. Van Kleef, "An Outline of the History of the Old Catholic Church", in the collection *Northern Catholicism* (London, 1933), pp. 531 ff.

<sup>24</sup> F. Mourret, *Le concile de Vatican*, p. 75.

<sup>25</sup> *Prov.* XXX, 33. Compare St. Thomas (*Sum. Theol.* IIa, IIae, q. 43, a. 7, ad 1) citing St. Augustine (*Contra epist. Parmeniani*, lib. III, c. 2; P. L. 43, 92): "Quando ex excommunicatione aliquorum imminet periculum schismatis, tunc excommunicatione ferre non pertinet ad veritatem iustitiae."

<sup>26</sup> Thus Luther said, in 1523, that if the Council of which we were speaking allowed communion under both species, he would reject it, establish communion under a single species and anathematize those who, following the council, might make use of the Eucharist under both species: *Formula missae seu communionis pro ecclesia wittenbergensi*, cited in a portion of the Council of Trent: *Concil. Trident.*, ed. Goerresgesellschaft, IV, 1911, p. 870. Cf. also G. Constant, *Concession à l'Allemagne*, I, 1923, p. 31, n. 2; p. 78, n. 1.

<sup>27</sup> I transcribe these lines because they are part of the passage from Foerster. They apply perhaps to certain isolated cases but in their general application they are certainly false. The epoch of the Council of Trent and that which followed were great ages of sanctity and mysticism in the Church.

<sup>28</sup> Same observation. This is contradicted by the whole life of the Church.

<sup>29</sup> This was written in the very midst of the modernist crisis. The remarks contain less truth, but all the same a certain value for our time. In the lines that follow the personal case of Foerster can be divined within the formulas.

<sup>30</sup> W. Foerster, *Autorité et liberté*, pp. 155-158.

<sup>31</sup> *Op. cit.*: "In the course of its modern evolution, the Church is still deprived of another element which formerly was part of the Christian patrimony, and which, during the whole of the middle ages, formed an integral part of the Church: it is a matter of political liberty . . . How does it come about that the modern Church has renounced its prerogative? It is because the social strata which were liberated from social and political yokes at the same time detached themselves from ecclesiastical tradition, and the Church then saw herself obliged more and more to rely upon the social strata which adhered to the ancient order of things. A peculiar situation resulted from this, and one which is not without danger for the Church. In several areas, since Catholicism relied for its support upon factions which were reactionary in matters of an economic, social and political nature, it has been concluded that the Catholic confession was linked with superannuated forms of social life. Whence popular opinion incessantly imputes to the Church the strictures of authoritative governments, and a libertarian government ends by entertaining a profound disgust for the Church. But would not this be the moment for ecclesiastical circles to recognize without reservation the Christian character of political liberty . . . ?

"Historical evolution has desired that the three ideals: Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity, grown in human minds thanks to centuries of education, be detached from the trunk of tradition and live a separate life. But in emancipating themselves from the moderating and educative influence of Christian thought, they have had to put themselves much more at the service of doctrinaire Reason, sometimes of Violence, and to ally themselves with the looser passions of human nature. Again the Church is seen constrained to take a defensive attitude and opposition to this degenerate off-spring. This highly justified attitude explains the tragic destiny of a man like Lamennais."

<sup>32</sup> Cf. A. de la Gorce, *Wesley, maître d'un Peuple* (1703-1791), (Paris, 1940).

<sup>33</sup> *Considérations sur le système de M. de Lamennais*, pp. 28-29, cited by Th. Foisset, *Vie de R. P. Lacordaire* (Paris, 1870), I, pp. 81-82. Lacordaire described accurately enough the confusion which ended in his having to take the road of la Chênaie, cf. Foisset, I, p. 142.

<sup>34</sup> Does not the present crisis in regard to vocations for the diocesan clergy, in a great number (alas) of places in France, stem in part from the realization of a certain lack of adaptation in the pastoral ministry and the conditions of life of the priest.

<sup>35</sup> Congar, Part II, pp. 231 ff., discussing the ambivalence of the germs of reform movements.

<sup>36</sup> H. Grundmann, *Religiöse Bewegungen im Mittelalter* (Berlin, 1935).

<sup>37</sup> On the "Apostolics" of Soisson, cf. L. Spätling, *De Apostolicis Pseudo-apostolis, Apostolinis* (Munich, 1947), p. 55.

<sup>38</sup> Speroni is an isolated figure whose thought is very individual. He has nothing in common with the "apostolic" current except the problem between spiritual authority and personal sanctity (Spätling, p. 120, considers this point to be the common denominator of all the "apostolic" movements). The positions of Speroni are known to us through the exposition and refutation of them made by his former co-disciple, Vacarius, in the *Libor contra multiplices errores*, recently edited by Père Hilarin de Milan (*L'eresia di Ugo Speroni*, Vatican, 1946). The passages to which we refer here are found respectively in the *Liber*, S. XIII (p. 510: "Sed quia, sicut imprudentium mos est, tu sequeris cor tuum, cum sit totum subversum et ab Ecclesia Dei alienatum, ideo te solum veritatem putas videre . . ."), and S. XXVI (p. 556: "Excecat te cupiditas impugnandi Ecclesiam . . .").

<sup>39</sup> Congar, p. 273, and p. 460.

<sup>40</sup> Thus the "Apostolics" of the Périgord, Spätling, p. 57. One even finds here and there a radical negation of the corporeal elements (Spätling, p. 74); none of this in the case of St. Francis, to be sure . . . On his respect for priests, cf. his *Testament*, S. 3; Jörgensen, *St. Francis of Assisi*; J. Lortzing, "Franz von Assisi als Reformator", *Wissenschaft und Weisheit*, IX (1942), pp. 61-70, 126-139.

<sup>41</sup> Scheel, *Dokumente*, nn. 74, 216, 512.

<sup>42</sup> There is this disquieting expression from the *Hyperaspistes*: "Hactenus solus esse volui, nisi quod ab Ecclesia catholica non segregor" (*Opera omnia*, X, 1257c); J. Lortz' judgment is rather severe.

<sup>43</sup> K. Holl, "Luthers Urteile über sich selbst", *Ges. Aufsätze*, I, p. 383, n. 4, and p. 409, nn. 3 ff: numerous texts of a clarity which leave nothing to be desired. Luther was passionate, but lucid.

<sup>44</sup> A. Renaudet, *Etudes érasmiennes*, p. 345.

<sup>45</sup> Holl, *op. cit.*, p. 396, nn. 4 and 6.

<sup>46</sup> In particular the famous preface to Volume I of his works, 1545: "Ego serio rem agebam" (Scheel, *Dokumente*, n. 511, p. 187).

<sup>47</sup> Holl, *op. cit.*, p. 388.

<sup>48</sup> Letter of Feb. 7, 1525 to W. Link, *Briefwechsel*, Weimar, III, p. 437.

<sup>49</sup> *Op. cit.*, n. 31.

<sup>50</sup> V.-L. Tapié, *Une Eglise Tchèque au XVe siècle* (Paris, 1935), pp. 9-14 (Rokycana); p. 14 ff (the Taborites); p. 55 (Martin de K.).

<sup>51</sup> Cf. his letter of Aug. 24, 1524 to Farel; Herminjard, *Corresp. des Réformateurs*, I, p. 271.

<sup>52</sup> W. Walker, *Jean Calvin*, p. 105; Calvin's *Opera* (Corpus Ref.), V, pp. 279-312, XXX, 127.

<sup>53</sup> "Nihil habet animi"; "Impar est oneri evangelico ferendo", cited by J. Parnier, *Recherches sur la formation intellectuelle de Calvin* (Paris, 1931), p. 31. Note that W. G. Moore (*La Réforme allemande et la littérature française. Recherches sur la notoriété de Luther en France*, Strassbourg, 1930, p. 153) attacks the idea that Lefèvre was a timid man.

<sup>54</sup> W. Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 182. Michelet characterizes him as follows: "Bubbling over, frank, clear, intrepid in everything, he had the noble heart of a knight above reproach, and his thirst for danger . . ." (cited by Parnier, *op. cit.*, p. 43).

<sup>55</sup> F. Buisson, *Sébastien Castellion* (Paris, 1891), pp. 77 ff.

<sup>56</sup> Renaudet, *op. cit.*, pp. 211 ff., 260, 282, 298, and esp. 305 ff.

<sup>57</sup> Second *Hyperaspistes*, Renaudet, pp. 352-353.

<sup>58</sup> Thus: Letter to Zasius, Jan. 4, 1522 (Allen, 1252, 7, V, p. 1); to John Glapion, April 1522 (Allen, 1275, 24, V, p. 48); to Noël Bêda, Oct. 2, 1525 (Allen, 1620, 44 and 47, VI, pp. 181-182).

<sup>59</sup> "Nihil tamen horum mutari volo praeter auctoritatem Ecclesiae. Nec ea mutatis damnat patrum instituta, sed admonet et forte pro horum temporum moribus variandum esse redemum . . . cum censeam nihil esse novandum nisi interveniente Ecclesiae auctoritate."—Nothing without the authority of the Church. Letter to Noël Bêda, Oct. 2, 1525, *op. cit.*—Nothing which interrupts the continuity, cf. Renaudet, pp. 42-43, 169, 171, 174. Compare in *Hyperaspistes*, 1526: "Fero igitur hanc Ecclesiam donec videro meliorem." (Renaudet, p. 260).

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 41, 148-150.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 169 ff. Renaudet suggests that we should look here for an explanation of his attitude.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 41, 148-150.

<sup>63</sup> "Si Luthero vel tantulum favissem, nolo jactare quid potuerim in Germania. Sed ego vel decies mortem optetior quam ut periculosi dissidii sim autor vel adjutor . . .", to Luis Coronel, April 21, 1522 (Allen, 1274, 55 ff., V, p. 47); "Epistolis etiam aeditis declaravi mihi nihil unquam foederis fuisse cum ullo Lutherano, sed seditiosum negotium mihi semper displicuisse . . .", to John Glapion, same date (Allen, 1275, 22 ff., V, p. 48); "Possum turbare mundum, si velim; verum citius moriar quam sit futurus auctor novi tumultus. Ego semper studui prodesse omnibus, neque quisquam magis abhorret a dissidio", to Josse Laurens, July 14, 1522 (Allen, 1292, 83 ff., V, p. 87)—Cf. Renaudet, pp. 193-194.

<sup>64</sup> Congar explains this term in various discussions, p. 43, pp. 335 ff., etc., as a return to the sources, to be found concretely in the biblical, patristic and liturgical revivals. (Tr.)

<sup>65</sup> Congar gives four conditions for a reform without schism: (1) the primacy of charity and the pastoral function; (2) remaining in the total community; (3) patience; (4) a return to principle and to tradition, not the introduction of "novelty" by a mechanical adaptation, pp. 231-356. (Tr.)

<sup>66</sup> Renaudet, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43, 162, 171, 187, on his attitude to the question of confession.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 174, 185. He wishes to proceed gradually and by first engendering new attitudes end mental convictions.

<sup>68</sup> In this paragraph, I am using especially Th. Foisset, *Vie du R. P. Lacordaire*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1870). This biography is a model of honesty, and if we take into account its date, an excellent example of intellectual courage.—For the attitude of Lacordaire after the condemnation of *L'Avenir*, one can also profitably read the fine article of H.-D. Noble, "Lacordaire et la condamnation de 'L'Avenir'", *Revue des Jeunes*, Feb. 25, 1927, pp. 410-436.

<sup>69</sup> Letter to the Abbé Carron, Nov. 1, 1820, Foisset, I, 112.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 203, 553 ff.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 140.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 203, 207, 223.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 158 ff.

- <sup>74</sup> Three texts, from January to May, 1833, are in Foisset, I, pp. 242, 243, 244.
- <sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 249.
- <sup>76</sup> Cf. Congar, Appendix I, the text of Saint-Exupéry.
- <sup>77</sup> Letter of Dec. 23, 1858 to Foisset, in Foisset I, 564; this entire text might well be quoted.
- <sup>78</sup> Letter to Mad. Swetchine of Mar. 31, 1854, in Foisset II, 306.
- <sup>79</sup> Ch. XI, ed. 1870, p. 150.
- <sup>80</sup> Foisset, II, 497, n. 1.
- <sup>81</sup> *Lettres à la baronne de Prailly* (Jan. 2, 1849), Paris, 1885, p. 147. — This idea of "doing good in times of strife" occurs again in a letter of Sept. 17, 1848 to M. Cartier, concerning the advanced attitude of the Père in 1848, Foisset, II, p. 145.
- <sup>82</sup> "I respect his thoughts and my own", he writes in a letter in which he takes leave of Lamennais, Dec. 11, 1832, Foisset, I, 227.
- <sup>83</sup> Letter of April 20, 1832 to Montalembert, Foisset, I, 210.
- <sup>84</sup> Letter of June 30, 1833 to Montalembert, Foisset, I, 291. n. a letter to Foisset, Dec. 23, 1858, in which he gives his judgment of Lamennais, he writes: "I have made a thousand efforts to make him understand that time was on his side, that he had only to keep silence, that victory was very close to the lost battles: for him this was an unintelligible language. He succumbed through weakness and not through excess of strength." Foisset, I, pp. 564-565.
- <sup>85</sup> "It is necessary that I age, that time pass, that I write a solid work, that I grow better. These first ten years of the priesthood have been too fast and too excited. I owe myself a long solitude." Foisset, I, 383.
- <sup>86</sup> A recurrent idea with Lacordaire: "My sermons go well; it's the case of a seed which grows." (Foisset, I, 295). "I shall await another time and I shall do whatever good remains possible for me. The present is a small thing, the future is all." (II, 48; comp. II, 210).
- <sup>87</sup> "We have received, you and I, proof that time is necessary for everything, and that it is enough always to be ready without ever anticipating the how appointed by Providence. What a difference between 1834 and 1844" . . . Letter of May 15, 1844 to Montalembert, Foisset, II, 65. Comp.: "I believe that man sees only a point of time, that God alone grasps it all together, and that the Church, inspired by Him, is directed in accordance with the whole ensemble of time, without seeing it . . ." Letter of Oct. 28, 1833 to M. de Dumas (II, 104).
- <sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 227. The underscoring is the author's.
- <sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 100.
- <sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 348, concerning the separation virtually made in the two Dominican provinces; very clear in the same way and on the same subject, II, 310, 462 ff.
- <sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, I, 213.
- <sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 468.



# NOTES on other Publications

## THE POLITICAL-CULTURAL SCENE

### 1.

*Christianity and Politics.* The World's Student Christian Association (13, rue Calvin, Geneva) has issued a Grey Book, *The Christian in the World Struggle*, which is concerned with locating the point of entry for the Christian in politics. The original document was written at the General Committee of the Federation at Whitby, Ontario in 1949 by M. M. Thomas of India and J. D. McCaughy of Great Britain. After cursory reading and analysis by different members of the Student Christian Movements, it was the basis of a political consultation held at Bièvre, France, the following summer, and this grey book is the result of that consultation. Critical commentaries by Keith Bridston and Max-Alain Chevallier, along with a study-guide and bibliography by Alasdair MacIntyre, help make the volume of interest and value to many others besides the S.C.M. groups for which it was especially prepared.

Dom Nicolas Perrier's *Cité chrétienne* (Fribourg) is a dispassionate treatment of political problems faced by Christians. Charles Morgan's *Liberties of the Mind* (Macmillan) contains critical essays on the good society as envisaged by Romanticism and Christian humanism. The June *ESPRIT* contains the objection of Mario Einaudi to their March discussion of "La paix possible," as well as reflections on America, Europe and neutrality by the editor, Albert Béguin. Daniel Rops' "Der Einbruch der Barbaren" (*DER VOLKSBOTE*, Innsbruck, Jan. 21, 1951) may be placed in the discussion of the position of the Christian between East and West.

Muhlenberg has published *Man and State* by Bishop Eivind Berggrav, a profound and well-written study. The author, one of the presidents of the World Council of Churches, emphasizes that all truth and right are of God and all evil is under His judgment. He argues that "reciprocity," a structural concept, should be the basic form underlying political relationships. Attention may also be directed to his article on the Church in the international crisis, which appeared in the Summer 1950 number of the *ECUMENICAL REVIEW*.

Yves Simon's *Philosophy of Democratic Government* (Chicago) is a fine study of democracy in the light of Christian humanism, a philosophical consideration of actual practical difficulties faced by free societies in the contemporary world. Simon emphasizes the necessity of government, even under the most favorable circumstances, to provide means for common action.

### 2.

*Law.* A. P. d'Entreves' *Natural Law*, sub-titled "an introduction to Legal Philosophy" (Hutchinson's University Library, London), is a valuable contribution, both historical and philosophical, to the complex problem of the relation between legality and morality. Prof. d'Entreves presents a well-documented and convincing argument for the thesis that "legality is an aspect of moral experience which extends far beyond the legal field proper"; bibliographical references are concisely confined to the most essential works in the field of legal philosophy. A useful companion volume for the student of the moral implications of law is

*Interpretations of Modern Legal Philosophies; essays in honor of Roscoe Pound* (Oxford, 1947). Among the essays written by eminent jurists, those by Giorgio Del Vecchio ("Truth and Untruth in morals and Law"), Hans Kelsen ("The Metamorphosis of the Idea of Justice"), and Luis Recasens Siches ("Ideas and Historical Conditioning in the Realization of Juridical Values") may be especially noted.

## 3.

*History.* A magnificent introduction to historiographical problems and to the theory of history is given by Louis Gottschalk in *Understanding History, a Primer of Historical Method* (Knopf). Prof. Gottschalk's guiding insight is expressed in the concept of "historical-mindedness," which he defines as follows:

*Historical-mindedness* requires the investigator to shed his own personality, and to take on, as far as possible, that of his subject in the effort to understand the latter's language, ideals, interests, attitudes, habits, motives, drives and traits. This may be hard to do and the historian may rarely succeed in doing it thoroughly, but the obligation upon him is obvious if he is attempting to understand and impartially judge rather than to criticize others' acts and personalities. Historical-mindedness sometimes requires the historian to make a better case for the subject than the subject would have made for himself, without necessarily believing it. He should put into his personality studies something of the understanding, but not necessarily forgiving, quality that a psychiatrist might give to the study of a patient.

The two-volume collection, *The Making of Modern Europe* (Dryden), edited by Herman Ausubel, consists of a selection of articles, reprinted from scholarly periodicals, on important aspects of European history. Lynn White's "Technology and Invention in the Middle Ages," Wilhelm Schenk's essay on the Levellers, and Henri Peyre's "Influence of 18th-century Ideas on the French Revolution" indicate the level of the selections. The last article, a forecast of the future of Christianity by Kenneth Scott Latourette, limits its consideration of the topic to the question of quantitative expansion, and predicts the relative decline of Catholicism and rise of Protestantism. This latter prognosis (made in 1946) rested on a view of the geographic distribution of power that has been considerably altered by the Communist victory in China.

Ausubel's anthology, primarily concerned with ideas and interpretations, is indicative of the mounting attention being given by historians to intellectual history. John Higham's "Rise of American Intellectual History" (*THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW*, April 1951) briefly traces progress in this field in so far as it deals with American thoughts and gives a reason for it: "In a time of ideological confusion and upheaval, intellectual history has served on the one hand to reformulate the traditions of the past, and on the other to expose their operation to critical scrutiny." Franklin L. Baumer's "Intellectual History and its Problems" (*JOURNAL OF MODERN HISTORY*, Sept. 1949) deals more generally and more critically with the scope of intellectual history and the problems and difficulties encountered.

A long excerpt from his forthcoming history of political thought has been published by Eric Voegelin in the April *REVIEW OF POLITICS*. The essay, "Machiavelli's Prince, Background and Formation," is an excellent account of

the phenomenon of naked power as it manifested itself in the disintegrating Christendom of Machiavelli's time. Attention should also be given to the fine translation and critical edition of Machiavelli's *Discourses* (Yale) by Leslie J. Walker, S.J.

*Europe*. EUROPE TODAY AND TOMORROW is an informative periodical, the English edition of the monthly bulletin of the European Movement (25, rue de Spa, Brussels), containing "documentary material on all aspects of the campaign for European unity," as well as articles on various current topics. Eugen Kogon, Cyril Falls, André Philip, etc. have been contributors. No. 3 (April) is chiefly devoted to a critical account of "neutralism," discussing it against the background of European security. The June issue of INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION also attacks (and dismisses) neutralist opinion in France and Germany, briefly analyzing views of Gilson, Beuve-Méry, and the Nauheim circle.

A special issue of DOKUMENTE (7th year, no. 3) is devoted to "Front der Jugend;" it concerns problems of European youth with reference to all countries, and studies the outlook for a united Europe based on a European awareness among the groups discussed. Remy Montagne, Hans Mertens, Jose Miguel de Azola, Robert Morel are among the contributors.

The April issue of HUMANITAS is given over to the problem of Germany. Prof. Bendiscioli brought together different specialists and succeeded in presenting a well-integrated critical survey of the basic problems. B. Reissmann and W. Roepke study the political and economic phases of German reconstruction; Hans Lukascek explains the social and economic implications of "Il problema dei profughi tedeschi;" Serio Galeotti contributes an historical perspective on the Bonn constitution; M. Bendiscioli contributes the article translated in this number of CROSS CURRENTS; Maria Schlueter-Hermkes discusses the work of Elizabeth Langgaesser, etc.

Friedrich Heer's *Aufgang Europas* (Wien, Europa-Verlag, 1949) is an important contribution to the treatment of the West's spiritual heritage. Edouard Bonnefons' *L'idée Européenne et sa réalisation* (Paris, Edition du Grand Siècle, 1950) discusses the movement for European unity throughout history. Pierre de Boisdeffre and Jean-Max Bouchand search for Europe's role in *Vocation de l'Europe* (Bloud and Gay, 1950).

##### 5.

*Social-economic backgrounds*. Arnold Gehlen's *Sozialpsychologische Probleme in der industriellen Gesellschaft* (Tuebingen, Mohr, 1949) has been favorably received. Antonius Eickhoff's *Christliches Ordnungsbild und soziale Wirklichkeit* (Muenster, Aschendorff, 1949) takes up the enlarged social questions of the day, including not only workers, but also D.P.s, mass-society, de-personalized intellectuals, etc. Heinz Brauweiler, *Gibt es ein Recht auf Reichtum?* (Koeln, Bundes-Verlag, 1950) defends the thesis of agreement between socialism and Christian-catholic natural law in the economic realm. In this connection, L. de Sousbergh's "Das Privateigentum als Naturrecht: eine neu-scholastische These im Licht der scholastischen Tradition" (DOKUMENTE, no. 2, 1951) supplies a thorough historical survey. FRANKFURTER HEFTE continues their series, "Zur Krise der modernen Ehe; Die Familie, 1951," by Rüdiger Proske, in the March and April issues. Also noted: Bernhard Härnig, "Mitbestimmung und Mitbeteiligung als Weg zur Entproletarisierung" (STIMMEN DER ZEIT, May, 1951.)



## 6.

*Art and Literature.* An important number of PRÉSENCE AFRICAINE (cahier 10-11) is given over to "L'art nègre." Helmut Hatzfeld's "Two Types of Mystical Poetry" appeared in the December, 1950 number of THE AMERICAN BENEDICTINE REVIEW. Henry David Aiken contributed "The aesthetic relevance of belief" to the JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS AND ART CRITICISM (June 1951). The April HIBBERT JOURNAL contains "The Devil's Dialectic," by Dr. Peter Munz, which is a head-on attack on "The Cocktail Party," both as a play and as an example of Christian thinking. Pie Régamey conducts a "Débat sur l'art non figuratif" in the July VIE INTELLECTUELLE. Also noted: Gert. H. Theunissen, "Moderne Kunst zwischen Schöpfung und Maschinenwelt" (FRANKFURTER HEFTE, April 1951).

## 7.

*Psyché.* Th. Bovet, A. v. Orelli and P. Plattner, *Die neue Sendung des Arztes* (Innsbruck, Tyrolia, 1950) is a competent treatment of the need for a 'medicine de la personne.' The May STIMMEN DER ZEIT contains August Brunner's "Rückkehr der Gespenster" and Robert Thurn's "Psychodiagnostik." Roger Bastide's *Sociologie et Psychanalyse* has been published by Gallimard.

## 8.

*Philosophy.* Gabriel Marcel's *Being and Having* is available in the United States through the Beacon Press. An important contribution towards understanding his thought has come from Pietro Prini. His *Gabriel Marcel e la metodologia dell'inverificabile* (Roma, Studium, 1950) captures the spirit of Marcel's metaphysics by developing the manifold implications of what he terms, with Marcel's acceptance, "the methodology of the unverifiable," i.e. the unending process of knowing and hence of approximation to the richly inexhaustible Truth. Franco Amerio's *Introduzione allo studio di G. B. Vico* (S.E.I., Torino, 1947) is an exhaustive study of Vico's thought, a magnificent synthesis organized in the form of a well-documented polemic against "the monopoly of the Croce-Gentile interpretation of Vico." Amerio succeeds in throwing new light on Vico's concept of the Providential source of history.

Erich Przywara's "Crisis of the West" (PHILOSOPHISCHES JAHRBUCH, no. 4, 1950) goes to the root of the contemporary crisis. First, he explores the meaning of the West for its own sake. Then he shows that the role of the West is inseparable from the destiny of Western philosophies and theology. He also determines the limits of the West, its philosophies and theologies, and their "end." But that "end" is an ambiguous term, embracing both a last point of cessation and a fulfillment of striving towards a certain perfection. Our crisis consists in deciding *how* the West is coming to an end. Will it be engulfed by Russia or America? or will it fulfill its own mission? That mission, he suggests, must be defined in the light of our total historical experience and with the aid of certain corrective insights of Aquinas. Also appearing in the same issue was Vinzens Rufner's meditations on the two axioms that summarize the medieval and modern viewpoints toward knowing and the known: *ens et verum convertentur* and *factum et verum convertuntur*. What is remarkable is that Rufner sees more than a sheer contradiction between these two viewpoints. Perhaps his positive attitude and hope for reconciliation between the contemplative and productive views of

truth stem from his studies of Vico, whose autobiography he translated into German, with notes, and an introduction to his thought. In Vico, the modern contention that the mind can know only what itself has made is rendered compatible with the traditional view that the mind must conform to independent reality.

Two former students of Heidegger have published helpful studies: Max Müller, *Existenzphilosophie im geistigen Leben der Gegenwart* (Heidelberg, 1949) and Walter Biemel, *Le concept de monde chez Heidegger* (Louvain, 1951). These books make use of recent lectures, publications, and unpublished manuscripts of Heidegger, and help to revise the almost-universal opinion that Heidegger is merely a pessimist, nihilist, and atheist. Even scrupulous commentators had come to that conclusion from a reading of Heidegger's earliest works. That is because those writings were ambiguous: they left the way open to such an interpretation. Unfortunately, popularizers of existentialism and its critics have just gone on repeating the same charges against Heidegger, ignoring or overriding the fact that since 1930 he has been closing the door to this interpretation. He has said as plainly as possible that the charge of atheistic nihilism is no longer a valid description of his views; he has not so much changed his description as removed the ambiguity. This he has done by the simple observation that The Nought is precisely the way in which the fullness of being appears to those who take their standards of being from particular instances in the world. He doesn't identify God with being, but allows the possibility of passing beyond being and its finite modes to God. These two recent studies give a detailed account of his newly-explicated position and should remove the caricature that has passed as an account of his philosophy.

Two articles of note have appeared in *TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR PHILOSOFIE* (Nov. 1950): Aimé Forest argues for the integration of rationalistic spiritualism into the context of a wider realism in an article entitled "La conversion rationaliste," and Victor Leemans surveys the principal contributions to recent sociologico-historical literature in a review-article, "Sociologie der Crisis." A fruitful effort towards understanding some of the apparently chaotic contributions to the field known as "sociology of knowledge" is made by Jacques Maquet in his *Sociology of Knowledge*, (Beacon Press), a critical analysis of the work of Mannheim and Sorokin in this area. Maquet attempts to synthesize the insights of both men into a fundamental framework for the founding of a rigorously scientific sociology of knowledge; the philosophical problems raised by this new science are carefully noted but no attempt is made to resolve them, as the author's role remains that of critic and not theorist.

The Catholic University Press has made available the recent *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, at which the first Aquinas medal was awarded to Jacques Maritain. Besides Maritain's moving response to this citation, there is a fine collection of papers on the nature of man in Christian thought by Gerald Smith, Dietrich von Hildebrandt, Elizabeth Salmon, Charles J. O'Neill, George P. Klüberstanz, and Lawrence E. Lynch. J. Donald Butler has published studies of naturalism, realism, idealism and pragmatism under the title; *Four Philosophies, their practice in Education and Religion*. Also noted: Gottlieb Sohngen, "Natur und Geist in katholischer Sicht" (*GLORIA DEI*, V, no. 3); the article on Martin Buber by Kogon and Thieme in *FRANKFURTER HEFTE*, March 1951; and for those who have become re-interested in Haecker

since the recent publication by Pantheon of his war diary, *Journal in the Night*, there is a helpful introduction to his thought by Eugen Blessing ("Was ist der Mensch? zur Anthropologie Theodor Haeckers," *DER BRENNER*, Innsbruck, no. 17, 1948).

## 9.

*Miscellaneous.* The Hazen Foundation has prepared a series of *Religious Perspectives of College Teaching* for teachers and graduate students. Issues are available on English Literature, History, Economics, Philosophy, Classics, Preparation of Teachers, Political Science, Experimental Psychology, Physical Sciences, Music and Anthropology.

WISSENSCHAFT UND WELTBILD (Wien VIII, Strozgasse 8, Austria) is in its fourth year. The January and February issues carry contributions in the fields of philosophy, science, economics, and psychology: Aloys Wenzl, "Das Lebensproblem als Grenzfrage von Biologie und Philosophie;" Wilfried Daim, "Das Trauma der Geburt und Heideggers Existentialismus;" Franz Aubele, "Wirtschafts und Sozialwissenschaftliche Literatur in West-Deutschland;" Alois Dempf, "Methoden der Metaphysik;" Andreas Posch, "Wert und Gefahr der Tradition;" Anton Tautscher, "Integrale Finanzwissenschaft," and Wolfgang Wieser, "Neue Ergebnisse der Vererbungsforschung: die Genetik der Mikroorganismen."

Also noted: Theodor Geiger, *Aufgaben und Stellung der Intelligenz in der Gesellschaft* (Stuttgart, Enke, 1949), a contribution to the clarification of the intellectual's position in the modern world; Walter Weymann-Weyhe's "Die Freiheit und der Intellektuelle" (*FRANKFURTER HEFTE*, March 1951); Friedrich Hansen-Löve's "Die Reform der Universität" (*WORT UND WAHRHEIT*, May 1951), pleading for truly European universities, neither "intelligence factories" nor "educational museums."

## HISTORY AND CHRISTIANITY

## 1.

*Meaning of History.* This is the title of an important book by Karl Löwith (Chicago). It is a history of the philosophies of history, working backward from Burckhardt and Marx to Orosius and Augustine. Löwith sees secular and sacred history as two realities, independent of one another, or perhaps related in a way that we cannot grasp. "More intelligent than the superior vision of philosophers or theologians is the common sense of the natural man and the uncommon sense of the Christian believer. Neither pretends to discern on the canvas of human history the purpose of God or of the historical process itself. They rather seek to set men free from the world's oppressive history by suggesting an attitude either of scepticism or of faith." The book essentially vindicates Augustine's theology of history.

Paul Ricoeur's essay on the philosophy of history in *CHRISTIANISME SOCIAL* (April 1951) is also deserving of attention. Discarding the opposition between human progress and Christian eschatology as too simplified, Ricoeur considers the reading of history on three levels,—progress, ambiguity, and hope—; it is with the latter, both a meaning and a hidden meaning, that Christian eschatology is tied. In a juxtaposition of Marxism, Existentialism and Christian faith,



this is an admirable attempt to give Christians a sense of history which is neither naively confident nor catastrophic. Also noted: Robert C. Pollock, "History is a Matrix" (THOUGHT, Summer 1951).

## 2.

*Theological Perspectives.* The first volume of Paul Tillich's *Systematic Theology* has been brought out by Chicago University Press. This important study is centered in the consideration that in the God-man, Christ, there is final revelation because here the revelation involves a self-negation; an acknowledgment of finitude without despair or self-destruction. *Christ and Culture*, by H. Richard Niebuhr (Harper) analyzes the problem of the way, or degree, in which Christianity is relevant to the situation in which the Christian must live. F. M. Braun, O.P., *Jesus Christus in Geschichte und Kritik* (Luzern, Raber, 1950) is a comprehensive though popular presentation. Hugo Rahner's *Maria und die Kirche* (Innsbruck, Marianischer Verlag, 1950) is a timely reprint. Léon Zander's "Ecumenicism and Proselytism" appeared in the March ECUMENICAL REVIEW. There is now an English translation of Paul Heinisch's *Theology of the Old Testament* (Liturgical Press, 1951).

Hans Urs. v. Balthasar's *Karl Barth, Darstellung und Deutung seiner Theologie* (Köln, Hegner 1951) attempts a positive evaluation. An evaluation of Sartre by Karl Barth appeared in LE SEMEUR, March 1951. Adrienne von Speyer's *Kinder des Lichtes* and *Apokalypse* (Wien, Herold 1950) have received much attention, as well as an article "Priesterliches Leben aus dem Gebet" (GLORIA DEI, no. 4/IV and no. 3/V). They constitute not so much a systematic theology as meditations on different portions of the Bible. Erik Peterson's *Theologische Traktate* (München, Kösel-Verlag, 1951) is a selection of essays written between 1926 and 1948, giving a picture of the spiritual evolution of a theological scholar from Protestantism to Catholicism. The articles are not in any historical order, nor is there any explanatory text, but the separate "Traktate" possess merit in themselves. Romano Guardini's "meditations on the person and life of Jesus Christ" are available in both German and French (Alsatia, Paris), and his study of Pascal has been translated into French (Seuil).

Those following the discussion of the place of the laity will welcome the publication of Ida Görres' well-received essays in a volume, *Die leibhaftige Kirche, Gespräche unter Laien* (Frankfurt, Verlag Josef Knecht, 1951), as well as Robert Scherer's *Christliche Weltverantwortung* (Frankfurt, Carolusdruckerei, 1949). Herman A. P. Schmidt's *Liturgie et langue vulgaire* is an important treatise of interest to those promoting the use of the vernacular in the liturgy. Also noted: Hans Asmussen and Josef Weiger, "Assumption Mariae: Für und Wider das Neue Dogma" (HOCHLAND, April 1951), and Wilhelm Hollberg, "Das russische Altgläubigertum" (SCHWEIZER RUNDSCHAU, April 1951).

# BLACKFRIARS

*A Special Double Number, dated July/August*

THE CHRISTIAN VIEW OF HISTORY

CHRISTOPHER DAWSON

CATHOLICS AND THE UNIVERSITY

PROFESSOR HILARY ARMSTRONG

CHRISTIAN JUDGMENT

GERALD VANN

THE AMERICAN MIND

DONALD ATTWATER

WILLIS D. NUTTING

THE SCULPTURE OF ARTHUR POLLEN

IRIS CONLAY

Reviews

-o-

Obiter

-o-

Notices

TWO SHILLINGS PER COPY

(Annual Subscription 21s.)

**BLACKFRIARS PUBLICATIONS**

34 Bloomsbury Street, London, W.C.I.

## THE WIND AND THE RAIN

*Edited by* NEVILLE BRAYBROOKE

10TH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE

NUMBERS 2/3 1951

CONRAD BONACINA:

*The Catholic Church and Modern Democracy*

ANDRE GIDE: *Adagio*

W. GORE ALLEN: *Sigrid Undset*

EMIL BRUNNER: *The Christian Sense of Time*

W. S. MAGUINESS: *Some Reflections on The Aeneid*

*Quarterly*

8s. 6d., or \$2 per annum

(Specimen copies sent on application)

47 EARLS COURT ROAD, LONDON, W. 8.

# THE NEW OUTLOOK

FOR FAITH AND SOCIETY

A NEW QUARTERLY MAGAZINE REVIEW

*Edited by J. V. LANGMEAD CASSERLEY, D.LITT.*

NUMBER 2.

SUMMER ISSUE

Contributors include: Roger Mehl, E. F. F. Hill, Anthony H. Richmond, K. G. Collier, Reginald Snell, D. G. Davies.

*The New Outlook* is conceived as a refreshing contribution towards a Christian understanding of what is happening around us to-day. Its object is to discuss the world's affairs, political, economic, social and cultural from the Christian point of view. It is for educated people of all ranks of society as a source of information and criticism.

3s. quarterly

10s. 6d. per annum

A. R. MOWBRAY & Co., 28 MARGARET STREET, LONDON, W. 1.

# THE MONTH

A CATHOLIC REVIEW

"Incontestablement la meilleure revue mensuelle en Angleterre."

—LA VIE INTELLECTUELLE

*Forthcoming Articles Include:*

THE ELECTRIC HARE:  
SOME ASPECTS OF GRAHAM GREENE  
Edward Sackville-West

UNPUBLISHED CORRESPONDENCE OF  
COVENTRY PATMORE & ROBERT BRIDGES

MIND AND HEART IN PASCAL  
Alexandre Durand

EMMANUEL MOUNIER  
Frederick C. Copleston

GRAHAM GREENE'S NEW NOVEL  
Reviewed by Evelyn Waugh

Annual Subscription (12 issues) \$5

BRITISH PUBLICATIONS INC.  
150 EAST 35th STREET, NEW YORK 16, N. Y.



# THE CATHOLIC WORKER

A monthly paper dedicated to the cause of labor, the poor, the oppressed.

Written in the language of the man on the street,  
THE CATHOLIC WORKER is openly and unashamedly  
the champion of the have-nots.

Articles on strikes, civil liberties, war, national policy, labor unions; the land, the Works of Mercy.

House of Hospitality in New York and affiliated  
groups and houses in various American cities.

Subscription 25c per year. Foreign 80c per year.

Bundle orders, 10 or more copies 1c per copy plus postage.

---

## THE CATHOLIC WORKER

223 Chrystie St., New York 2, N. Y.

Please send me THE CATHOLIC WORKER for ..... years.

I am enclosing \$..... My subscription starts with  
the ..... issue.

Name .....

Address .....

Post Office ..... State .....

"The most pressing duty of Christians is to live the liturgical life,  
and increase and cherish its supernatural spirit."

—Pope Pius XII

## ORATE FRATRES

Now in its 25th year of recognized leadership

The pioneer liturgical review in English. Explains the liturgy of  
the Church and offers practical suggestions for daily sharing in the  
"indispensable source of the true Christian spirit."

Published monthly

U. S. and possessions: 1 year: \$2.50; 2 years: \$4.25

Canada and foreign: 1 year: \$3.00; 2 years: \$5.25

## ORATE FRATRES

Collegeville, Minnesota

# THE COMMONWEAL

*In recent months has published the views of a wide range of contributors, including:*

**DOROTHY DAY  
HENRI DE LUBAC  
GEORGE H. DUNNE  
WALDEMAR GURIAN  
EMMET LAVERY  
COMPTON MACKENZIE  
JACQUES MARITAIN  
RAISSA MARITAIN**

**BRUCE MARSHALL  
FRANCOIS MAURIAC  
WILLIS D. NUTTING  
SEAN O'PAOLAIN  
H. A. REINHOLD  
LEO J. TRESE  
GERALD VANN  
EVELYN WAUGH**

Foreign Reports from Donald Attwater, Robert Barrat and Gunnar D. Kumlien. The Stage by Walter Kerr. The Screen by Philip T. Hartung. Regular columns by John C. Cort and Francis Dowling. The new books by outstanding reviewers.

**"No periodical in this country maintains a higher literary standard."**

**—The Christian Century.**

**Subscription \$7 a year (Sample Copy on request)**

**12 Weeks for \$1 for New Subscribers**

**THE COMMONWEAL, 386 4th Avenue, New York 16, N. N.**

## PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH

**AN INTERNATIONAL QUARTERLY**

**Official Organ of the International Phenomenological Society**

**Edited by MARVIN FARBER**

**in cooperation with a distinguished group of American and Foreign Scholars**

This publication represents no special school or sect. Its aim is to maintain philosophy in the ancient sense, as an exact, descriptive discipline, at the same time bringing it to bear on the problems of the modern world. Space is provided for contributions representing philosophical tendencies in all countries. A series of translations of Russian articles on philosophy and psychology was inaugurated in December, 1944, and is being continued. The journal's significance for the various fields of scholarship makes it of interest to a wide reading public.

**Published by the  
UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO  
BUFFALO 14, NEW YORK**

**Subscription price: Five Dollars per year**

A descriptive circular listing the main contents of each number since the journal's foundation in September, 1940, may be obtained upon request.

In Forthcoming Issues  
of  
**CROSS CURRENTS**

EDMUND HUSSERL  
SOREN KIERKEGAARD  
KARL JASPERS  
LOUIS BEIRNAERT

Philosophy as a Strict Science  
De Omnibus Dubitandum Est  
The Importance of Kierkegaard  
The Mythic Dimension of Christian  
Sacramentalism

and articles by Vladimir Solovyov, Simone Weil, Helmut  
Hatzfeld, Paul Ricoeur, Eugen Kogon, and Luigi Sturzo.

**CROSS CURRENTS**

BOX 189, NEW YORK 27, N. Y.



Copies still available of back issues

No. 3 (Spring 1951)

MAURICE BLONDEL  
D. F. MUNBY  
RICHARD LOEWENTHAL  
M. F. SCIACCA  
PIE-RAYMOND REGAMEY  
KARL RAHNER  
MARYSE CHOISY  
ARTHUR A. COHEN

The Unity of the Christian Spirit  
A Plea for Economics  
The Myth of the Nineteenth Century  
The Inner Apologetics  
Religious Art and Modern Artists  
The Church of Sinners  
Psychoanalysis and Catholicism  
Communication: The Encounter of Judaism and  
Christianity



No. 2 (Winter 1951)

ROMANO GUARDINI  
MAX PICARD  
MARTIN BUBER  
JEAN RIMAUD  
LOUS BEIRNAERT

MARCEL MORE  
KARL BARTH  
JEAN DANIELOU

Myth and the Truth of Revelation  
The Atomisation of Modern Art  
The Education of Character  
Psychologists versus Morality  
Does Sanctification depend on Psychic  
Structure?  
The two Holocausts of Scobie  
The Church Between East and West  
A Dialogue with Time

One Dollar a Copy

Three Dollars a Year



